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Social policy has been transformed in Mexico during the last two decades. Social insurance 
programmes on which welfare provision was based throughout the twentieth century have been 
retrenched and new social assistance programmes have been introduced and expanded.  
This thesis aims to reveal the redistributive potential of these social policy reforms. The research 
maps the changes in the welfare policy architecture and estimates their vertical and horizontal 
redistributive effects. The study identifies the winners and losers of the reform process, the 
specific changes in the structure of the architecture that benefited different population groups and 
characterises the welfare model that emerged from the reform process.  
The research consists on the hypothetical simulation of the effects of changes in the tax/benefit 
system. The thesis adapts the ‘model families’ method to estimate and compare the effects of 
taxes and benefits at the household level before and after the reforms.  
Findings highlight that the productivist/residual logics adopted in the design of the reforms 
neglects the welfare of families who do not qualify for social assistance, and results in minimal 
benefit levels insufficient to raise families above poverty lines. The reforms have reproduced the 
tax/benefit system’s fragmentation and the unequal levels of protection offered by the state, 
which block the formation of redistributive coalitions. The outcome is a system of low 
redistributive potential to reduce high levels of poverty and inequality.  
The thesis represents an original contribution at the empirical level, because it provides a 
comprehensive assessment of recent reforms in terms of the population segments favoured by 
them; at the methodological level, since it applies the micro-simulation logic to the study of 
social policy in the country; and at the theoretical level, because it characterises the welfare 
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Social policies constitute the main tools that modern societies have devised to fight against 
poverty and inequality. Along with fiscal policies by which the revenue to fund social benefits 
and services is raised, they represent redistributive mechanisms that allocate resources among 
different population groups. This thesis is a study of the redistributive potential of the Mexican 
tax/benefit system. 
The Mexican tax/benefit system has been deeply reformed in recent years. A series of changes 
have transformed the way the Mexican state intervenes in the field, and new programmes have 
taken social protection to groups of the population never reached before. The thesis aims to 
estimate the consequences of these changes for Mexican families and to identify these 
achievements and shortcomings. This chapter introduces the research, presents its aims and 
methods; explains its rationale, scope and expected contributions; and lays out the structure of 
the thesis. 
1.2. Social Policy in Latin America and Mexico 
The study of Latin American social policy systems is important because of their long history that 
in some cases predates their introduction in more advanced capitalist countries, because of their 
relevance for the development of political regimes and economic models since their creation, and 
because in recent decades the region has become the place where many innovations in social 
policy have been pioneered (Lavinas, 2013).  
The history of social policy in Latin America can be divided in two phases, although as will be 
explained, the second phase could in turn be divided in two parts. During the first phase, referred 
to as the development phase in this thesis, which started in the early decades of the twentieth 
century, social policy was based on stratified social insurance programmes, not unlike those of 
continental European countries. Social insurance commonly provided healthcare and income 




unemployment was less frequent, as this was considered to be offered by severance payments 
mandated in labour legislation. The main difference with European social insurance systems was 
that in most Latin American countries coverage percentages remained at low levels.   
The second phase is marked by a number of reforms that transformed the way social policy is 
organised and delivered in the region. It has been argued that never before, in no other region, 
has so much change been undertaken in the social policy field as in Latin America after the 
1990s (Barrientos, 2004). It is during this phase, referred to as the reform phase in the thesis, that 
Latin America became the social policy laboratory of the world (Lavinas, 2013). The reform 
phase can be divided in two parts. The first part was characterised by the reform of social 
insurance programmes that in many countries notably included the privatisation of pension 
systems and the introduction of systems of individual capitalisation. Other typical reforms of the 
period included the decentralisation of healthcare and education services and the flexibilisation 
of labour legislation. 
The second part of the reform phase can be characterised as the expansion period. At the end of 
the twentieth century and beginning of the present one, a number of reforms expanded social 
protection to groups of the population that had been historically neglected. During the 
development phase, coverage of social insurance programmes had been limited to urban formal 
sector workers and their families. This meant that with a few exceptions, coverage never 
surpassed more than half of the population. The expansion of social policy took social benefits 
beyond this limited group. The expansion was undertaken at different time and took different 
shapes in each country. 
Major conclusions of the research on Latin America have been that the welfare model passed 
from a corporatist type based on social insurance programmes, like the one of Continental 
European countries albeit a large informal economy, to a liberal model based with a greater 
reliance on residual programmes with a strong productivist component, more similar to the 
model of Anglo-Saxon countries, but still with the presence of a large informal economy 
(Barrientos, 2009, Barrientos, 2004). It has also been noted that whilst residual programmes have 
gained centrality, the social insurance and liberal paradigms coexist in the design of social 




Other authors have argued that actually different welfare models can be observed in the region, 
and that greater divergence can be observed in more recent years as some countries enter a post-
neoliberal phase with the state regaining importance for welfare provision (Cameron and 
Hershberg, 2010).  
The history of social policy in Mexico follows these same phases but with certain particularities. 
The main social insurance programmes were introduced in the 1940s, decades later than in other 
countries in the region, and developed at a slower pace not reaching coverage of 50 per cent of 
the population until the 1970s. Mexican social insurance was divided in programmes for waged 
private and public sector workers, the former being much larger and unified with only a few 
exceptions, and the latter being more fragmented among different categories, although with one 
core system that covered all federal and many state and municipal civil servants. These social 
insurance programmes offered basically the same benefits and services, namely healthcare, 
pensions, incapacity benefits, childcare and notably housing loans, but under distinct conditions 
and at different benefit levels (e.g. quality and amounts), administered by different government 
agencies, for different groups of workers and their families. Legal insurance was never extended 
beyond workers under a formal subordinated employment relation, which meant that the self-
employed, peasants and simply workers who did not contribute to the system because their 
employers avoided the payment of contributions, among others, would never be entitled to social 
protection. Little was offered to families not covered by social insurance, apart from education, 
which did achieve coverage of 100 per cent of children in primary school age by the 1970s, and 
limited healthcare services. 
The reform phase began with the government that took office in 1994. In Mexico, the reform of 
social insurance and the expansion of social assistance would be carried out simultaneously. By 
that year several Latin American countries had already reformed their social insurance pension 
systems. This was the first reform that was undertaken in Mexico, approved by Congress in 1995 
but enacted in 1997. The social insurance pension system for private sector employees was 
privatised and the pay-as-you-go system was replaced by a system of individual capitalisation. 
Additionally, the insurance architecture was rearranged and contribution structures were 




At the same time that the first social insurance reforms were enacted, the creation of the 
Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition or Progresa represented the beginning of the 
expansion wave of social protection to groups of the population not covered by social insurance 
programmes. The Progresa programme paid cash transfers to poor families conditional on 
attendance at health checkups by all their members and on school attendance of children. The 
name of the programme was later changed to Oportunidades. This type of programmes that 
spread rapidly throughout Latin America came to be known as conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs); the Mexican programme was the first of its kind to be implemented at the national level, 
since a similar programme in Brazil had already been implemented at the local level (Borges 
Sugiyama, 2011). CCTs and social insurance pension reforms represented two social policy 
innovations that would be imitated by countries in many other regions of the world. In Mexico, 
the expansion of social protection would continue later on with more social assistance 
programmes for population with no social insurance coverage.  
Income tax legislation has also been reformed recently, albeit the most important reform was 
introduced a few years before the first social policy reforms were adopted. A new income tax 
law was enacted in the early 1980s and the top marginal rate was reduced from 60 to 35 per cent 
(Elizondo, 1994). Rates have been modified in several occasions since then, but the top rate has 
always remained below that 35 per cent. 
All these institutional and policy changes in Mexico were undertaken in the context of the 
processes of economic and political liberalisation that began in the 1980s. From the 1930s until 
the 1980s the country country’s political regime was called a hegemonic party regime, because 
even if elections were held systematically for all political posts, one party occupied a hegemonic 
position, overwhelmingly controlled all political and economic resources and virtually won every 
election. The economic model was based on the Import-Substitution Industrialisation strategy, 
which aimed to promote domestic markets by closing the economy and establishing high tariffs 
on imports, and a central role assigned to the state on economic planning. 
A severe economic crisis affected the country in 1982 and led to the dismissal of the ISI model 
and the liberalisation of the economy. At the same time, pressures for greater democratisation 




party lost control of Congress for the first time in 70 years and in 2000 an opposition candidate 
won the presidential elections. It was in the context of these changes that the transformation of 
the Mexican social protection architecture was carried out.On Mexican social policy, it has been 
argued that it has historically had lower level of development than Southern Cone countries, e.g. 
Chile and Uruguay (Mesa-Lago, 2000, Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002); that along with Brazil, it 
can be distinguished from those countries because of the presence of a large informal economy 
(Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002, Filgueira, 1998); and that, like Barrientos argued for the entire 
region, in recent decades it has passed from a corporatist to a liberal type of residual features and 
increasing centrality of market arrangements for welfare provision (Dion, 2009, Dion, 2010, 
Bayón, 2009). 
The work of Scott (2013) is relevant for the study of redistribution. This author has carried out 
several studies since 2006 to estimate the redistributive effects of taxes and social spending 
across income levels. His findings have shown that the system is redistributive towards low 
income population; in 2010 cash benefits generated net gains after the payment of taxes for the 
first three income deciles. On the study of redistribution at the household level, Absalon and 
Urzua (2011) have started a project to model redistributive effects of taxes and benefits using 
data from the 2008 national income and expenditure survey. Results were not available at the 
moment of conducting the data analysis for this thesis; one challenge that these researchers faced 
was the lack of variables on several social programmes. 
The current literature on the Mexican social policy reforms has not identified the changes in the 
redistributive effects of social policy reforms across families of different composition and labour 
market attachment. However, the estimation of those effects is considered necessary given the 
great changes that have transformed welfare provision, but reproduced the fragmented nature of 
the country’s social policy protection system. This thesis aims to fill this gap.    
1.3. Thesis Aims, Methods and Scope 
This section provides an overview of the thesis. The research seeks to contribute to the literature 




system at different points in time. The ultimate goal is to identify successes and shortcomings of 
recent policy changes in addressing some of the country’s main social problems.   
1.3.1. Aims and Research Questions 
This is a thesis of the redistributive potential of recent social policy reforms in Mexico. As 
explained above, after a long period that covered most of the twentieth century when social 
policy was based on social insurance programmes, a number of reforms that started in the mid-
1990s have transformed the policy architecture. The initial phase began in the 1940s with the 
introduction of stratified healthcare and income maintenance programmes that limited their 
scope to workers in formal employment and their families. During the 1990s, in the context of 
intense economic and political liberalisation processes, the reforms transformed how social 
policy is delivered in the country. 
The reforms have consisted in the retrenchment of the traditional social insurance programmes 
and the introduction and expansion of social assistance programmes. At the same time, a series 
of fiscal reforms have modified the way in which families contribute to fund public policies. The 
thesis aims to explore and estimate what have been the consequences of these reform processes 
for the welfare of Mexican families. 
The main objective is to establish how the reforms have modified the redistributive potential of 
the Mexican tax/benefit system. The research is considered necessary to identify the 
achievements and failures of the changes in the design of public policy adopted in the country 
during the recent decades. The study will reveal who benefits from social policies and to what 
extent, considering how much they contribute for the funding of those policies, and what is the 
potential of the tax/benefit system to redistribute income towards the population that requires 
support to emerge from or avoid falling into poverty. The ultimate goal is to make not only an 
original contribution to academic knowledge but to also contribute with evidence-based analysis 
to the public debate on social policy in Mexico. 
The main research question of the thesis is the following: 
 ‘How did the fiscal and social policy reforms undertaken in Mexico between 1994 and 




There are three sub-questions as well:  
 How were the changes in the system’s rules expected to benefit or affect households 
from different sectors of the population?  
 How were changes or continuities in the redistributive potential of the tax/benefit system 
obtained?  
 How can the emerging architecture of the tax/benefit system be characterised? 
The study compares the vertical and horizontal redistributive potential before and after the 
reforms. Vertical redistribution refers to how the state redistributes income across income levels. 
Horizontal redistribution refers to how the state redistributes income among population groups, 
and in the case of the present thesis, would correspond to the redistribution that occurs as a 
consequence of state action, between families of different composition and employment profiles.  
1.3.2. Research Methods 
The thesis will uncover the redistributive potential of the changes in the system introduced 
between 1994 and 2012, in terms of the net income of different types of families after the 
amounts they should pay in taxes and receive in benefits according to the system’s rules. By 
comparing the net gains that each family type would be expected to obtain in each year, the 
research reveals which types were favoured or affected by the policy changes and to what 
degree, which specific changes affected or benefited each type of family and finally how have 
the changes and their redistributive features reconfigured the country’s welfare model. 
The research is based on using an adaptation of the ‘model families’ approach (Bradshaw, 1994, 
Bradshaw and Tokoro, 2014, Eardly et al., 1996, Marx and Nelson, 2013). This technique has 
been extensively utilised for social policy cross national research for more than three decades. In 
this thesis it is adapted to compare two moments in time within the same country. ‘Model 
families’ consists on the hypothetical simulation of taxes and benefits on family types to estimate 
their redistributive potential. Family types are meant to be illustrative of the population. The 
advantages of the approach are that it enhances the extent in which like is compared with like, it 
allows for comparisons when empirical data is non-existent and it reflects the outputs of the 




By applying ‘model families’, the thesis will produce a picture of how the Mexican tax/benefit 
system functions according to its rules, in order to find out which population groups has public 
policy intended to favour, and in which way, during the last 18 years. The research will not 
estimate the effects of the implementation of public policy, which in a country like Mexico can 
be affected by several factors, among them limited institutional capacity and high levels of 
clientelism; the study will rather focus on the redistributive features of social and fiscal policy 
outputs as reformers have designed them. 
The ‘model families’, or family types as they are also referred to in the thesis, were selected 
according to three dimensions that determine the types and amounts of taxes that families pay 
and the benefits and services they are entitled to receive from the state. These dimensions are 
income level, family composition and the employment status of the families’ earners. This last 
dimension is referred to in the thesis as the employment profile of the family type. The study 
includes income levels set in original earnings expressed in the number of times of the legal 
minimum wage, from one to 25, the latter because it is the maximum amount at which social 
insurance contributions are paid and some benefits calculated. Family composition refers to the 
number and age of household members, and included childless couples, couples with children of 
different age and households of pensioners; all compositions are assumed to have only one 
earner, because the Mexican tax/benefit system is individualised, with no special conditions for 
dual earner families. Employment profiles refer to the labour market segments in which the 
breadwinners are inserted. There are four profiles relevant for estimating taxes and benefits: 
employed as a waged worker in the formal private economy, employed in the public sector, self-
employed in the formal economy, employed or self-employed in the informal economy.  
The Mexican legislation and policy rules determine the taxes that a family should pay and the 
benefits that it would receive according to the three selected dimensions with one exception. 
Among employment profiles, people employed or self-employed in the informal economy would 
corresponds to a segment created de facto, not de jure. This segment exists because either 
workers either avoid paying taxes or find themselves being employed by an employer who 
avoids them. This group is considered as a separate segment in the study because they would still 
be entitled to benefits from the state, and because in practice they constitute more than half of the 




thesis because by 2012 no federal programme existed to offer income support or maintenance to 
that group.  
1.3.3. Research Rationale, Scope and Expected Contributions 
The study of social policy in Latin America is still relatively underdeveloped compared to the 
amount of attention the field has received in other parts of the world. Despite the fact that the 
region’s social protection systems have a long history, that some Latin American countries 
introduced welfare policies before some advanced capitalist countries, that today most countries 
possess fairly comprehensive welfare systems, and that the region has served as the experiment 
ground for policy innovations that have been imitated around the globe, several authors have 
noted that there still is a lack of sufficient research on the development, outputs and outcomes of 
social policies in Latin America (Dion, 2009, Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, Lavinas, 2013). 
The relevance of the study of social policy in Latin America is highlighted by the great amount 
of changes that the fairly well-developed social protection systems have experienced during the 
last three decades. As has been noted, when it comes to welfare, nowhere else has so much 
change been carried out as in Latin America during this period (Barrientos, 2004). The primary 
decision to undertake this thesis stems from the will to complement the existing literature on the 
effects of social policy changes in Latin America. 
Research on Latin American systems of taxes and benefits is still in the development stage 
(Absalon and Urzua, 2011). Taxes and benefits represent the tools that governments have at their 
disposal to redistributive income, and therefore to fight against poverty, inequality and the many 
social problems that come with them. The design of tax/benefit systems has direct consequences 
on the well-being of families, with a straight impact on their income. Not all fiscal and social 
policies have redistributive intentions but they all have redistributive consequences, and they all 
have an impact on the levels of support that the state offers to families and on the welfare of the 
population. 
The design of taxes and benefits shapes the levels of poverty and inequality that prevail in a 




understand how have the many changes implemented in recent decades impacted families and 
improved or worsened the region’s historic social problems. 
The case of Mexico has been selected to conduct the study for three main reasons. First, because 
of the historic importance of the social protection system for the country’s development. Mexico 
is the second largest of the region and its size is reflected on the dimension of its social 
protection system. If the allegedly covered population by all its various components is added up 
(e.g. IMSS, ISSSTE, Oportunidades, Popular Health Insurance), the Mexican welfare system 
could be one of the largest in the world. Even if the social insurance system for private sector 
workers (IMSS) covers only half of total population, which amounts to approximately 50 million 
people, it would still be larger than most European social insurance systems. Given the size of 
the social protection system, it is considered necessary to further investigate its effects on the 
welfare of the population.  
Secondly, because of the great changes that have transformed the way the state organises welfare 
provision. Some of these changes in fact represent innovations that have been imitated in many 
countries of Latin American and beyond. It is therefore considered important to investigate the 
effects of these changes not only to assess the Mexican reforms, but also to offer a guide on the 
design of social programmes and their expected redistributive effects for countries that attempt 
similar reforms. 
Thirdly, because of the high levels of poverty and inequality that affect the country. It is 
considered that a better understanding of how the social protection system has been functioning 
is needed to discern the reasons behind the persistent high levels of poverty in the country. The 
analysis of the architecture of the tax/benefit system is necessary to reveal its failures and 
achievements and to identify areas of opportunities where the system can be improved to 
enhance its potential to fight poverty and inequality. 
The scope of the study are policies implemented at the national level, which is the federal level. 
Mexico is a federal country and local governments, whether state or municipal, have the faculty 
to introduce and administer some taxes and social benefits. Although the activity of state and 
municipal governments has been increasing in recent decades, federal policies have the strongest 




of public spending. All social insurance and the main social assistance programmes in the 
country are administered by the federal government, although social insurance programmes also 
include in their administration labour and employer representatives. 
The social programmes covered in the study are those delivered to the population as a right 
established in the federal government’s normative framework, either as social insurance or social 
assistance programmes, within five policy areas: healthcare, pensions, work, family benefits and 
housing. These are the areas commonly associated with social protection. Education is the only 
service in the country that is universal, and although sometimes it is not linked to the study of 
social policy, in Mexico it is commonly included and it was considered important for this thesis 
because of the introduction of tax deductions on private education spending. In housing, several 
programmes offer subsidies to low income population; the largest one was chosen for the study. 
On the side of taxes, the thesis includes all social insurance contributions and direct taxes that 
families should pay at the federal level according to the legislation.  
It is also important that the main interest in embarking in this project is to study the reforms of 
social policies. Fiscal policy is included to estimate the redistributive potential of social policies 
and because income tax, social security contributions and tax allowances and deductions can 
play an important welfare role (Howard, 1999, Bradshaw et al., 1993).  That is the reason why in 
the theoretical framework and literature review, the emphasis will be placed on social policy. By 
incorporating fiscal policy in the data analysis, the thesis will generate a comprehensive picture 
of the social protection assembly that the last three governments have mounted.  
The thesis analyses the reforms implemented between 1994 and 2012. Before 1994 the 
development of social protection in Mexico system great continuity. Social policy reforms were 
not adopted even in the 1980s when economic structural adjustment programmes were 
introduced amidst the debt crisis. It would be until the 1994-2000 government that the 
transformation of social policy began. The final year of the study is 2012, the last year of the 
2006-2012 government and also the last year available for the data analysis.   
The thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on social policy in Mexico by identifying its 
redistributive potential at the vertical and horizontal levels at the household level. It will 




by investigating the redistributive effects across families of different structure, i.e. number and 
age of members, and labour market attachment of the earner(s), which determines the eligibility 
to different kinds of social programmes. The current literature does not identify redistribution 
across these dimensions. The study will also make a contribution by assessing the entire reform 
process, from the year before the reforms began until the final year available. No current studies 
on redistribution in Mexico cover this period. This thesis will provide a better understanding of 
the potential effects of policy changes on the population, and can serve as a platform from which 
the effects of future proposals of changes can be estimated 
The thesis also seeks to make a contribution at the methodological level, by applying the micro-
simulation logic to the study of social policy in Mexico. As commented in the previous section, a 
micro-simulation model of taxes and benefits was being developed at the same time of this 
thesis. This thesis represents a first approximation to the redistributive features of the Mexican 
tax/benefit system.  
A third contribution is the identification of the main features of the welfare model that has 
emerged from the reform process. The literature points out that a residual model has been 
introduced in Mexico, with the retrenchment of social insurance and the expansion of social 
assistance programmes. By calculating the potential effects of the tax/benefit system at the 
household level, this thesis seeks to identify additional features of the social protection model 
that the policy changes have shaped. 
In sum, this thesis constitutes a study of the redistributive potential of fiscal and social policy 
changes introduced in Mexico between 1994 and 2012. The research will consist in the 
hypothetical simulation of the effects of taxes and benefits on different family models illustrative 
of the whole population. The main objective is to estimate how the changes have altered the 
redistributive potential of the tax/benefit system. The method that will be adopted is the model 
families approach, described in the next section. 
1.4. Thesis Overview 
The rest of the thesis is divided in seven chapters. Chapter 2 starts with a review of some of the 




of recent reforms. The three main types of social programmes - social assistance, social 
insurance and universal programmes - are defined and their major redistributive implications are 
explained. Emphasis is put on the concept of the ‘paradox of redistribution’, which argues that 
whilst only social assistance programmes are explicitly redistributive, social insurance and 
universal programmes can also hold a strong redistributive potential because of the support they 
can gather. Two theoretical approaches of recent social policy changes relevant for the study of 
Mexican case are also discussed, retrenchment that has led to the enhancement of the residual 
component of social policy systems and the productivist turn that social policies have taken to 
enable the incorporation of people into labour markets.  
The second part of chapter 2 begins by describing the evolution of the Mexican social policy 
system, which is divided in two phases. All the main social policy areas are covered in the 
narrative. The first phase corresponds to the corporatist or development phase, when social 
policy was based on social insurance programmes in the context of the hegemonic party regime 
and the industrialisation through import-substitution (ISI) economic strategy. The second phase 
corresponds to the reform stage, when social insurance was reformed and social assistance was 
expanded, in the context of greater democratisation and an open economy. This part also reviews 
the current literature on the characterisation of the reforms, their main drivers and redistributive 
effects. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the methodological approach and details how the research objectives and 
questions will be empirically investigated. The chapter begins by listing the research objectives 
and questions and the expected contributions of the study. The chapter continues by discussing 
the ‘model families’ approach and its main advantages and limitations, and the selection of the 
family types for this study. The final part of the chapter describes the research design, specifies 
the policy areas and programmes, and offers a comparison of the policy architectures before and 
after the reforms.  
The next three chapters present the results of the data analysis. The effects of taxes and benefits 
architectures on disposable income are described and compared for the years 1994 and 2012. 
Chapter 4 shows the effects of taxes on the disposable income of family models. Three types of 




contribution structures for private sector and public sector workers. Income taxes are the second 
type, and are divided in tax schedules for waged and non-waged workers. ‘Popular Health 
Insurance’ contributions represent the third type, this programme was introduced in 2002 to offer 
healthcare to families not covered by social insurance. 
Chapter 5 presents the effects of cash benefits on disposable income. Three types of cash benefits 
are included in the study. First, sickness, work injuries and maternity benefits paid by the social 
insurance system. Secondly, family cash benefits, which are delivered by the Oportunidades 
programme. Third, social insurance and social assistance old-age pensions. This chapter 
concludes with a comparison of the levels of cash disposable income for different family types 
before and after the reforms. 
Chapter 6 starts by presenting the calculations of the value of benefits in-kind, which are 
healthcare, childcare and education. The first two are delivered as both social insurance and 
social assistance programmes; education is the only universal programme in the country. Values 
are estimated on the basis of per capita spending in each programme, and are added to disposable 
income in order to obtain the final income after taxes and benefits for each family type. The 
chapter continues with the calculations of levels of private welfare spending, which were used to 
estimate income tax deductions. The third section of the chapter reviews changes in housing 
programmes for families with and without social insurance coverage. The chapter concludes with 
a summary of the calculations, comparting the potential effects on original income before and 
after benefits in-kind. 
Chapter 7 discusses the research’s main findings. Three points are highlighted. First, that the 
reforms increased levels of vertical redistribution, but centred on low income population with no 




women in work1. The second point refers to the rationale that propelled the reforms. The 
redistributive features of the reforms revealed a combination of a productivist, or ‘social 
investment’, logic that prioritises the market as the principal mechanism through which families 
can overcome poverty, and a residual logic, that targets benefits exclusively on the extreme poor, 
excluding large sectors of the population who still require support but are not poor enough to 
qualify for social assistance programmes. The third point that is highlighted is the fragmented 
nature of the system’s expansion. The reforms have created a fragmented system that reinforces 
the country’s inequality, but allows the expansion of social protection required in a context of a 
pluralist democracy. The chapter finalises with a characterisation of the welfare model, referred 
to as ‘neoliberal’, because the reforms have shaped a social protection system that complements 
the ‘neoliberal’ economic strategy of low labour costs to enhance the country’s competitiveness. 
The last chapter wraps up the thesis. It begins by offering the answer to the four research 
questions, explaining that whilst the reforms raised levels of redistribution, they mostly benefited 
families with earners in precarious employment because the expansion was based on 
productivist/residual social assistance programmes, and characterising the main features of the 
‘neoliberal’ welfare model that has been consolidated in the country. The chapter continues by 
describing the research’s main contributions and policy implications, and finalises with a brief 
depiction of reforms introduced after 2012 and an exploration of avenues for future research. 
1.5. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has laid out the thesis topics, its objectives, questions, scope and rationale. The 
ultimate goal is to provide elements for the discussion on tax and social policy changes in 
Mexico and Latin America. Whilst findings do not generate the effects of the final 
implementation of taxes and benefits, they do reveal the potential redistributive intentions of the 
                                                 
1 The Mexican system does not consider any benefits specifically tailored for lone parents. Households headed by 
lone parents can only receive benefits as long as the parents are in formal employment, in which case they would be 
covered by social insurance, or if they pass the means-tests that any other household would have to pass to be 
eligible to social assistance. The system provides benefits to women only as long as they are working, with no 
difference being made between lone mothers and other women, hence the term ‘women in work’ used throughout 




transformation of the policy architecture, and identify the major shortcomings that explain the 
failure of social policy to reduce poverty and inequality in recent years. 
During recent years, social policy has been expanded in virtually all Latin America, but the study 
of the Mexican case is especially relevant because contrary to other countries in the region, 
poverty and inequality have not decreased. It is important to obtain a better understanding of the 
effects of how social policy changes were designed, in order to offer alternatives for 
improvement, especially in the face of the rapid socio-demographic changes that Mexican 





2. Social Policy, Redistribution and Recent Reforms 
2.1. Introduction 
Redistribution is one of the central issues in social policy. States redistribute income by 
collecting taxes and spending the resources on welfare benefits and services, but different types 
of social programmes seek distinct types of redistribution. This chapter introduces the main 
theoretical concepts around social policy, redistribution and the logics that have shaped recent 
social policy changes around the world.  
The chapter is divided in five sections. The next section defines some main concepts around 
social policy and welfare state models. The third section briefly defines the concept of policy 
architectures. The following section describes the redistributive aims that social policies may 
pursue and analyses the redistributive implications of different types of social programmes. The 
fifth section outlines recent policy changes shaped by the residual and social investment logics 
adopted across regions.    
2.2. Social Policy, Social Programmes and Redistribution 
Social policy as a policy field can be defined in several ways. Alcock (2003) defines it as the 
public policies that contribute or hinder the wellbeing or welfare of individuals or groups.  Dean 
(2012) also refers to the government policies that may bear upon human wellbeing. Beland 
(2010, p. 19) argues for a broader concept defined by the specific aims that social policies may 
pursue, hence for this author the term refers to the programmes that ‘…aim to support the poor, 
fight inequality and promote citizenship solidarity, reduce market dependency… and/or protect 
workers and their families against specific economic risks’. 
Social programmes can be classified in different ways. Two ways are to distinguish between 
programmes that have publicly or privately provided benefits, and between programmes that 
deliver cash benefits and programmes that provide in-kind services. An additional classification 
is based on the programmes’ sources of funding, eligibility criteria and the approaches to setting 




social programme can combine elements of more than one of these types (Beland, 2010, Gilbert, 
2002, Palier, 2010).  
 Social assistance programmes, funded by general taxes, consisting of income or means-
tested benefits targeted at poor population or specific disadvantaged groups, with flat-rate 
benefit levels set on the basis of need, with the primordial aim of combating poverty. 
 Social insurance programmes, funded by social contributions also known as payroll taxes 
paid by employers and workers, in many cases complemented by governments with 
general taxes, cover workers who pay of have paid contributions and usually also their 
families; entitlement to benefits and benefit levels then depend on the worker’s record of 
earnings and contributions; the main objective is to replace income in the highest degree 
possible during the periods when workers find themselves out of paid employment and 
maintain their living standards.  
 Universal programmes, funded by general taxes, offering coverage as a social right 
without income, means or contribution tests, to all or a specific group of citizens or 
residents; usually benefits are set at the same level of the whole covered population; the 
principal aim beyond poverty reduction is to achieve high degrees of equality and social 
cohesion.  
Policy areas considered to be part of the social policy field can also vary according to different 
approaches. Beland (2010) describes five main policy areas shown in table 1 along with some 
possible objectives; this author does not include education with the argument that although it is a 
form of social policy and it constitutes an important area of any country’s welfare state, it 
represents a distinct field of study and as a policy area requires other analytical tools. Hill (2003) 
and Dean (2012), on the other side, do include education because of its fundamental implication 
for the welfare of the population, along with social security, employment policy, health, personal 






Table 1. Social Policy Areas and Objectives 
Policy Area Possible Objectives 
Work, unemployment and welfare Income support and services to workers temporarily out of work or with low 
earnings. 
Pensions Income support for the elderly, disabled or the dependents of a deceased 
worker. 
Healthcare Access to medical services and/or insurance. 
Housing Help to purchase a home or pay for the rent of one. 
Family benefits Services related to child welfare, gender equality and education. 
Source: Adapted from Beland (2010) 
As for the concept of welfare state, its definition and use also varies according to different 
authors. For Beland (2010) the term refers to the group of social programmes in any given 
country. For Therborn a country could only have a welfare state when social spending surpasses 
all other spending branches (Castles, 2006) and for the case of Latin America, Filgueira (2002, 
2005) argues that the concept cannot be applied to the region because social policies are not as 
developed in terms of spending and coverage levels as in Western Europe. In this thesis it is 
Beland’s definition the one that is adopted; the terms welfare state and social policy system are 
used alternatively, along with social protection.  
Esping-Andersen, parting from the work of Titmuss, developed a typology of welfare state 
models highly influential on the social policy literature. The typology consists of three distinct 
welfare models (Palier, 2010, Dean, 2012, Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). This work was based 
on cross-national research carried out for the mature welfare states of core capitalist countries, 
but as is explained below, has also been applied to Latin America (Barrientos, 2009, 2004, Dean, 
2012). The models and their main features are the following (Palier, 2010, Dean, 2012, Esping-
Andersen, 1990, Esping-Andersen, 1999):  
 The liberal or residual model, based on social assistance programmes that target the poor, 
with minimum benefit levels and an emphasis on market arrangements for the allocation 




services, and where the emphasis is put on the combat of poverty. This model would be 
typical of the Anglophone countries of Northern Europe and North America. 
 The conservative-corporatist model, also known as ‘bismarckian’ based on social 
insurance, with earnings-related benefits and fragmented programmes along different 
occupational lines, where the objective seems to be not so much the reduction of poverty 
and inequality but the preservation of income status. This model is typical of Continental 
European welfare state; it is important to note that social insurance in those countries was 
expanded to achieve universal or quasi universal coverage. This was also the model on 
which Latin American countries based the original design of their social policies, 
although with few exceptions, coverage levels remained at much lower levels.  
 The social democratic model, based on universal programmes with similar levels of 
generous benefits offered to the whole population, with extensive state intervention and 
the main objectives of enhancing equality, social cohesion and homogeneity. 
Scandinavian countries are seen as the ones that have based their social policies on this 
model. 
Esping-Andersen’s original work was criticised on several grounds, notably on the neglect of the 
role of the family as welfare provider and on the existence of additional models for different 
groups of countries (Powell and Barrientos, 2011). Of particular relevance for the study of Latin 
American social policy is the case presented by several authors for the development of a fourth 
model in Southern European countries (Ferrera, 1996, 2005, Castles and Ferrera, 1996). 
Nonetheless, this typology has served as the starting point of welfare state research during the 
last two decades (Beland, 2010, Dean, 2012). Another important point to note is that welfare 
models are not found in pure form and in reality a country’s social policy system can mix 
elements of more than one model, however, research has shown that different groups of countries 






2.3. Policy Architectures   
The concept of policy architectures could be useful for the study of social policy outputs and 
outcomes. Martinez Franzoni and Sanchez Ancochea (2014) roughly define it as the combination 
of instruments that establish the eligibility criteria, funding, benefits and provision of a social 
programme. The architecture constitutes the blueprint of the programme, in other words, it shows 
how the programme was built.  
The policy architecture determines the output and outcomes of a programme or a set of 
programmes. The blueprint creates constrains and opportunities that will define who gets what 
from social policy. If a programme’s architecture lacks the potential to redistribute income in a 
fair and egalitarian manner, no implementation effort will produce different results.    
2.4. Social Policy and Redistribution   
Redistribution is at the core of the study of social policy. Welfare states are assumed to be 
redistributive mechanisms that aim to improve the economic well-being of a group of or of the 
whole population. It is by collecting resources through tax systems and reallocating them through 
social policies that governments aim to raise the living conditions of some or all citizens. The 
redistributive effects or welfare states reflect a country’s social values and political and power 
structures. The purpose of this section is to critically discuss the literature on redistribution and 
the challenges associated with capturing the redistributive effects of social policies empirically 
(Alcock et al., 2003, Dean, 2012, Stiglitz, 2000). 
2.4.1. Types of Redistribution 
Although social policy is usually thought of as seeking redistribution from the rich to the poor, 
this is not always the case. Redistributive objectives and outcomes vary according to the specific 
features of social programmes and their funding arrangements. The case may even exist when 
the redistributive effects of a social programme are not progressive but rather end up transferring 
income from the bottom to the top of the income scale. The type of evaluation that should be 
carried out to identify a programme’s results can also vary depending on the type of 
redistribution that is sought. Hills (2003) outlines eight redistributive aims that social policies 




 Vertical redistribution. The aim is to redistribute income from high to low income levels. 
The evaluation of the levels of this type of redistribution should focus on the 
identification of the net gainers and net losers after the payment of the taxes that fund the 
welfare programmes. 
 Horizontal redistribution on the basis of needs. The aim is to redistribute income among 
people of similar income levels but particular needs, for example, redistribution through 
public healthcare systems towards people who are in need of medical care. 
 Redistribution between different groups. Refers to redistribution between groups defined 
in a different way than by income level to offset other type of inequalities or to address 
discriminatory practices, for example, redistribution among different social classes, 
ethnic, age or gender groups. 
 Insurance. Type of redistribution sought by programmes that protect people against 
economic risks through the pooling of resources. The evaluation is carried out in actuarial 
terms, that is, the probability of people incurring in the covered risks. 
 Efficiency justifications. Programmes that are universal, compulsory and public might be 
adopted because they are thought to be cheaper than other forms of welfare provision, 
without special concerns for income redistribution. These programmes could be 
evaluated in relation to what would be the effect if the services or benefits were to be 
provided by the market (or other types of welfare programmes). 
 Life cycle smoothing. Given that some welfare programmes benefit people during 
specific cycles of their lives, e.g. elderly pensions, but are funded by generation in 
another life cycle, e.g. working age people, redistribution does not occur from one person 
or group to another, but rather across the person’s own life cycle, like a savings account 
in which people deposit whilst they are working and draw out when it is required. The 
evaluation of this type of effect should be based on the comparison of the total amounts 
that people put into the system and withdraw throughout their lives.    
 Compensating for ‘family failure’. Refers to programmes that seek to tackle inequalities 
within families due to the unequal sharing of resources among their members, for 
example, when one of the parents in a divorced couple fails to pay child support. 
Evaluation should be carried out in the same terms, namely estimating the redistributive 




 External benefits. Refers to programmes that are justified by their effects beyond the 
direct beneficiary. An example could be old-age pensions that also benefit other family 
members, not only the pensioner. Certain evaluations could centre on evaluating these 
kinds of effects. 
 
2.4.2. Challenges in Assessing Redistribution 
Hills (2003) also comments on seven conceptual issues that should be taken into account when 
studying redistribution and social policies. The first one is the ‘counter-factual’, that is, what 
would be the effects on taxation levels, on other welfare programmes or on the overall economy 
if the studied welfare programme(s) was (were) not there; however he admits that it is quite 
difficult to assess this empirically. Next issue is the ‘incidence’ of the programme(s), namely, the 
identification of the real beneficiaries of a programme, since policies may benefit other people 
besides those who could seem to be the intended beneficiaries. The third issue refers to the 
‘valuation’ of benefits and services, which represents less challenges when analysing cash 
benefits, as they already have a monetary value, but carries certain difficulties  when it comes to 
analysing in-kind services, since the cash value has to be estimated. He comments that the latter 
is usually done by taking the cost of providing the service for the state, although questions of 
variations in how much a service cost and how much recipients value it may arise.  
A fourth issue described by Hills (2003) is the definition of the groups among which 
redistribution is going to be studied, because the assumptions that must be made for the selection 
process will affect the results; an crucial step at this point is the choice of the unit of analysis, 
e.g. households or individuals, and its features. Another issue is the definition of the concept that 
will be examined, in other words, the distribution of what will be studied? For example, will it be 
gross public spending before taxes or net public spending after taxes; at this point the relevance 
of including the payment of taxes is highlighted to properly identify the redistributive effects of a 
programme. The last two refer to the time period, since different periods will produce different 
results; and problems with the availability of the data, since data may not exist for the time 




An important issue to consider when analysing tax structures are the tax deductions that a system 
allows for expenditures on private social services. These allowances hide subsidies for private 
sector provision of welfare benefits and can overly benefit groups of society that tend to 
purchase those types of services (Howard, 1999).  
2.4.3. Redistribution and Different Social Programmes 
Redistributive goals vary among the different types of social programmes. Social assistance 
programmes aim to reduce poverty and inequality by targeting poor or disadvantaged groups by 
applying income or means-tests. Since funding for the programmes comes from general taxation 
paid by the whole population, these programmes are thought of as being explicitly redistributive, 
usually viewed as foremost seeking vertical redistribution, since their logic is that wealthy 
taxpayers who do not receive benefits fund the benefits and services provided to the poor who 
may contribute less or not contribute at all because of their condition of poverty  (Beland, 2010, 
Dean, 2012). Nonetheless, horizontal redistribution based on need or aimed at offsetting 
inequalities generated by other sources than income can occur by targeting specific groups of 
society, e.g. family allowances for lone mothers. 
Social insurance programmes have as their primary aim to maintain income levels throughout 
people’s lives (Palier, 2010), hence are seen as seeking foremost redistribution across the life 
cycle of the individual. These programmes operate in similar way to a savings account, where by 
contributing to a fund during their active working years, people can protect themselves against 
certain risks and receive benefits when required, like in old-age when a pension would be 
granted or during unemployment spells. However, social insurance is also about risk pooling and 
depending on their design, these programmes can also contain strong vertical and horizontal 
redistributive elements (Dean, 2012, Beland, 2010). Examples of vertical redistribution can be 
found in the design of the structure of contributions. Social insurance contributions may be set 
progressively so that high income workers contribute a larger share of their wages. Another 
example can be found in pension systems, where pensions are paid from the resources pooled 
together by active workers and low income workers may eventually receive more than what they 
contribute. An example of redistribution on the basis of needs can be the provision of health 




Universal programmes are usually not associated with vertical redistribution, since income is not 
a variable to establish eligibility or benefit levels and all citizens or residents in a group would 
tend to receive similar benefit levels. These programmes are usually justified in terms of the 
promotion of social solidarity, the avoidance of creating disincentives to work or increase 
income because of the loss of eligibility as in social assistance, or efficiency concerns since even 
if spending may be higher at the end it could result more expensive to apply income or assets 
tests like in social assistance programmes. Nonetheless, horizontal redistribution towards specific 
socio-demographic groups or based on needs does occur, as in the case of universal old-age 
pensions or healthcare systems (Gilbert, 2002, Beland, 2010), apart from the fact that eventually 
these programmes can lead to higher levels of redistributions than other types which are 
explicitly redistributive, as the next section explains. 
On the redistributive potential of social assistance programmes, Dean (2012) points out that even 
if the principal aims of these programmes are to fight poverty and inequality, such outcomes 
might not be achieved if benefit levels are too low or the tax system is not sufficiently 
progressive. Hence social policy systems of the liberal type which are based on social assistance 
might actually have a low redistributive potential and eventually a limited impact on reducing 
poverty and inequality . Beland (2010) comments on the risk that middle and high income groups 
show reluctance on paying taxes to fund social programmes that benefit the poor, especially 
depending on whether the beneficiaries are judged as being ‘deserving´ or ‘undeserving’ poor. 
This risk might make social assistance programmes politically vulnerable and compromise their 
funding. Korpi and Palme (1998) carried out seminal research on this topic. 
Korpi and Palme (1998) studied the relation between the institutional design of welfare states 
and their redistributive potential and outcomes. Based on empirical work carried out on mature 
welfare states, they concluded that, contrary to the objectives explicitly sought, social policy 
systems based on targeted social assistance programmes with means-tested flat-rate benefits, 
actually had a lower impact on reducing poverty and inequality levels than other types of 
systems. The reasons found by the authors for such outcomes were that the overall levels of 
social spending in each country depended on the institutional design of the social policy system 
and that an inverse relation existed between the degree of targeting used by welfare states and the 




country spent in total on social policy. The authors finally found that the countries that were 
basing their welfare state on targeted social assistance programmes and hence presented lower 
levels of social spending, had a worse record in reducing poverty and inequality. The reason was 
that redistribution was ultimately left to market arrangements which tend to be highly unequal. 
This phenomenon was called ´the paradox of redistribution’, because the more benefits are 
targeted at the poor and the more there is a concern with creating equality via public transfers to 
all, the less likely significant reductions of poverty and inequality will be achieved. 
On the other hand, the authors found that welfare states based on social insurance programmes 
with earnings-related benefits had a better record in reducing poverty and inequality. This was 
especially true for countries with integrated insurance programmes and less for corporatist 
welfare states that have different occupational schemes, since in the latter the systems end up 
highlighting socioeconomic distinctions and generating divergent interests. Earnings-related 
benefits made the system attractive to middle-class citizens, who would feel compelled to accept 
higher levels of taxation and contribute to fund it because they would also be benefited, hence 
increasing the resources available for further redistribution. The opposite was the case of targeted 
means-tested programmes which incentivised the exit of the middle classes and pushed them to 
purchase welfare protection in the private sector. 
Hence, it is the type of institutional structure of the welfare state, Korpi and Palme (1998) 
argued, one of the main factors that explain redistributive outcomes. Welfare states with 
predominant social assistance programmes end up entrenching divisions in society by deepening 
the cleavages between the poor who the system targets, and other social classes who largely pay 
for the taxes and contributions to fund it. This in turn hinders the formation of cross-class 
redistributive coalitions to demand an expansion of the welfare state with services and benefits of 
better quality and higher amounts. On the contrary, welfare states with universalistic features that 
cover all citizens in the same programmes foster coalition formation, creating a broad support 
base for social policies and resulting in an increase in the resources available for redistribution. 
The authors do acknowledge that other factors such as political traditions, demographic 
composition and industrial structures also have an impact on redistributive outcomes, but they 




2.5. Recent Changes: The Residual and Social Investment Logics 
Social policy systems have been extensively reformed in a global scale during the last 30 years. 
A retrenchment wave was triggered in the United Kingdom and the United States, but also in 
Chile, after the long period of expansion of state intervention in the social sphere that started at 
the end of the Second World War. A combination of economic changes, right-wing governments 
and rising expenditure due to the maturing of welfare states provoked calls for the retrenchment 
of welfare states. The welfare state was blamed for being wasteful, too bureaucratic and 
encouraging welfare dependency. The neoliberal paradigm emerged in social policy, prioritising 
fiscal austerity, and promoting cuts to social programmes, the introduction and expansion of 
residual policies that targeted benefits exclusively at the poor (Pierson, 1996, Beland, 2010).  
For countries in the capitalist core, Pierson (1996) argued that the legacies of social programmes 
and the constituencies created by them, diminished the influence of neoliberalism; so that in spite 
of the pressures for retrenchment, different countries followed the social policy model they 
already had established. So countries with a corporatist welfare state continued along the same 
path, as countries with universal types did. Yet, authors like Hacker (2004) and Thelen (2003) 
showed how even if structural changes were not evident and countries have followed their 
unique paths, the analysis of different modes of policy change revealed significant shift towards 
a more residual type of social policy across policy areas and countries. 
Gilbert (2002) elaborated on the transformation of social policy and described it at as the shift 
from the welfare state to the enabling state. For this author the rise of the enabling state 
represented a new paradigm based on policies that target benefits, promote work, emphasise 
individual responsibility and subsidise private arrangements. The primary aim of social policy 
was no longer to protect people from market failures, but to enable the functioning of those 
markets. The market was now perceived as the principal mechanism for welfare provision. The 
risk was that public policy would be mostly focused on increasing productivity, hence adopting a 
productivist character, with no purpose of public service and a diminishing support for the 
original goals of social policy, namely fighting poverty and inequality, enhancing social 




Giddens (1998) introduced the concept of positive welfare and social investment strategies as a 
third way between the traditional social policy paradigm and neoliberalism. Under this 
perspective, social policy should not only be about protecting people from economic risks, but 
more about providing the necessary resources for people to face those risks, whilst more 
emphasis should be put on obligations, not only rights. Positive welfare meant investing in 
human capital so that people acquire the necessary resources to face risks, rather than providing 
income support or maintenance. Enhancement of human capital should be pursued by adopting 
social investment strategies; for example, instead of sweeping labour market deregulation as 
neoliberals would propose, or an exclusive reliance on unemployment insurance programmes as 
in the traditional social policy paradigm, Giddens argues the state action should focus on active 
labour market policies (e.g. training and education) that provide people with the necessary skills 
to participate in labour markets.  
Morel et al (2012) explain that the social investment approach is based on policies that invest in 
human capital, like childhood education and care and lifelong education, make efficient use of 
human capital, like women’s employment, and enhance social inclusion, like enabling the access 
to labour market for groups traditionally excluded. For these authors social policy should be seen 
as a productive factor for economic development and growth, in contrast to neoliberalism that 
views it as a cost and hindrance. The ultimate goal of social policy should be to prepare people 
for current economic (e.g. flexible labour markets) and socio-demographic transformations (e.g. 
new social risks like population ageing and the increase in lone parenthood).     
Morel et al (2012) argue that their concept of social investment, based on previous work by other 
authors that advocate a social-democratic perspective, differs from Gidden’s because the latter is 
too close to the neoliberal paradigm. They note that Gidden’s criticises generous benefits for 
increasing ‘moral hazard’, that he places too much weight on duties and not enough on rights, 
that he perceives that inequality is necessary for economic efficiency, and that he places too 
much emphasis on social policy as a ‘spring board’ for change neglecting its protective role. The 





Morel et al (2012) and other authors (Nolan, 2013) warn about some risks of adopting the social 
investment strategy. One of these risks is the sacrifice of the fight against poverty in the present 
with the expectation that investment in human capital will reduce it in the future. As social 
spending is channelled through policies that aim to prepare people to face future risks, like 
education and training policies, less attention can be paid to policies that should be addressing 
current social problems. Another risk is that social policy focuses on the incorporation of women 
to labour markets for economic purposes, with no real interest on policies that aim to improve 
their living standards. 
2.6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter presented the principal theoretical concepts that serve as a framework for the thesis. 
The review was based on literature that explained the characteristics of the different types of 
social programmes, their redistributive implications and the challenges in measuring 
redistribution. The differences between the redistributive implications of social insurance and 
social assistance programmes are fundamental for the study of the Mexican case. 
The chapter concluded with a discussion of theories around recent social policy changes. Two 
logics have shaped the transformation of social policy since the 1980s. On one hand, the 
curtailing of social programmes and the emphasis on residual targeted policies to reduce 
spending levels; on the other, the introduction of policies that aim to incorporate people into the 
labour markets by investing in their human capital. The authors cited here have developed their 
insights by analysing the transformation of social policy in countries with advanced welfare 
states. However, it was in Latin America where the residual and social investment logics were 
pioneered, by innovations like the privatisation of pension systems and the introduction of 
conditional cash transfers. The concepts discussed in this chapter are highly relevant for the 





3. Social Policy in Latin America and Mexico 
3.1. Introduction 
The Mexican social protection system has been deeply reformed during the last decades. The 
thesis aims to reveal the redistributive effects of those profound changes. This provides the 
historical, social and labour market contexts of the research, and maps the social protection 
policy architectures before and after the reforms. 
The chapter begins with a summary of the history of social policy in Latin America. The next 
section provides the narrative of the evolution of the Mexican social protection; it offers some 
basic information about the Mexican political and economic contexts and then focuses on a 
detailed description of the evolution of the Mexican social protection system with an emphasis 
on the reform process. The following section discusses the recent literature on social policy 
reforms in Latin America and Mexico, with special attention on studies of redistribution 
conducted in the latter. The fourth section presents basic socio-demographic and labour market 
indicators. The fifth section maps the country’s social policy architecture. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are provided. 
3.2. Social Policy in Latin America 
The history of social policy in Latin America can be divided in two phases. The first phase is 
associated with the implementation of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) economic 
model and the populist authoritarian or semi-authoritarian political regimes that prevailed in the 
region between the 1930s up to the 1970s. Most Latin American countries implemented a social 
protection system during the first half of the 20th century. These systems were a fundamental 
part of the industrialisation through import substitution (ISI) strategy and the populist semi-
authoritarian political regimes that appeared throughout the region during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Although social protection systems varied significantly, at the core of virtually 
all of them were social security systems based on social insurance principles that provided 




systems were similar to European social insurance systems, with the notable exception that they 
remained with much lower coverage levels. 
The second phase is associated with processes of political and economic liberalisation that began 
in the 1980s. This second phase can in turn be divided in two stages; the first one when pressures 
for retrenchment spread throughout the region and led to measures like the privatisation of 
pension programmes; and a second stage characterised by the expansion of social protection 
coverage to groups of the population traditionally neglected, with programmes like conditional 
cash transfers.  
3.2.1. The Development Phase 
The first phase of the history of social policy in Latin America covers the period between the 
1940s and the 1980s. The initial development and expansion of welfare systems is associated 
with the implementation of the ISI economic model adopted and the emergence of populist-
corporatist political regimes after the Second World War. Even though some countries like 
Argentina and Uruguay had introduced comprehensive social security systems decades before in 
the 1910s, it was not until the 1940s that social policies expanded throughout the region (Barba, 
2006, Filgueira, 2005, Huber, 1996, Barba, 2004). Under the ISI model, the state assumed the 
central role in the development effort and sought the promotion of domestic industries and 
markets by a series of protectionist measures, like the imposition of tariffs and conditions on the 
import of manufactured and capital goods, and the regulation of foreign investment; whilst 
providing direct subsidies for the creation and strengthening of native industries, and capital for 
basic economic and social infrastructure (Filgueira, 2005, Moreno-Brid et al., 2009).  
Social policy then became an essential component of the industrialisation strategy and the 
corporatist organisation of society pursued by the states. Huber (1996) comments that the 
adoption of the ISI model favoured the growth of salaried urban middle and working classes, 
which required protection from loss of income due to old age, illnesses and injuries. Since these 
groups of workers were organised in trade unions, they were able to demand social benefits from 
the state. The state responded to their demands because they constituted the strategic groups for 
the functioning of the ISI model. The state’s response was based on the provision of social 




by employers as a protected economy gave them the opportunity to pass their share of the cost on 
to the final consumer (Brachet-Marquez, 2007, Dion, 2005). Hence, governments offered social 
protection coverage to the strategic social groups and in return the groups provided the political 
support necessary for the legitimacy of the political regimes (Dion, 2010). 
Eventually, social insurance systems would emerge in most of the countries of the region. The 
systems usually included health, old age and work injuries insurance. Unemployment insurance 
remained underdeveloped, but employment protection was offered through legislation that 
enforced severance payments upon unfair dismissals. Social insurance became a complement to 
the industrialisation strategy; in fact, as Barba (2004) puts it, social insurance was one of the axis 
of the coalition formed by the middle classes, trade unions, business organisations, politicians 
and civil servants that supported the ISI model. 
Latin American social protection systems would evolve with a high degree of stratification. 
Differentiated access to benefits and services according to the employment status of the insured 
worker (families were covered only as economic dependants of the insured worker) reflected the 
power balances in each country. Commonly public sector and key industry workers were both 
the first to be protected and enjoyed higher protection levels than the rest of the covered workers 
(Filgueira, 2005, Barrientos, 2004, Barrientos, 2009, Barba, 2004, Barba, 2006, Lautier, 2001). 
Moreover, since access to the systems was made dependable on employment status, large sectors 
of the workforce (e.g. the self-employed, rural workers and peasants, workers in small 
enterprises who operated in the informal economy and were not organised and domestic 
workers) were excluded, resulting in what has been defined as a ‘truncated’ social policy, 
because coverage never extended beyond what came to be known as formal sector workers 
(Barrientos, 2009, Moreno-Brid et al., 2009). In fact, this exclusion ended up dividing the 
populations and generating definitions for the concepts of formality and informality (Frenk et al., 
1999).  
The processes roughly summarised here varied greatly across the region. The literature shows 
more than significant differences in the political environment, levels of industrialisation, or 
economic growth, just to mention some factors that influenced welfare state emergence and 




Filgueira (2005, 1998) and Segura-Ubiergo (2007). The objective here is not to present an 
extensive review of this period; but just to mention some examples of the differences, countries 
like Argentina and Uruguay implemented comprehensive social security programmes decades 
before the rest of the countries and even before some core capitalist countries like the United 
States. These countries also registered higher coverage levels, close to some European systems; 
Costa Rica implemented a system more along ‘Beveridgean’ principles with universal health 
coverage; Brazil and Mexico were perhaps the two countries where the segmentation of the 
system was the strongest; whilst in most Central American countries the development of social 
policy occurred at a later stage, with very limited coverage and excluding the majority of the 
population (Mesa-Lago, 2000, Mesa-Lago, 2009, Filgueira, 2005, Barba, 2004, Barba, 2006, 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2007). Despite the differences, the existence of a large informal sector and 
highly stratified welfare systems, were features present all Latin American countries throughout 
the expansion phase (Huber, 1996).  
3.2.2. The Reform Phase 
The second phase of social policy development in Latin America starts in the 1980s. Neoliberal 
economic reforms were introduced in that decade as a consequence of the severe economic crises 
affected the region. The crises were originated by the excessive debt acquired during previous 
decades, and particularly in Mexico where the cycle of crises began in 1982, due to the fall in oil 
prices. Closed economies, excessive public spending and high levels of corruption were 
perceived as the crisis main causes. In response to these problems and following advice of 
international financial organisations, countries in the region introduced programmes of economic 
liberalisation. In some cases the economic liberalisation measures were a condition to obtain 
rescue packages that the IFIs offered. The package of economic structural adjustment measures 
came to be known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, Huber, 1996).  
The ISI strategy was dismissed and replaced with an export-oriented growth model. At the same 
time, processes of political liberalisation began to unfold and pluralist democracies gradually 
consolidated. Social policies were reformed in tune with these economic and political changes. 
Reform models differed across the region, but an initial common denominator was the pursuit of 




social protection beyond the groups traditionally covered (Haggard and Kaufman, 2008, 
Barrientos, 2009, Dion, 2010).  
Economic restructuring propelled the first stage of the reforms in the social policy realm. 
Protectionist policies were perceived as part of the problem that detonated the crises and 
governments shifted towards export-oriented economies. International financial institutions (e.g. 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank) 
played a major role in the promotion and implementation of the reforms, even though the role of 
local elites who benefited from the reforms was also important. Structural economic reforms 
included reduction or elimination of trade tariffs, budget cuts and the contraction of the public 
sector, privatisations of public enterprises, financial sector deregulation and opening to foreign 
investment (Barrientos, 2004, Barba, 2006, Huber, 1996).  
In the social policy field, the reforms sought the retrenchment of social insurance programmes 
and enhancement of the role of markets in welfare provision. Austerity measures and economic 
liberalisation policies generated increases in the size of informal employment and in 
unemployment and poverty rates. Social insurances systems came under financial pressures due 
to the reduction in the number of contributors and wage levels. In addition (and perhaps more 
importantly), the neoliberal agenda pushed by IFIs and domestic elites promoted the idea that 
social insurance programmes were to blame for high labour costs, for creating economic 
inefficiencies, for being an obstacle to the expansion of the formal sector and for privileging 
certain types of workers and not targeting the neediest population groups, among other 
criticisms, some of which were also applied to employment protection legislation (Barrientos, 
2004, Huber, 1996, Lautier, 2001, Barba, 2005). Social policy reforms spread throughout the 
region a few years later after economic reforms were implemented. The common policy changes 
implemented in the region during this stage were the privatisation (or semi-privatisation) of 
pension systems, changing from an pay-as-you-go system of defined contributions to an 
individual capitalisation system of defined benefits; the decentralisation of health and education 
services; and the flexibilisation (either defacto or dejure) of labour legislation (Mesa-Lago, 2000, 




In some countries the second stage of the reforms developed simultaneously to the first stage, in 
others a few years later. The second stage is associated to the processes of political liberalisation 
and democratisation that also emerged during the 1980s. This stage is characterised by the 
expansion of social protection to groups of the population traditionally neglected. The causes that 
explain the expansion wave are the growth in the size informal economy, the increase in poverty 
rates, pressures generated for greater democratisation and the consolidation of multi-party 
electoral competition. These factors combined to prompt governments to introduce policies to 
benefit the majority of the population conformed of poor informal sector workers and their 
families. This sector of the population would have been ignored under the previous political 
regimes, because their legitimacy resided in the corporatist structures, and not in the electoral 
system. Targeted social assistance programmes, notably conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programmes but also others like non-contributory pensions became the ideal medium to deliver 
social benefits to groups of the population never reached before by social protection (Dion, 2010, 
Lavinas, 2013).  
The scope, depth and outcomes of the reforms varied greatly across the region, yet these trends 
of retrenchment of social insurance and expansion of social assistance can be observed in most 
countries. It has been argued that social policy in most South American countries has entered a 
third post-neoliberal phase, characterised by the overhaul of some of the market-centred reforms 
of the 1980s-1990s (Cameron and Hershberg, 2010, Huber and Stephens, 2012). However, as 
will be shown in the following section, this does not seem to be the case of Mexico. 
3.3. The Case of Mexico 
Mexican social policy followed a similar trajectory as the rest of the large Latin American 
countries. The main welfare institutions were created during the 1940s and 1950s, expanded 
throughout the next three decades, but then were reformed after the economic crises of the 1980s 
and 1990s. This section reviews the history of social protection in Mexico, summarises major 
reforms and highlights the main policy changes. 
The section begins with a brief history of the Mexican political regime, to serve as context for 




of Porfirio Diaz. The dictatorship fell in 1911, elections were held and the leader of the 
revolutionaries, Francisco Madero, was elected president. A coup overthrew Madero in 1913, 
who was assassinated, but a group of former revolutionaries with leaders like Fransisco Villa and 
Emiliano Zapata fought back, defeating the spurious regime. Eventually violent conflict began 
among the revolutionary factions, mainly between the more agrarian factions of Villa and Zapata 
and the more urban factions of Venustiano Carranza and Alvaro Obregon. These series of violent 
conflicts came to be known as the Mexican Revolution (Silva-Herzog, 1997).  
When the country was relatively pacified, two outcomes that would shape the country’s future 
emerged: i) a new constitution enacted in 1917 that incorporated social and labour rights and was 
considered at that time a highly progressive piece of legislation; and ii) a hegemonic political 
party that dominated the Mexican political system for most of the 20th century. This party was 
originally created in 1927 to group all the revolutionary factions with the name National 
Revolutionary Party; the party’s name was changed to Mexican Revolution Party and organised 
under a corporatist structure with representation of workers, peasants and public workers 
organisations in the 1930s; in the next decade the name was changed again to Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) and has remained with that name until these days (Crespo, 1994).  
The PRI dominated political life in Mexico for seven decades. The Mexican political regime was 
defined by Sartori (1976) as a hegemonic party system, different from one-party totalitarian 
regimes (e.g. USSSR) or dominant party regimes (e.g. India). Mexico is a federal country, so 
elections were systematically organised for executive and legislative positions at the three tiers 
of government, namely municipal, state and federal, but there was not real political competition 
given the PRI’s virtual absolute control over all political and economic resources. The PRI 
functioned as a negotiating space and as the political arm of the president in turn. A few 
opposition parties participated in elections, but they were mainly allied with the PRI. Perhaps the 
only real legal opposition came from the right wing National Action Party (PAN), but it never 
could present any real competition to the PRI. The communist party was illegal until the late 
1970s.  
Political pressures for democratisation began to rise since the 1960s and resulted in the important 




until the 1980s. Amidst a severe economic crisis, pressures from the right and the left gradually 
began to open up the political system. In spite of some repression, especially towards leftist 
movements, after the Zapatista movement and after another economic crisis hit the country in the 
mid-1990, the definitive political reform that left the organisation of elections in the hands of a 
citizen council was implemented in 1996.  Finally, in 1997 the PRI lost control of the Chamber 
of Deputies and in 2000 the PAN candidate won the presidential elections. In 2006 the PAN 
repeated their victory in the presidential elections (Crespo, 1994, Brachet-Marquez, 2007). 
3.3.1. The Evolution of the Mexican Social Protection System 
As mentioned before, the history of the Mexican welfare system is usually divided in two phases 
(Barba, 2006, Barba, 2004, Barba et al., 2007, De Gortari and Ziccardi, 1996, Cordera and 
Lomeli, 2005, Brachet-Marquez, 2007, Brachet-Marquez and De Oliveira, 2002). Although the 
precedents of social protection in the country go back to the Mexican revolution and the 
enactment of the 1917 constitution, the beginning of the development phase tends to be situated 
during the 1940s, when first national social insurance programmes were created, During this 
phase social insurance programmes acted as both complementary and corrective mechanism to 
the industrialisation and urbanisation strategy implemented by the state, and were crucial to gain 
the necessary support that the political regime required to gain legitimacy. From the 1980s up to 
date, structural reforms adopted to deal with severe economic crises prompted the introduction of 
a neoliberal paradigm and the adoption of market-centred reforms in the social sphere, whilst 
democratic pressures prompted the extension of social protection coverage.  
3.3.1.1. Development Phase of Social Protection in Mexico 
3.3.1.1.1. Early Days 
The first precedents of social legislation in Mexico were work-injuries regulations passed by the 
governments of the two industrialised states of Nuevo Leon and Mexico during the first decade 
of the 20th century2. During the Revolution, several leaders embraced worker’s demands for 
                                                 
2 According to Brachet-Marquez (2007), a response to the anarchist inspired labour movement which preceded the 
Mexican Revolution. The movement was repressed but it put pressures on the government to increase the level of 
protection for workers. The strikes at the Cananea mine and Rio Blanco textile plant are two examples of actions 




social protection (e.g. President Madero created the Department of Labour in 1912 with the 
objective of mediating labour conflicts and installing a social security system; a minimum wage 
law was passed in the same period) but political instability made it unfeasible for any programme 
to be implemented; nonetheless, as the different fighting factions began competing for labour’s 
support and as some revolutionary leaders began implementing some social reforms at local 
levels, expectations for social change started to rise (IMSS, 1996, Brachet-Marquez, 2007, Solis 
Soberon and Villagomez, 1999). 
In 1917 a new constitution was drafted, which along with labour rights, land reform and the right 
to education, incorporated the right to social security. Article 123 established an obligation for 
federal and local governments to create insurance funds for disablement, life, involuntary 
unemployment, accidents and others with similar ends (IMSS, 1996, Solis Soberon and 
Villagomez, 1999a). It took decades for some social reforms to be carried out, but the 
constitution provided a blueprint for future social demands and state responses, and was 
fundamental for the stabilisation and legitimisation of the regime that emerged out of the 
Revolution (Cordera and Lomeli, 2005, Brachet-Marquez, 2007). 
The constitution mandated the introduction of social security for workers, but no programme was 
introduced for more than 20 years, except for the case of public civil servants. In 1925 the 
General Law for Civil and Retirement Pensions was passed and the Department for Civil and 
Retirement Pensions was created to regulate and administer this scheme, it included pensions and 
housing loans. Following a series of strikes teachers were also incorporated in 1928. A special 
insurance system for the military was also created (Solis Soberon and VIllagomez 1999b; 
ISSSTE 2011a). 
Attempts to introduce a national social insurance programme during the 1920s and early 1930s 
failed. The winning faction of the Revolution, in its fight against other factions, sought, and 
effectively attracted the support of organised labour, but no plan on social insurance was 
implemented due to opposition from the employer sector, to the fact that the government began 
to favour the country’s capitalist development and to the economic depression (Solis Soberon 




Another important development during the period was the enactment, in 1931, of the Federal 
Labour Law (LFT for its acronym in Spanish). Nonetheless, on social security, this piece of 
legislation only included the topics of work accidents and illnesses and severance payments for 
unjustified dismissals (IMSS, 1996).  
The administration of President Cardenas (1934-1940) stands out for its progressive reforms (e.g. 
nationalisation of strategic industries, land redistribution), but on the social policy front no 
national social protection system was introduced. Besides a network of health centres for rural 
population and the improvement of public servants and military pension schemes and the 
introduction of similar schemes for oil and railroad workers, plans for the implementation of a 
national insurance programme were halted basically due to tensions between the government and 
business generated by the large scale of the several of the reforms (IMSS, 1996, Brachet-
Marquez, 2007, Dion, 2005). 
3.3.1.1.2. The Post-War Period 
After the Cardenas presidency, the regime would make a turn towards the prioritisation of 
industrialisation and capitalist development. This allowed for the incorporation into the regime 
of the private business class represented by several employer organisations, who would grow in 
power, effectively becoming the fourth unofficial sector, and perhaps the most powerful, of the 
regime’s corporatist structure (Gonzalez Casanova, 1965).    
The ISI model was adopted by Mexico in the early 1940s, and social policy would become an 
important element of the model, as its complementary or corrective mechanism (Barba, 2006, 
Barba, 2004). The cornerstone of social protection in the country is the enactment of the Social 
Insurance Law (LSS) and the creation of the Mexican Institute for Social Insurance (IMSS for its 
acronym in Spanish) in 1943. After much hesitation during the previous administration, the 
government’s final decision to implement social insurance was the product of pressures from 
labour organisations and the need for the regime to guarantee their support, especially after the 
contested elections of 1940 (Dion, 2005). It can be claimed that social insurance sealed the 




The IMSS was structured around a ‘Bismarckian’ social insurance model3, conducted by the 
state with tripartite participation in its administration incorporating workers and employers 
representatives. Contributions were also tripartite. Insurance became compulsory for all 
employees and benefits were extended to their families. The self-employed, domestic workers, 
peasants and workers in the rural sector and independent professionals were left out (IMSS, 
1996).   
The LSS considered protection for sickness, maternity, work injuries, disablement and old-age, 
plus the death of the insured worker; namely all contingencies commonly covered by systems 
around the world except unemployment, with the argument that it was already covered by the 
severance payments that employers had to pay for unjustified dismissals, according to the 
Federal Labour Law enacted in 1931 (Brachet-Marquez 2007).   
Little was offered for the population sectors excluded from social insurance a part from basic 
health services and public health campaigns operated by the Secretariat for Health also created in 
1943. Basic health services commonly required the payment of fees at the point of service and 
were very limited; they intended to substitute the rural health centres network that had been 
president Cardenas had try to create. At the end, the creation of the Secretariat for Health 
represented a duplication of normative and budgetary functions with the IMSS and the creation 
of dual health system that promoted inequality: on one side the IMSS services, on the other the 
ministry’s services, underfinanced and with far lower benefit levels  (Frenk et al., 1999, Brachet-
Marquez, 2007, Bosch and Campos-Vazquez, 2010, Lakin, 2010). 
The IMSS expanded slowly throughout the country in the next two decades, concentrating in 
large urban areas (IMSS 1996). Social spending was kept at low levels compared to countries 
like Argentina and Chile. The state leaned heavily towards a strategy of industrialisation and 
capitalist development. Public spending was largely devoted to the promotion of a domestic 
industry. However, there were other policies not part of the social security system that fulfilled a 
                                                 
3 This was the model promoted by the International Labour Organisation and adopted in several Latin American 
countries during the same decade (Frenk et al. 1999, Mesa-Lago 2000), as well as in some southern European 





social role. Land redistribution, although significantly slowed down after the Cardenas period, 
was still particularly important for the rural sector and for the regime as an instrument of social 
control. Food subsidies programmes were also important, along with the rapid expansion of basic 
education   (Hansen, 1971, Barba, 2006, Barba, 2004).   
In 1960 the Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers (ISSSTE for its acronym 
in Spanish) was created. The ISSSTE substituted the Department of Retirement and Civil 
Pensions but with an increase in all benefit levels. Its creation represented a further 
fragmentation of the welfare system, because the IMSS could have assumed this functions 
(ISSSTE, 2011). Although the IMSS could have been assigned the responsibility of social 
security for public servants, pressures from public sector unions first to surpass the benefit levels 
prompted the creation of a separate legislation for them. Insurance systems for oil, railroad and 
electricity workers were also enhanced during those years and a special scheme was created for 
banking sector employees (IMSS, 1996, Frenk et al., 1999). Social insurance institutions would 
become the main  articulation mechanism between the ISI model and the corporatist 
arrangements between the state and its urban allies of the industrialising coalition (Barba, 2004, 
Barba, 2006).  
By the 1960s the ISI model in Mexico had generated very high economic growth rates but an 
extremely unequal development. Pressures for social change began to rise. Railroad and health 
workers’ strikes and the student movement of 1968 were all signs of that social unrest. Hence, 
with its political legitimacy at risk, the regime attempted a course change, though never 
abandoning its authoritarian and corporatist natures (Hansen, 1971, Brachet-Marquez, 2007, 
Barba, 2006, Barba, 2004)  
An important element of the course change was a pretended expansion of the social protection 
system. However, attempts at a fiscal reform that would have been necessary to fund that 
expansion failed due to the opposition of what had become a very powerful business sector 




3.3.1.1.3. The Expansion Attempt 
The social insurance law was reformed in 1973 with the main intention of expanding the benefits 
of social security to uncovered groups. Compulsory insurance for a minority of the rural 
workforce was instrumented, but for most sectors rural sector workers and peasants, domestic 
and independent workers, the self-employed and employers, only voluntary schemes were 
introduced. The reform specified that through presidential decrees, they would be gradually 
incorporated into the compulsory insurance scheme (IMSS, 1973b, IMSS, 1973a). However, that 
has never happened. The reform also introduced the option for any individual not subject of 
compulsory or voluntary insurance, to access the IMSS medical services (IMSS, 1973a, IMSS, 
1973b). 
Benefit levels were also increased as part of the LSS reform (e.g., new family allowances for 
pensioners), but perhaps more importantly, a new insurance branch to fund day care centres for 
children of women in work, between the ages of 43 days, when maternity leave ended, and 4 
years, when preschool education began. The obligation of IMSS to provide child day care was 
already established in the LSS since the 1960s, but it had not been implemented. An insurance 
prime was introduced of one percent of salary entirely paid by employers for all workers, both 
male and female and regardless of whether they had small children  (IMSS, 1973a, IMSS, 
1973b). The IMSS was already providing child care services for children of its own female 
employees (Brachet-Marquez, 2007) and the ISSSTE offered these services for female civil 
servants. 
The growth of the IMSS day care centre network was slow. Between 1974 and 1983 only 78 new 
centres were built, offering just above 17,000 places for children. One reason was that resources 
from the corresponding insurance branch were utilised to fund the sickness and maternity branch 
which financed medical services (IMSS, 1996). 
In 1972 the INFONAVIT (National Institute for the Workers Housing Fund) was created to fund 
housing for insured workers. Before INFONAVIT’s creation, public intervention in the housing 
sector had been restricted to the building of housing units for public sector workers. People who 
migrated from the countryside to urban areas commonly occupied irregular settlements, which 




de facto becoming owners of their own dwellings; which limited pressures for wage increases, 
thus providing cheap labour for the industrialisation process. When large scale public housing 
policy began, it concentrated on the same formal sector groups that had been benefited by social 
insurance. At the start, INFONAVIT both built and offered credits for new homes to workers in 
the formal sector already insured by the IMSS, with a tripartite administration that considered 
participation of employers, workers and government representatives. A payroll tax of five 
percent of salary, entirely paid by employers, was introduced to finance the fund (Brachet-
Marquez, 2007). Employers did not oppose the new contributions, since in a closed economy 
they could pass the cost on to the final consumer (Brachet-Marquez, 2007). A similar housing 
fund called FOVISSSTE had been created for civil servants and administered by ISSSTE 
(ISSSTE, 2011).  
INOFANAVIT would later be transformed into a solely financing institution, leaving the 
construction of housing projects to private contraction companies, which were many times 
owned by union leaders. One of the arrangements within the PRI was that, in exchange for the 
opportunity of profiting from the housing scheme, these leaders kept their union members under 
control (Brachet-Marquez, 2007). 
Another important element of the pretended expansion of the welfare system during the 1970s 
were poverty combat programmes mostly in rural areas emphasis was placed on the rural sector, 
like Public Investment Programme for Rural Development (PIDER) in the 1970-1976 
administration; and the National Plan for Depressed Zones and Marginalised Groups 
(COPLAMAR) and the Mexican Food System (SAM) in the 1976-1982 administration. They 
included food subsidies and distribution; construction of water, electricity and road 
infrastructure; and health services, administered jointly with IMSS. These programmes would be 
characterised for being temporary and for their lack of coordination, inefficiency and extended 
clientelistic use. They would all be scaled down as part of the budget cuts introduced after the 
debt crisis of 1982 (Brachet-Marquez, 2007, Barba, 2006, Cordera and Lomeli, 2005, Palacios 




3.3.1.2. The Reform Phase 
The economic crisis of 1982 led to the demise of the ISI model and the introduction of 
neoliberalism in the country4. The government responded to the crisis with the implementation 
of structural macroeconomic reforms, policies of trade and financial liberalisation, market 
deregulation, privatisation and the reduction of the state’s intervention in the economy (Moreno-
Brid et al., 2009); yet, apart from the cancellation or fusion of anti-poverty programmes, an 
attempted decentralisation of education and basic health services and the introduction of income 
tax deductions for private health expenditures, no large scale social policy reform was 
implemented for more than a decade (Brachet-Marquez, 2007, Laurell, 2001).  
Two important events did happen on the social policy front during this early period of neoliberal 
economic reforms. On one side, after the contested elections of 1988, when a faction of the PRI 
split in protest of the economic reforms and joined old left-wing movements to postulate a 
presidential candidate and eventually form a new political party, which would be called the 
Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), the federal administration created the National Solidarity 
Programme (Pronasol) which became the first attempt at providing social benefits in a large scale 
outside the social insurance system. The government opted for this design to evade the 
traditional corporatist structure, since several union leaders had supported the left wing 
candidate. Nonetheless, the Pronasol did not represent any increase in the levels of social 
protection because it was basically an umbrella programme that grouped several initiatives like 
the provision of water and infrastructure in poor neighbourhoods and because of its high 
clientelistic nature. On the other side, the de facto deregulation of labour markets, as trade 
liberalisation, which included the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), required 
cheap labour costs to compete in an open economic environment (Brachet-Marquez and De 
Oliveira, 2002, Dion, 2009, Dion, 2008). 
                                                 
4 International financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
played an important role in promoting and prescribing neoliberal reforms in Mexico, providing technical assistance 
and conditioning  loans and financial support upon the implementation those reforms (Mesa-Lago and Muller, 2002, 
Barba, 2006), nonetheless, as Barba (2006) notes, the reforms should not be conceived as external impositions by 





After a new economic crisis affected the country in 1995, the first large scale social policy 
reform was undertaken. The 1997 pension reform replaced the pay-as-you-go system of defined 
benefits for an individual account system of defined contributions. Private financial firms called 
Retirement Fund Administrators (AFOREs) were created to manage the pension funds. Whilst 
the IMSS was left in charge of collecting contributions, the payment of pensions was left to 
private insurance companies. The period of contributions required to be eligible for an old-age 
pension was raised from 10 to 25 years (Solis Soberon and Villagomez, 1999, IMSS, 1997). The 
reform was largely conceived as a way of strengthening the domestic financial sector after the 
crisis, in the face of the financial crisis of late 1994, by creating a solid instrument to boost 
national savings and reduce the dependency on foreign capital and the risks and costs of financial 
volatility (Barba, 2006, Barba, 2004, Brachet-Marquez, 2007). Other changes to social insurance 
included the decrease in employer contributions and increase in the state’s share, and the sub-
contracting of childcare services to for-profit private providers5 (IMSS, 1996, Knaul and Parker, 
1997).   
Another important social policy reform also undertaken in 1997 was the creation of the 
Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition (Progresa), which consisted of cash transfers for 
low income families conditioned on school attendance of children and regular health check-ups 
and attendance to health talks. Progresa was a response of the government to the dramatic 
increase in poverty levels after the economic crisis, designed under a logic that viewed labour 
market participation as the main instrument mechanism to overcome poverty. Strict targeting 
was one of its main features (Levy, 2006, Levy and Rodriguez, 2004). It represents the first 
programme that paid cash benefits to poor families in the country’s history, and substituted other 
poverty reduction initiatives like the Pronasol and generalised food subsidies, which were 
criticised for not being aligned with a market rationale (Barba, 2006, Barba, 2004). At the end, as 
mentioned, Pronasol was highly clientelistic, but besides these arguments there was also a strong 
political motive for dismissing it, since it had become tightly identified with the administration 
of president Salinas and a quarrel had started between him and the current administration of 
president Zedillo (Cordera and Lomeli, 2005). 
                                                 
5 The participation of non-profit social organisations to provide care services for children of IMSS female members 
had been introduced since 1983, but this new policy allowed for private providers who sought profit to become 




After the PAN won the presidential elections in 2000, the name of Progresa was changed to 
Oportunidades, and the programme was expanded to urban areas and benefits were enhanced. In 
a few years the programme was offering benefits to more than 20 million people throughout the 
country. During the two PAN administrations between 2000 and 2012 targeted social assistance 
would be greatly expanded. Other programmes were implemented besides Oportunidades, all of 
which targeted low income population not covered by social insurance. Other policies included 
childcare services for low income women in work, non-contributory old-age pensions for elderly 
people in localities of less than 30,000 inhabitants and the voluntary health insurance programme 
funded by contributions from the state and families, called Popular Health Insurance,  (PHI) 
(Dion, 2008, Levy, 2008). PHI offered health services but with a limited package of services, 
initially only 78 medical interventions were covered (Lakin, 2010). 
On the housing sector, the PAN governments sought to enhance the role of private mortgage 
companies and financial institutions in the funding of housing. At the same time, social insurance 
institutions (i.e. INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE) introduced joint mortgage schemes with private 
financial institutions. Payment on mortgage loans was made deductible from income tax. 
Additionally, programmes that offered housing subsidies for low income population not covered 
by social insurance, were boosted mainly for self-built solutions (Puebla Cadena, 2006, Levy, 
2008). 
In 2002 a new income tax law was passed. The previous one dated from the early 1980s. Some 
major changes were the modification of marginal tax rates and the introduction of deductible 
concepts for private spending on welfare services, like mortgage loans as mentioned above. In 
addition, a special regime for self-employed minor taxpayers with reduced rates was introduced 
with the aim of incorporating more people into the formal economy (OECD, 2004). 
In 2007 the social insurance system for civil servants (ISSSTE) was reformed. The reform 
basically consisted in introducing the same changes that have been implemented in the reform of 
the IMSS 10 years later. The old-age pension scheme was semi-privatised too and changed from 
a pay-as-you-go system to an individual capitalisation one. Other changes to make the system 
analogous to the IMSS were considered, however, significant concessions were made as part of 




two minimum salaries and not one as in the case of the IMSS system (OECD, 2009, LISSSTE, 
2007). 
Finally, in 2011 spending on private education was made deductible from income tax, like 
spending on private health services. The limit to deduce this amount was the average per capita 
spending in public education (SHCP, 2011). It can be interpreted that with this reform, the 
government tried to benefit middle and high class groups, the traditional PAN support groups, in 
the middle of the crime wave that has affected the country since 2006. 
3.3.2. Main Features of the Mexican Reforms 
There are some core features that can be highlighted of the reform process. First, the decline of 
the centrality of the social insurance system for welfare provision. Barba (2006) described the 
Mexican social insurance institutions as the main articulation mechanism between the ISI model, 
the corporatist pact of the state and the industrialising coalition, and the breadwinner system. So, 
as Barrientos (2004) points out, when the ISI model was dismissed throughout Latin America, 
social insurance lost its support, especially from the state and employers; at the same time the 
group that could have supported social insurance, namely organised urban formal sector workers, 
was diminishing in number and power due to economic liberalisation polices. Indeed, the 
informal economy has been increasing; data from official government surveys show that the 
percentage of workers with access to social insurance out of the total salaried subordinated 
population, which is the population who should be insured by law, fell from 56 percent at the end 
of 2000 to 52 percent in December of 2010 (INEGI, 2011b); and coverage percentage out the 
total population by the private sector workers’ social insurance system, which increased steadily 
since the its creation in the 1940s, picked in 1990 at 47.5 percent, then stalled and in 2010 it 
remained at the same level (46.6%). 
A second feature of the social policy shift has been the growth of social assistance programmes 
for poor families with no social insurance. Social programmes mainly aimed at combating 
poverty have always been part of the Mexican welfare system, especially after the 1960s, when 
an expansion of the system was attempted in response to several political crises, but those 
programmes changed constantly and many of them would be eventually cancelled as part of the 




several way, they have been larger in scale and more institutionalised. The largest of these social 
assistance programmes is Oportunidades, but they also include Popular Health Insurance, 
assistance non-contributory pensions, day care centres and housing subsidies; their expansion has 
resulted in a steady increase of social spending since the second half of the 1990s. According to 
data published by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEPAL/ECLAC), social spending at the Federal level in Mexico as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 8.44 in 1995 to 12.5 in 2008, while per capita social spending almost doubled 
from 450 to 885 US dollars in the same period (CEPAL, 2011). 
The centrality of the market as part of the social policy paradigm that has been deployed during 
the past two decades could be another of the feature of the policy shift. Oportunidades stands out 
for its attachment to this new market logic. As two of its creators have stated, the programme is 
inserted in a logic under which public policies should help poor families improve their conditions 
through market participation  (Levy and Rodriguez, 2004). Barba (2005) identifies this logic 
with the shift towards productivist policies, which are in tune with the social investment logic. 
This relinquishment to market mechanisms in the social realm can also be observed in the 
pension reforms of 1997 and 2007, where private firms were put in charge of administering old-
age and retirement pension funds and of the delivery of benefits, whilst pension amounts will 
depend on the investment decisions of those firms. Additionally, tax deductions on income tax 
for private health and educations spending and payment of interests on mortgage loans, can also 
be seen as means to subsidise private arrangements within the social sphere.  
Another feature of the reforms is the emphasis on targeting mechanisms. Again the design of 
Oporutnidades provides the best example for this feature in Mexican social policy (Levy, 2006, 
Levy and Rodriguez, 2004); but the rest of the recently implemented social programmes also 
emphasise the focalisation on low income groups (e.g. non-contributory pensions only cover old-
age adults in localities of less than 30,000 inhabitants, which are assumed to be the poorest; 
eligibility for day care centres is restricted to children of women living in households with an 
income of 1.5 minimum salaries or less; whilst the different housing subsidies also apply means-
testing mechanism). The exception could be voluntary Popular Health Insurance, which attempts 
to expand health services with a more universalistic logic, but considering that poor families are 




targeted at poor population. One of the consequences of the targeting approach could be that, 
given the increase in informality, many low income families not in extreme poverty could be left 
unprotected because they do not qualify for the benefits but do not have access to social 
insurance either. (Lautier, 2001)  
A new residual welfare paradigm has emerged in Mexico (Franco, 2006, Barba, 2005, Lautier, 
2001, Barrientos, 2009). The development of social policy shows a shift in the design of the 
recently introduced policy instruments. However, the old paradigm has not been abandoned. The 
new paradigm coexists today with the traditional paradigm, which has not been totally dismissed. 
In fact, resources devoted to social insurance programmes still exceed considerably the resources 
spent on social assistance. These thesis aims to uncover what have been the redistributive effects 
of these policy changes. 
3.4. Research on Social Protection in Latin America and Mexico 
This section reviews the relevant literature on the social policy reforms in Latin America and 
Mexico. The first part focuses on cross-national studies of the region that include Mexico, the 
second part outlines research conducted exclusively on Mexico. The literature reviewed is 
associated to research conducted to identify the effects and outcomes of social policies. The 
review includes literature published in English and Spanish. 
3.4.1. Research on Latin America 
Research on Latin American social policy is still scarce considering its long history, the 
fundamental role that it has played for the development of most countries and the fact that during 
the last decades, the region has become the world’s ‘laboratory’ of social policy with innovations 
like the privatisation of pension systems and the creation of conditional cash transfer 
programmes. Many Latin American countries have registered a decrease in rates of poverty and 
inequality during the second half of the 2000s, some of the authors reviewed for this section 





In some occasions, Latin America has been integrated into broader studies of welfare in the 
‘developing’ regions of the world (Rudra, 2007, Gough, 2004). Whilst studies like those could be 
valuable in mapping some broad trends in social protection development, the large scope they try 
to embrace and the wide differences among the regions they try to focus on, makes it difficult to 
obtain a clear and in-depth understanding of the inputs, outputs and outcomes of social policies.  
Mesa Lago (2000, 2001, 2004), Filgueira (1998) and Barrientos (2004) represent the pioneers of 
the field. Mesa Lago (2004) came up with the first typology of countries according to the 
characteristics of their social protection systems during the development phase. He grouped 
countries in three categories: i) pioneer countries, which introduced their systems around the 
1920s, covered a large percentage of the population, offered protection against all major social 
risks, and had higher levels of contributions, expenditure and financial disequilibrium (e.g. 
Southern Cone countries, Brazil and Costa Rica); ii) intermediate countries which implemented 
social security systems around the 1940s and 1950s under the influence of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), exhibited a more unified system without the diversity of stratified 
insurance funds present in the pioneer group, registered lower levels of coverage and did not 
offer protection against all risks, especially unemployment, and had lower levels expenditure 
(where Mexico was placed along with Colombia, Venezuela and others); and, iii) latecomers, 
which implemented their systems during the 1960s and 1970s, only covered a minority of their 
populations, did not include all insurance branches either, and exhibited lower contribution and 
expenditure levels (e.g. most of Central America) (Mesa-Lago, 2000). Mesa-Lago later analysed 
the impact of the reforms, especially of the privatisation of pension systems, and concluded that 
they were generating negative results like the reduction in coverage levels, high administrative 
costs and low return on the resources deposited in individual accounts  (Mesa-Lago, 2001, Mesa-
Lago, 2004). The author revised his typology after the reform phase up to the mid-2000s, but 
concluded that the same three groups continued to be identifiable, without any changes. 
Filgueira (2005, 1998) also developed a typology of countries based on their social protection 
system. Mesa-Lago’s work was criticised for focusing exclusively on social security systems and 
for being too descriptive (Segura-Ubiergo, 2007, Filgueira, 2005). Filgueira (2005, 1998) 
incorporated variables related to welfare outcomes in his typology. He based his classification on 




development indicators and on the analysis the political economy of social protection systems. 
Three welfare state types were identified by the author: stratified universalistic, in countries with 
more developed social security systems, dual in countries where systems did not evolved to 
cover all the population (i.e. leaving out rural and informal groups), and exclusionary where the 
state did not protected the majority of the population. Filgueira argued that the first type is the 
one that more resembles the conservative European model. Mexico was placed in the second 
group, as a dual type of state. The author has argued that after the reforms these types were no 
longer valid and that countries in the region had taken different paths; for Mexico the author 
commented that the post-reform model was characterised by its search for efficiency and fiscal 
responsibility, limited coverage and targeted programmes for the poor aimed at reducing future 
poverty levels rather than combating present ones.  
Barrientos (2004, 2009) applied the welfare regime approach to the region. This author argues 
that one unique welfare model can be identified for the entire region. He concluded that a regime 
change had taken place, from one that resembled the conservative model identified by Esping-
Andersen (1999, 1990) for Continental European countries, to one more similar to the liberal 
model of Anglo-Saxon countries. In his work Barrientos has looked at the welfare mix, welfare 
outcomes and the welfare systems’ stratification effects before and after the reforms. He 
especially found similarities with what has been identified as a Southern European variant of the 
conservative regime; however, features like the limited coverage of social security to formal 
sector workers, a narrow specification of social risks and residual welfare policies led him to 
label this regime conservative/informal. The author then argued that a different pattern had 
emerged after the reforms, as the welfare mix was modified because of the reduction in 
employment protection, the privatisation of social insurance schemes, the decentralisation of 
education and health services, the enhancement of the private sector’s role in welfare provision 
and financing and the introduction of targeted-productivist social assistance programmes; he 
called this new regime liberal/informal. Barrientos has also suggested that the social assistance 
policies (e.g. the Oportunidades programme in Mexico) reduced the role of the labour market as 
stratification device, a situation which he warns is not entirely positive and that more than the 
expansion of the welfare system, it signals the downgrading of protection schemes for formal 




Martinez Franzoni (2008) developed a typology of Latin American social protection systems in 
2008. This author applied cluster analysis to classify identify the region’s welfare regimes 
according to levels of commodification, decommodification, defamilialisation and welfare 
outcomes. She identified three regimes: ‘state-targeted’ (only Argentina and Chile), ‘state-
stratified’ (Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Panama) and ‘informal-familialist’ (the rest 
of the countries). Results showed that in all three informal welfare arrangements were relevant to 
a certain extent, however, in the first two the state was more active in protecting citizens against 
social risks, whilst in the third one the state played a minor role and individuals relied mostly on 
families for protection. Differences between the ‘state-targeted’ and the ‘state-stratified’ regimes 
stemmed from the features of their social policies: in the former targeted policies were more 
important, in the latter countries presented more universal but more stratified systems between 
occupations and formal and informal groups. Mexico fell into the state-stratified regime, but with 
some exceptions from the other countries in the same group, namely lower levels of social 
spending and a more profoundly reformed system. 
Lautier (2001) also analysed the social policy shift in Latin America. This author argued the 
reduction in insured employment is generating an increase in what he calls a ‘no man’s land’ 
where precarious workers who are not poor or not poor enough to qualify for the targeted 
programmes, fall and are left unprotected by the welfare system. As possible causes for the 
reduction in formal employment, Lautier pointed to  the downsize of the public sector and the 
privatisation of public enterprises, and the reduction in employment of strategic private firms 
where workers enjoyed privileged protection levels along with a movement towards outsourcing. 
He also described the changes in social assistance, which role has been enhanced as part of the 
policy shift. On social assistance he also observes that in the pre-reform era this types of policies 
functioned with a populist logic, but after them, a ‘focalisation’ logic was introduced, although 
their populist character has not been entirely dismissed. Lautier warns that his observations are 
more theoretical than empirical but that they could be enriched by subsequent research. He first 
published this paper in the late 1990s; back then he suggested two possible paths that Latin 
American nations could follow two possible paths given the failure of neo-liberalism to engender 




Franco (2006) describes the two paradigms that coexist in Latin American social policy after the 
reforms. On one side, there is a ‘traditional’ paradigm which postulates the monopoly of the state 
over social policy in all its aspects like financing, design, implementation and control; a 
homogeneous offer of benefits for all beneficiaries, despite the peculiarities of different 
population groups, with the idea that it will promote social cohesion and equality; a gradual 
expansion of coverage levels and the incorporation of all population groups according to the 
available resources;  and an emphasis on means, assuming that undertaking the planned actions 
will yield the expected objectives. On the other side, there is an ‘emergent’ paradigm introduced 
in Latin America after the debt crises of the 1980s, which postulates that the capacity for 
innovation and resolution of problems does not reside exclusively in the state but is dispersed 
throughout society (e.g. local governments, the private sector, non-governmental organisations 
and families); that insists on recognising the capacity of individuals to make their own choices 
and prefers the handover of public resources to beneficiaries so that they can satisfy their needs 
through the market (i.e. subsidising demand instead of offer); advocates for the co-responsibility 
of beneficiaries and the decentralisation of services; places the emphasis on the neediest groups, 
by attempting a precise targeting of potential beneficiaries; and underscores the importance of 
the impact of programmes measured in comparison with their initial objectives. The author 
points out that the ‘emerging’ paradigm can be observed in the design of recent social assistance 
policies introduced to combat poverty (e.g. CCT programmes) and in the reforms to the social 
security systems and other social policy sectors. The author underscores that the amount of 
resources devoted to the ‘traditional’ paradigm programmes is still much higher, and that this is 
still the dominant paradigm in the region. He finalises by warning that both the potential and 
achievements of CCT programmes designed under ‘emergent’ paradigm principles have been 
largely overstated; an observation also shared by authors like Lloyd-Sherlock (2008) and Damian 
(2007). 
Lautier (2001) analysed the social policy shift at the end of the 1990s, and argued the reduction 
in formal employment was generating an increase in what he called a ‘no man’s land’ where 
precarious workers who are not poor or not poor enough to qualify for targeted social assistance 
programmes were falling and were being left unprotected by the welfare system. As possible 
causes for the reduction in formal employment, Lautier pointed to the downsize of the public 




firms where workers enjoyed privileged protection levels, and a movement towards outsourcing 
jobs. He commented that the expansion of social assistance policies, which had moved from a 
marginal position towards occupying an increasingly central in the social protection systems,  
was insufficient to fill the ‘no man’s land’. 
Lavinas (2013) discussed the expansion of social protection through conditional cash transfers. 
She argued that the success of these programmes was exaggerated and that their promotion as 
tools for effective social protection was due to their compatibility with the neoliberal economic 
model. The author argued that conditional cash transfers had a limited potential to redistribute 
income because of their residual nature and low spending levels; hence their impact on the 
reduction of inequality in some Latin American countries was at best minimal, if not non-
existent. Additionally, she affirmed that in the absence of comprehensive social protection 
systems, the objective pursued by conditional cash transfers of commodifying of the poor was 
more likely to leave them in a state of higher vulnerability to labour market forces. Finally, she 
concluded that whilst the traditional social policy paradigm had the aim of protecting workers 
under equal conditions, the twenty-first century paradigm based on residual policies eventually 
leads to ´the downsizing of social protection in the name of the poor’. 
Huber and Stephens (2012) published a study on the most recent changes in Latin American 
social policy. They noted that democracy has had a positive effect on increases of social 
spending and in levels of poverty and inequality. Additionally, they argued that countries with 
strong leftist political parties and governments had influenced the creation of more universalist 
types of social protection, and those were the countries that showed a better redistributive 
potential.  
In sum, recent literature on Latin American social policy agrees that the centrality of the 
corporatist welfare model diminished as the importance of the liberal model increased. The 
extent to which a full shift in the welfare model has taken place is debatable, and more probably 
both paradigms have ended up coexisting. The enhancement of the liberal paradigm is 
observable in the introduction of social assistance policies, notably conditional cash transfers 
programmes. Many authors agree that these programmes have a limited potential at reducing 




that in recent year several countries have entered a post-neoliberal phase, where the state has 
assumed a stronger role in welfare provision. This has not been the case of Mexico. The authors 
that have developed typologies of social protection systems agree that this country is where a 
shift towards a liberal-productivist type of social policy with lower levels of social spending is 
more evident. The next section centres on the studies conducted exclusively for the Mexican 
case. 
3.4.2. Research on Mexico 
3.4.2.1. Research on the Welfare Model 
This section reviews the most recent work on the effects and outcomes of social policy reforms 
in Mexico. The review includes authors that have characterised the country’s welfare model after 
the reforms, and more importantly for this thesis, authors that have estimated the redistributive 
effects of social policies.  
Bayon (2009) offers a characterisation of the welfare model that has emerged after the 
transformation of social policy in the country. This author reviews changes in healthcare, 
pensions, employment legislation, education and the family sphere, and variations in some basic 
indicators of each area. She argues that the neoliberal shift has exacerbated inequality, poverty 
and social exclusion and that in contrast to other Latin American countries, the consolidation of 
democracy has not been accompanied by a revision of the neoliberal economic model or its 
social consequences, although she does not offer any extensive explanations for the causes of 
that continuity. The author concludes that the state has assumed an increasingly residual role in 
welfare provision limited to population in extreme poverty, that healthcare and pension reforms 
have deepened the historic segmentation of the system and that the informal component of the 
system reflected in the role of the family as welfare provider, has been emphasised. 
Dion (2010) published what is probably the most detailed account of the history of social policy 
in Mexico. She is mostly interested in identifying the social, political and economic 
arrangements that triggered and shaped the development of social protection policies, She argues 
the processes of political and economic liberalisation, propelled the relative retrenchment of 




characterisations of the country’s welfare model before and after the reforms. She concludes that 
the country transited from a corporatist to a liberal/residual model, like Bayon, but she also 
highlights the significant expansion of social protection that the introduction of social assistance 
represented. 
3.4.2.2. Research on Labour Market Effects 
On the effects of social policy changes at the meso-level, recent debate on social policy in 
Mexico (Lustig, 2010, Foust, 2010) has centred around Levy’s (2008) work. This author has 
argued that the new social assistance programmes provide incentives for workers and firms to 
stay or move towards informality. Levy carried out econometric analysis and concluded that 
social security contributions provide disincentives for private investment and that social 
assistance programmes promote low productivity informal jobs and affect economic growth He 
proposed a system of universal benefits funded by an increase in consumption taxes. The extent 
to which his proposal would in fact represent a universal system is debatable, because he 
suggests keeping family benefits, i.e. the Oportunidades programme, as a targeted social 
assistance programme. In addition, Lustig has suggested that this proposal would produce a 
downsizing of benefits for the present social insurance beneficiaries and would end up affecting 
most workers apart from those in the first two income deciles. However, even for these workers, 
the immediate impact of increasing consumption taxes would be negative even if in the future 
those in the informal economy would be able to enjoy an old-age pension. 
3.4.2.3. Research on Redistribution 
The work of Esquivel et al (2011) and Scott (2013) is relevant for the study of the redistributive 
effects of social policies. Mexico registered a drop in inequality between 1996 and 2006, 
although it has later increased. Esquivel et al (2011) investigate the determinants of that 
reduction. During that period the Gini coefficient for total per capita household income 
decreased from 0.543 to 0.498. The authors modelled several probable causes with data from the 
National Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH)6, among them two social policies: pension 
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programmes and Oportunidades social assistance benefits. Three determinants were found to be 
the main contributors to the reduction in inequality: the relative rise in wages of low-skilled 
workers, remittances from migrants and the Oportunidades programme. On the other hand, 
pensions were found to be among the causes actually generating inequality.  
Esquivel et al (2011) also published a study on the distribution of taxes and benefits based on the 
work of Scott (2013, 2009). This author has been conducting incidence analysis to estimate the 
distributive effects of taxes and social spending per income deciles, using data from national 
income and expenditure surveys. The analysis included spending on healthcare, education, state 
contributions to pension systems from general revenues, subsidies to the rural sector, 
consumption subsidies and programmes targeted at the poor were included. The study published 
in Esquivel et al (2011) corresponds to the year 2006; it was possible because for that year, at the 
request of the Secretariat for Social Development, the survey introduced a special module on 
social programmes. In 2013 Scott (2013) published similar studies for 2008 and 2010.   
For 2006, Scott (2013) found that only 42 per cent of total spending was progressive in absolute 
terms, i.e. the poor received more in per capita terms than the rich. Of the rest, 47 per cent was 
regressive in absolute terms, i.e. the rich received more per capita even if the poor got more in 
proportion to their income, and 11 per cent was openly regressive,  i.e. benefits represented a 
higher proportion of the rich’s income, actually increasing inequality (p. 285). The programmes 
found to be more progressive were those targeted at the poor, healthcare for the uninsured and 
education, whilst social insurance programmes were found to be regressive, and among these the 
most regressive were pensions for public sector employees. In general, according to the author 
social spending had a positive effect in reducing inequality in 9.3 per cent. This result is mainly 
due to the inclusion in the study of education, which represents the largest proportion of social 
spending and was found to be progressive.  
For 2006, Scott (2013) found that a low redistributive effects of the tax/benefit system that 
reduces the GINI coefficient in only 12.6 per cent, compared to reductions of up to 50 per cent in 
other OECD member countries. For 2008 and 2010, the author estimated a reduction in income 




On the net gains in final income after taxes and benefits, Table 2 compares the results of Scott’s 
studies for 2006 and 2010. The table shows the percentages in which taxes and benefits increase 
or decrease original income, and the net gains after the application of both, per income decile. 
The 2010 study estimated net cash gains and net gains including benefits in-kind. According to 
Scott, in 2006 taxes represented 6.7 per cent of the original income for the first income decile, 
whilst for the tenth decile the proportion increased to only 13.9. The net effect, subtracting taxes 
from benefits, was 68 per cent for the lowest families and -9 per cent for the highest decile. In 
2010, taxes remain at similar levels, but benefits register significant increases for the first two 
deciles; for the third and fourth deciles net gains also increased but at more modest levels. It is 
interesting to observe how the value of benfits in-kind increases final income; according to Scott 
this is mainly due to healthcare and education services.   
Table 2. Incidence of Taxes and Benefits (% of Original Income) 
Income 
Decile 
Benefits Taxes Net Effect 
2006 2010 2006 2010 
2006 2010 
Total Cash Total 
1 74.7 105.8 -6.7 -6.4 68 32.1 137.9 
2 43.7 45.9 -5.9 -5.1 37.8 8.1 54 
3 32.5 32.8 -6.9 -6.1 25.6 2.6 35.3 
4 26.6 25.1 -7.6 -6.3 19 0.0 25.1 
5 21.9 20.3 -7.5 -7.8 14.4 -2.8 17.5 
6 18.5 16.3 -8.7 -8.2 9.8 -4.2 12.1 
7 16.4 12.2 -8.5 -8.9 7.9 -5.7 6.5 
8 13.6 9 -10.2 -10.3 3.4 -7.5 1.6 
9 10 6.3 -11.5 -11.6 -1.6 -9.4 -3.2 
10 4.8 2.2 -13.9 -14 -9 -12.7 -10.5 
Sources: Scott (2013) 
 
Scott’s calculations would suggest that the levels of vertical redistribution of the Mexican 
tax/benefit system have increased in recent years. However, these research does not generates a 




reforms, it would be necessary to go back in time before the reforms were introduced, which not 
be possible using data from income and expenditure surveys because of the absence of the 
necessary variables. In addition, Scott’s research does not permit a deeper analysis of the mixed 
effects of fiscal and social policies on population groups that share other attributes apart from 
income level. This is especially relevant for the Mexican case when the attachment of the 
household earners to a fragmented labour market determines the access to social benefits and 
services, more so than in other countries where the wedge in the entitlement only distinguishes 
between employed and unemployed. What is required then is to take the analysis to the micro-
level in order to reveal not only the system’s vertical but other modes of redistribution too, on 
families representative or illustrative of the diverse spectrums of society. As Scott concludes, a 
next step could be to develop taxes and benefits simulation models; these models would allow 
the identification of different redistributive effects across specific types of families or 
households.  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) publishes data on the 
impact of tax/benefits systems on income of different household types for several member 
countries; but no data is provided for Mexico (OECD, 2014). Lopez-Calva and Urzua (2011) 
mention that in Latin America models for the simulation of the effects of tax/benefit systems on 
households are still in the development stage. These authors have recently led an effort for the 
integration of such models for five countries in the region including Mexico. The authors 
comment that Latin American countries do not have a tradition of designing micro-simulation 
models, in contrast to Europe where they are extensively used.  
These models are meant to simulate the structure of the system of taxes and benefits at the micro 
level, usually on households or individuals, to estimate the system’s impact on income 
distribution, levels of poverty and inequality or in general on the overall welfare generated by 
fiscal and social policy changes. The advantage of micro-simulation models is that they can 
account for the heterogeneity and diversity of the population’s attributes in contrast to 
econometric models that simulate policy impacts at a more aggregate level (Lopez Calva and 
Urzua, 2011). The volume ‘Taxes and Benefits Systems in Latin America’ edited by Lopez-




nonetheless, the results of their application were not yet available at the moment of the writing 
this thesis. 
Absalon and Urzua (2011), responsible for the Mexican model, describe the country’s tax/benefit 
system, the available data for the integration of the model and their characteristics, the variables 
and assumptions they were making for the integration of the model. The source for the data that 
was being used was the 2008 ENIGH. Table 3 lists the components of the Mexican tax/benefit 
system as identified by the authors. The table includes the institutions that collect the taxes or 
contributions and/or provide the benefits or services, and it specifies whether the authors were 
















Table 3. Variables of the Tax/Benefits Simulation Model of Absalon and Urzua 
Tax/Benefit Institution(s) Simulated 
Direct taxes   
Personal Income Tax SHCP Yes 
Corporate Income Tax SHCP No 
Property Tax Municipal governments Partially 
Car Ownership Tax State governments Partially 
Indirect taxes   
VAT SHCP Partially 
Excise taxes SHCP Partially 
Import taxes SHCP No 
Social security contributions IMSS and ISSSTE Yes 
Benefits   
Oportunidades SEDESOL Yes 
Procampo SAGARPA Yes 
School breakfasts DIF No 
Milk social subsidies LICONSA No 
Temporal Employment Programme STPS No 
Old-age pensions IMSS and ISSSTE Yes 
Survivors pensions IMSS and ISSSTE No 
Pensions disability IMSS and ISSSTE No 
Sickness cash benefits IMSS and ISSSTE No 
Maternity cash benefits IMSS and ISSSTE No 
Housing loans INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE No 
Popular Health Insurance SS No 
Source: Absalon and Urzua (2011). 
 
On the tax system, the only direct tax that the model would include was personal income tax, 
including the deduction of allowances and subsidies. Corporate income tax, the other tax 
collected at the federal level, would be excluded because the ENIGH does not identify it. The 




data from the ENIGH since the survey did not record the specific amounts paid for such taxes. 
On indirect taxes, for VAT, namely sales tax, the authors were planning on assuming fixed 
amounts for the consumption goods or fixed expenditure proportions, since the ENIGH did not 
record it either, as was also the case of excise taxes, namely special taxes on goods like alcohol 
or tobacco, so only the tax on gasoline could be imputed. Import taxes were also going to be 
excluded because of the lack of data in the ENIGH. Regarding social security contributions, both 
IMSS and ISSSTE contributions were included since the ENIGH did identify their amounts paid 
by each household (Absalon and Urzua, 2011). 
On the benefit system, Absalon and Urzua (2011) included the simulation Oportunidades family 
cash transfers and Procampo benefits, a programme of the Secretariat for Agriculture that 
consists of subsidies for farmers and peasants to compensate them for losses incurred due to the 
sector’s trade opening, but not exactly a social protection programme.  The only other benefits 
simulated were going to be social insurance old-age pensions. The rest of the benefits were 
excluded because of the unavailability of data. The authors comment that the system includes 
other social programmes that were disregarded because of their small scale, because they 
exclusively covered workers of particular organisations or because of their ‘sui generis’ nature. 
Absalon and Urzua’s (2011) study will not assess the effects of several core programmes of the 
Mexican social protection system, like incapacity benefits and housing programmes. 
Additionally, because of the absence of empirical data from the 1990s, like in the case of Scott’s 
work, it will not be possible to assess the full effect of the reform process. This thesis aims to 
contribute to the literature by filling in this gap. The next section presents some general 
information on Mexico to provide a context for the analysis. 
3.5. Socio-Demographic and Labour Market Indicators 
In 2010 Mexico had a population of 112.3 million (INEGI, 2010), it is the second largest country 
in Latin America after Brazil, and the eleventh in the world. It is considered an upper middle 




1,644,449 million US Dlls, and GDP per capita to 14,666 US Dlls7 (58th in the world) (WB, 
2011).  
Mexico has changed dramatically during the second half of the twentieth century. Between the 
1940s and 1980s, decades of the ISI model, the country experienced the highest population 
growth rates in its history, with annual averages of more than 3 per cent from 1950 until 1980; 
total population increased from 19.7 million in 1940 to 81.2 million in 1990. At the same time, 
the country passed from being a predominantly rural country, with 64.9 per cent of the 
population living in rural areas in 1940, to a largely urban one, with 71.3 per cent in urban areas 
in 1990, as shown in figure 1. Since then, growth rates have slowed considerably, falling to 1.9 
per cent in the 1990s and 1.4 per cent in the last decade; nonetheless total population did increase 
in more than 30 million, whilst the percentage of urban population reached 76.8 (INEGI, 2010).  
Figure 1. Total Population and Percentage of Urban Population, 1910-2010 
 
Source: INEGI (2013). 
 
Contrary to other Latin American countries (UNDP, 2014), poverty and inequality rates have not 
decreased in Mexico during the twenty-first century. The methodology that the government 
                                                 




began to use to measure poverty in the early years of the twenty-first century was based on three 
per capita poverty thresholds. The lowest threshold was called ‘food poverty’ (pobreza 
alimentaria in Spanish) and referred to the minimum income that a person required to obtain a 
minimum acceptable level of nutrition. Population in households with a per capita income below 
that line were considered to be in ‘food poverty’ (Szekely, 2005). 
The second poverty threshold was called ‘capabilities poverty’ (pobreza de capacidades in 
Spanish), which referred to the minimum income required to meet a person’s nutrition needs, 
education and health needs. Population in households with a per capita income that fell below 
this threshold was considered to be in ‘capabilities poverty’ (Szekely, 2005). 
The third poverty threshold was called ‘patrimony poverty’, (pobreza de patrimonio in Spanish), 
and it referred to the minimum income that a household required to meet the nutrition, health and 
education needs of all its members, but also housing, clothing, and transportation needs. 
Population of households with a per capita income that fell below this thresholds were 
considered to be in ‘patrimony poverty’ (Szekely, 2005). 
Figure 2 shows the variation of the percentage of the population that fell below two poverty 
thresholds, ‘food poverty’ and ‘patrimony poverty’, for the period 1950-2010. As can be 
observed, rates registered a sharp decline up to the 1980s, but have remained at the same level 
since. The ‘patrimony poverty’ rate dropped from 88.4 per cent of the whole population in 1950 
to 54 per cent in 1984, but has since remained above 50 per cent in most years; in 2012 it was 
estimated at 52 per cent. Population in ‘food poverty’, also considered to be in extreme poverty, 
fell from 62 per cent of the entire population in 1950 to 23 per cent in 1984, but by 2012 it had 
just dropped to 20 per cent (CONEVAL, 2013, Szekely, 2005). In 2008 the government modified 
the methodology to measure poverty again, but there are no historic series on the estimation of 




Figure 2. Poverty Rates, 1950-2012 (% of Urban Population) 
 
Source: Szekely (2005) and CONEVAL (2013) 
 
Inequality measurements have remained at high levels too. Figure 3 presents two calculations of 
the GINI index, a long series for the period 1950-2004 published in Szekely (2005) and the one 
published by the World Bank, only for the period 1984-2010 (WB, 2013).  According to the first 
series the index dropped to its lowest point in the mid-1980s, and then rose to levels close to 
0.50. The series published by the World Bank tell a similar story, with the index remaining at 
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Figure 3. GINI Index, 1950-2010 
 
Source: WB (2013) and Szekely (2005) 
 
In addition, according to estimations presented in Hansen (1971), in 1950 the richest 20 per cent 
of the population concentrated 59.8 per cent of total income, whilst the income of the poorest 20 
per cent only represented 6.1 per cent. Estimations published by the World Bank suggest that by 
1984 income distribution improved, as the share of income of the fifth quintile decreased to 52 
per cent, but by the late 2000s the situation had worsened again and in 2008 the share of the 
richest quintile had risen to 56.2 per cent, whilst the share of the other quintiles had declined, 
with poorest quintile obtaining only 3.9 per cent (WB, 2011). 
These indicators could suggest problems with the design of fiscal and social policy in Mexico. In 
spite of their recent expansion, it would appear that the social programmes introduced in recent 
years have failed to lift poor families above poverty thresholds and to redistribute income in a 
more equal way.  
At the same time, Mexican society has been rapidly changing in recent decades. The ageing of 
the population has accelerated as life expectancy increased and the fertility rate has fallen. More 
women have joined the labour market, and the numbers of lone mothers and female headed 














for the design of social policy, as the capacity of families to care for their members decreases, 
whilst the needs for social protection increase. Specific changes include the following (all data 
taken from government national surveys):  
 A rise in the participation of women in the labour market. According to data from the 1990 
census show female labour force participation rate was 19.9 per cent8, whilst in 2011 the rate 
was estimated at 42.2 per cent. 
 The percentage of female led households out of the total number of households increased 
from 17.3 per cent in 1990 to 24.6 per cent in 2010.  
 The average size of households has decreased from 4.7 members at the beginning of the 
1990s to 3.9 in 2010. 
 The proportion of households comprised by extended families out of the total households 
increased from 19.6 per cent in 1990 to 24.5 per cent in 2000 and then fell slightly to 23.6 per 
cent ten years later. This means that in 2010 three out every ten Mexicans lives within an 
extended family. 
 Population is still relatively young, with a median age of 26 years. The decline in fertility 
rates has reduced the percentage of underage dependants younger than 16 years to 29.3 per 
cent in 2010 from 38.6 per cent in 1990. The country has entered a phase where the working-
age population constitutes the majority; dependency rates have fallen from 74 underage or 
old-age dependents out of every 100 people in working age in 1990, to 55 in 2010. 
 Nonetheless, the population is also ageing rapidly product of the decline in fertility rates 
along with the reduction in mortality rates. The percentage of elderly people above 65 years 
old increased from 4.2 per cent in 1990 to 6.3 per cent in 2010, and if current trends continue, 
according to projections by the National Population Council it is projected that in three 
decades one out of every five Mexicans will have 65 years or more. 
The labour market has also experienced great changes in the past seven decades. In 1950 the 
primary sector employed 58.3 per cent of workers; later, as people began migrating to urban 
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areas and the country became more industrialised, the proportion of workers in the secondary 
sector began to rise, although, it was the services sector the one that grew faster at the expenses 
of the decline in agricultural employment. As can be observed in figure 4, between 1950 and 
1980 employment in the secondary sector grew by 7 points, whilst employment in the tertiary 
sector increased by more than 20 points. After a boost to the industrial sector after the 
liberalisation of the economy, in the past decade its proportion of employment fell to 23.9 per 
cent. 
Figure 4. Employment per Sector of Economic Activity, 1950-2010 (% of 
Working Population) 
 
Source: INEGI (2013). 
Population growth and the changes in employment structure explain the emergence of the large 
urban informal economy. Even if rural migrants might have provided the labour force for the 
country’s industrialisation, the large majority of them and their descendants were not absorbed 
by industry, but instead joined precarious services jobs or became self-employed in small scale 
activities. Unlike industrialisation processes in core capitalist countries, in Mexico the ISI model 
was never able to create a strong domestic market and to generate enough industrial jobs to 
incorporate the large numbers of people who migrated from the countryside (Brachet-Marquez, 




The national statistics office (INEGI) recently modified its definition of informal economic 
activity in the country. Traditionally informality was measured by the number of people 
employed in firms that avoided the payment of all taxes and did not keep proper accountancy 
records. In 2012, the proportion of people employed in such firms, whether they were self-
employed, employed by someone else or the employer, amounted to 27.9 per cent of the 
workforce. However, this definition does not consider the people employed in firms that could be 
paying some taxes, but that lacked employment protection and social security coverage. Two 
definitions of informality were adopted to address this omission. 
 The informal sector was defined on the basis of the characteristics of the economic 
unit (or firm). When the economic unit operated on family resources and did not keep 
basic accountancy records, the person was deemed to be employed or self-employed in 
the informal sector. In 2012 this number represented the 27.9 per cent of the workforce 
mentioned above. 
 Informal employment was defined on the basis of the employment conditions. This 
concept refers to all employment that lacks the protection of the legal and institutional 
framework, whether the economic unit falls in the definition of the informal sector or 
not. When these workers are added, the size of informality increased to 59.8 per cent 
of the workforce in 2012. 
The INEGI began estimating both concepts in 2005, since then the percentages have not 
changed. These concepts are important because the employment profile of the earner determines 
the access to social benefits by the entire family. Table 4 shows the segmentation of the labour 
market in Mexico applying the two definitions of informality. Data was taken from the national 
employment survey. Horizontal columns refer to the characteristics of the economic unit, namely 
to the first definition explained above; vertical columns refer to the type of employment, namely 






Table 4. Workers per Type of Employment (Thousands of Workers) 
Sector 
Type of Employment 
Waged Workers Employers Self-employed Total 
Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal 












1,272 12,549 20,271 
Total 18,377 17,698 904 1,301 9,997 1,272 29,278 20,271 
  Source: Adapted from INEGI (2014a). 
 
The number of waged workers amounts to 36.1 million workers; however, out of that total, 18.4 
million (51 per cent) are informal workers. Of the number of informal workers, almost six 
million are employed in the informal sector, that is firms that do not pay any taxes or keep 
accountancy records, and 12.5 million are employed are self-employed in firms that may be 
paying some taxes but do not comply with all their obligations, among them the payment of 
social insurance contributions for their employees. 
Employers and the self-employed are not covered by social insurance, but in theory they should 
be paying taxes, like income or corporate tax. Together both of these segments represent 28 per 
cent of the labour force. Out of the total, 2.6 million are inserted in the formal sector and comply 
with their tax obligations, but the majority of 10.9 million are in the informal sector. When all 
the concepts are added, the total size of the workforce is 49.6 million people, of which 29.3 
million workers are informal and 20.3 million are formal 
The segmentation of the labour market determines the payment of taxes and reception of benefits 
in the following way:  
 As mentioned before, the social insurance legislation only covers waged workers. This 
means that according to the survey, 36.1 million waged workers should be insured, but in 




covered either by the IMSS if they are employed in the private sector or the ISSSTE if 
they are employed in the public sector. 
 The IMSS reports 16.1 million insured workers and the ISSSTE 2.7 million workers 
(IMSS, 2013b). These figures surpass the 17.7 million because they represent real data 
reported by the institutions, but they illustrate the proportion of insured workers per 
institution.  
 Employers and the self-employed are not covered by social insurance but they should be 
paying taxes; however, only 19 per cent comply with the tax legislation. 
 Social assistance programmes would target all informal workers (and their families), 
which represent 59 per cent of the total labour force. 
Table 5 classifies labour market segments according to the components the taxes they pay and 
the type of social programme they could be eligible for. The most numerous segment would be 
workers in informal employment, representing almost 60 per cent of the total workforce. 
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Social assistance Social assistance 
Percentage 31% 5% 5 % 59% 
  Source: Own elaboration with data from INEGI (2014a), IMSS (1997) and ISSSTE (2007) and SHCP (2002). 
1/ The military, the state oil company and some local governments administer separate social insurance schemes, but 
the ISSSTE represents the largest institution. 
 
Regarding the retired population, the number of social assistance pensioners has surpassed the 




just created in 2005 for people who are 70 years or older and are not eligible for a social 
insurance pension reached 3.1 million pensioners in 2012 (Presidency, 2013). The IMSS system 
reports 3.4 million pensioners including old-age, disability and work injuries pensions; these 
pensioners were formerly employed in the formal private sector. The ISSSTE system reports 874 
thousand including all types of pensions as well; these pensioners were formerly employed in the 
public sector. Considering only the number of old-age pensioners, the IMSS reports 1.9 million 
and the ISSSTE 595 thousand, 80 per cent of the total number of social assistance pensioners.  
Figure 5 shows the coverage of old-age pension programmes of the total population 60 years or 
older. In total these three programmes cover 49 per cent of the population; there are other public 
pension programmes for oil state workers, the military and some municipal and state 
governments, but they do not represent a significant percentage. The figure shows that around 
half of the elderly people in Mexico lack any income support, but the lack of protection was 
worse before the introduction of non-contributory, when the social insurance system covered less 
than a quarter of the population the age group. 
Figure 5. Coverage of Pension Programmes, 2012 (% of Population 60 Years or 
Older) 
 

















As commented previously, social insurance covers insured workers and their economic 
dependents. During the first decades after the creation of the IMSS, coverage percentages grew   
Slow, as expansion was focalised in the urban areas where the key industries were located. In 
1950 the IMSS covered only four per cent of the total population. Coverage accelerated and by 
1990 it reached almost half of the population, but has stagnated since then. Figure 6 presents the 
percentage of population covered by the social insurance system between 1950 and 2010. 
Starting in 1970 the figure includes ISSSTE coverage too. In 2010, both institutes were covering 
only 57 per cent of the total population.  
 
Figure 6. Social Insurance Coverage, 1950-2010 (% of Total Population) 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from IMSS (2013b), ISSSTE (2013) and CONAPO (2013). 
 
Social assistance targets families with no social insurance coverage. The largest of the social 
assistance programmes is Oportunidades. Coverage of this programme passed from 300 
thousand families in 1997 to 6.5 million in 2012. Assuming an average of four members per 
family, in 2012 the programme covered 26 million Mexicans, 23 per cent of the population. 
Oportunidades is the only social assistance programme that does not limits coverage to the lack 
of social insurance; however, not being covered by social insurance does constitute one of the 

























Hence, 90 per cent of Oportunidades beneficiaries are not covered by social insurance (Damian, 
2007). Coverage figures of other social assistance programmes are presented in chapters 6 and 7. 
Mexican society has been changing rapidly in recent decades. Families have historically 
represented the main source of welfare in the country, but recent socio-demographic changes 
challenge its capacity to provide protection for their members. The labour market is highly 
segmented, and the majority of workers are not covered by the social insurance system, hence 
their families do not have access to comprehensive levels of social protection. Social policy 
reforms have been largely based on the introduction of benefits outside the traditional social 
insurance system. The next section maps and sketches the policy architectures before and after 
the reforms.   
3.6. Policy Architectures in 1994 and 2012 
This section wraps-up the chapter by comparing the social protection architectures of 1994, 
before the reforms, and 2012, after the reforms. Further details on the architectures of taxes and 
benefits and their coverage are provided in chapters 5, 6 and 7. The comparison presented here 
sketches the changes in the design of social policies described in the previous sections. Table 6 
presents the architecture of each policy area, consisting of the eligibility criteria, benefits, 
funding and administration of each social programme. 
The main features of the reforms are evident. First, the reforms of social insurance system, which 
had at their core the retrenchment of pension programmes. Secondly, the expansion of social 
assistance programmes for population with no social insurance coverage. Thirdly, the centrality 
of the market as a mechanism for welfare provision. Fourthly, the emphasis on targeting as a tool 
to distribute welfare benefits. These features represent the innovations introduced during the 







Table 6. Social Protection Architectures in 1994 and 2012 
Policy Area / 
Programme 
Eligibility Criteria Benefits Funding Administration 
1994 2012 1994 2012 1994 2012 1994 2012 
Healthcare         




































ISSSTE Public sector 
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pensions ’70 and 
more’ 
 Persons 70 
years or older 
with no social 
insurance 
pension. 
 Old-age flat 
rate pensions. 
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women in work 
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sector waged 
women in work 
100% of salary 
for 84 days 
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Policy Area / 
Programme 
Eligibility Criteria Benefits Funding Administration 
1994 2012 1994 2012 1994 2012 1994 2012 
contributions contributions 
IMSS Childcare Waged women 
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3.7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has reviewed the history of the social policy in Latin America and Mexico and the 
relevant literature on the reforms that have transformed it, presented some basic information on 
the socio-demographic characteristics of Mexico to serve as a context for the study and mapped 
the country’s social policy architecture. The literature presented in the chapter is relevant to 
justify the objectives of the thesis, which are to estimate the redistributive effects of social policy 
changes.  
It has been argued that in no other region of the world have so many changes been introduced in 
the field of social policy as in Latin America during the last decades (Barrientos, 2004). Some of 
the reforms have represented innovations that have been imitated around the world . These two 
factors make the study of social policy in Latin America and Mexico highly relevant. 
There seems to be agreement in the literature that the Mexican social protection system has 
transited towards a liberal/residual type. Rich empirical evidence provided by Scott shows that 
levels of vertical redistribution have increased in recent years, although no comparative analysis 
is offered to the moment before the reform phase began, and his insights do not go beyond 
redistribution among income deciles.  
This thesis aims to contribute to the literature by identifying what would be the repercussions for 
Mexican families of the transformation of social policy, by revealing the redistributive logic of 
social policies not only across income levels, but also across different sectors of the population 
that enjoy different benefit levels, and by providing a full assessment of the reform phase by 
comparing redistribution of taxes and benefits between 1994, before the reforms began, and 
2012. In other words, the thesis aims to identify which family types have been benefited or 
affected by the reforms and by which policy changes. The questions that guide the research and 





4. Research Aims and Methods 
4.1. Introduction 
The following chapter presents the project’s objectives, the methods that will be applied to try to 
reach them and sketches the research’s design. The main purpose of the study is to assess the 
redistributive potential on families, of the changes in social policy that have been undertaken in 
Mexico during the past 18 years. A hypothetical simulation will be carried out of the taxes and 
benefits that a group of model households would have to pay or be entitled to. The potential 
effects of taxes and benefits will be simulated at two moments in time, before and after the 
reforms. The simulation technique that will be applied is the ‘model families’ method. All direct 
taxes and benefits of the major programmes that form the national social policy architecture of 
the country will be included.  
The rest of the chapter is divided in four sections. The second section explains the research aims 
and research questions. Section 4.3 describes the ‘model families’ approach that will be applied 
in the research and its main characteristics. The fourth section presents the research design and 
details the general assumptions and concepts for the development of the project. It includes 
information on the selection process of model families, based on three dimensions: employment 
profile, income level and family composition; and the assumptions that are made to achieve the 
comparison across time. This section finalises by offering a sketch of the tax/benefit system’s 
components, as they will be calculated for each employment profile.  At the end, some 
concluding remarks are offered.  
4.2. Research Aims and Questions 
To remind the reader, this research project is a comparative study of market-centred social policy 
reforms in Mexico at the household level in two moments in time. The thesis seeks to contribute 
to the literature on Mexican social policy by offering a comprehensive assessment of the reform 
process and its vertical and horizontal redistributive effects. Whilst this project is about Mexico, 




can or have had, not only in other Latin American countries, but also in countries outside the 
region where similar reforms of taxes and benefits have been implemented.       
The research will identify the potential effects at a household level of the shift that has been 
undertaken in Mexican social policy during the past two decades. More specifically, to determine 
if the reforms implemented across the social protection system have potentially augmented or 
diminished the levels of support offered by the state to households from different socioeconomic 
groups, and if such a variation has occurred, then to identify the extent in which those different 
types of households could have been benefited or affected by the policy changes. The levels of 
support are operationalised in terms of the disposable income of model families after the 
payment of taxes and the reception of benefits. The research is based on the hypothetical 
simulation of taxes and benefits according the established rules in the year prior to the reforms, 
1994, and the last year available, 2012. Model families selected for the study are meant to 
illustrate different population groups and the distribution of taxes and benefits as established by 
the tax/benefit system’s rules. 
By covering a period of 18 years, the project will yield a comprehensive evaluation of the reform 
social policy process and will reveal which have been the socio economic groups on whose 
welfare the state has put more or less emphasis. Results will exhibit the horizontal and vertical 
redistributive potential of social policies before and after the reforms, hence illustrating the 
consequences for different types of families of the policy changes, and revealing if there has 
been a variation in the population groups prioritised by the state, and if so what has been the 
extent of such variation. 
The main research question that the thesis attempts to answer is the following:  
 How did the fiscal and social policy reforms undertaken in Mexico between 1994 and 
2012 modify the redistributive potential of the tax/benefit system? 
 The redistributive potential is operationalised in terms of a family’s income after the payment of 
benefits and the reception of benefits according to the rules set by the policy architecture, 
especially the eligibility criteria, benefit levels and funding sources of different social 




reception of cash benefits, and final income which also includes the usage of benefits in-kind. 
The tax/benefit system refers to all direct taxes paid at the national level and the benefits of the 
major social programmes operated by the federal (national) government, from the main social 
policy areas, namely pensions, employment benefits, family benefits, healthcare, housing and 
education. Taxes and benefits are calculated on an annual basis. 
Since the purpose is to evaluate the reform process, the study will calculate and compare the 
effects of the tax/benefit system on family income at two moments in time, before and after the 
reforms. The moment before the reforms is the year 1994, the first year of the government that 
started the reform process, and 2012, the year of the last government and the last year available. 
The research covers the last three governments. In Mexico presidential administrations last six 
years, with no possibility of re-election. As explained above, before 1994 the development of 
social policy shows a great stability, based on the gradual expansion of social insurance through 
the incorporation of new programmes or the extension of coverage.    
The research will seek to answer three sub-questions: 
 How were the changes in the system’s rules expected to benefit or affect households from 
different sectors of the population? In other words, who were the winners and losers of 
the reforms? Which were the family types most affected or benefited by the reforms? 
 How were changes or continuities in the redistributive potential of the tax/benefit system 
obtained? In other words, what specific changes in the system’s rules benefit or affect 
households from different sectors of the population? Which programmes affected or 
benefited different family types? 
 How can the emerging architecture of the tax/benefit system be characterised? In other 
words, what are the main features of the country’s social protection model that emerged 
from the reform process?  
The thesis then aims to identify the consequences of the social policy reforms at the family level. 
The data analysis seeks to reveal how the reforms of the tax/benefit system have impacted the 
welfare of Mexican families, expressed in terms of their income after taxes and benefits, which 
policy changes have favoured or affected different families and to establish the main features of 




The research rationale, scope and expected contributions were presented in chapter 1. It was 
mentioned that contrary to the trend observed in other Latin American countries, poverty and 
inequality rates in Mexico have remained at extremely high levels. According to the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), most countries in the region have registered steep 
decreases in the percentages of poor and vulnerable people during the current century, whilst in 
Mexico the fall has been of only a few percentage points. These measurements differ from the 
official poverty measurements published by the national statistics office of Mexico. This thesis is 
then justified because it is considered that a better understanding of how the social protection 
system has been functioning is needed to discern the reasons behind the persistent high levels of 
poverty in the country. The analysis of the architecture of the tax/benefit system is necessary to 
reveal its failures and achievements and to identify areas of opportunities where the system can 
be improved to enhance its potential to fight poverty and inequality. 
Figure 7. Poor and Vulnerable Population in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico (% of Total Population) 
 
Source: UNDP (2014) 
4.3. The Method: Model Families 
The ‘model families’ method consists on the hypothetical simulation of the redistributive impact 


























modelled according the system’s rules. The units of analysis on which the effects are calculated, 
which could in fact be families, households or individuals, are meant to be illustrative of the 
population, not representative. The method generates a picture of how a tax/benefit system 
should work following its established rules. 
‘Model families’ has been extensively applied in cross-national comparative studies of social 
policies in countries with advanced welfare states. It was originally developed in the 1980s to 
compare family policies, but was later applied to compare other social policy areas 
(Papadopoulos, 1998, Bradshaw, 1994), like social assistance programmes (Eardly et al., 1996), 
unemployment benefits (Papadopoulos, 1998) and lone-parenthood policies (Bradshaw et al., 
1996). The approach has also recently been applied to compare social protection levels in former 
Communist states (Bradshaw et al., 2013). 
Bradshaw (1994) states that comparative studies of social policies can be classified in four types: 
‘macro studies of inputs’, ‘macro outcome studies’, ‘micro studies of inputs’ and ‘micro studies 
of outcomes’. Micro studies of inputs would be aimed at examining particular systems, 
comparing benefits and services, and answering questions like what benefits and services are 
available, at what level, how are they delivered, by whom and for whom, and how frequently. 
‘Model families’ would fall under the category of these micro studies of inputs.  
Papadopoulos (1998) elaborates more on the objectives, characteristics and possible uses of the 
method and notes that its primary goal is to study policy outputs.  He explains that the 
application of ‘model families’ requires first an analysis of the policy environment and the 
institutional structure at a meso-level, in order to then allow the study of the policy outputs at a 
micro-level. This author calls the approach ‘micro-data simulation technique’ (MDST), and 
defines it as a technique for generating micro-data to analyse the structure and objectives of 
public policies, more specifically it consists in the simulation of the outputs of a group of 
policies (i.e. the tax/benefit system), in terms of the benefit packages offered by the government 
to households, families or individuals. The technique can be used to analyse and compare policy 





As mentioned, the application of ‘model families’ is based on the simulation of the expected 
effects of the tax/benefit system on different types of families (households or individuals). The 
impact of the tax benefit/system refers to the amount that a family would be expected to pay in 
taxes and social security contributions, and to receive in welfare benefits from the state, 
according to the legislation and rules of a determined country. The precise components of the 
tax/benefit system that are considered can vary according to the type of study that is undertaken. 
The precise application of the method can also vary, but by looking at the studies that have used 
it, its steps can be summarised in the following way:  
 The first step of the method is to select the units of analysis, i.e. the group of model 
families, according to certain criteria that depend on the research topic and objectives.  
 Then the current legislation should be reviewed to gather information on the taxes that 
each model family would have to pay and the benefits and services that would be 
available also for each model family.  
 Data could also be collected about private expenditure associated with welfare services 
(i.e. education, health and housing). 
 A matrix is built with the taxes, benefits and private expenditure that correspond to each 
model family.   
 Finally, the net disposable income for each model family is estimated, taking in to 
account original gross earnings of each model family, subtracting net taxes that it would 
have to pay (i.e. income tax and social security contributions subtracting tax deductions), 
adding the benefits and services each model family would be entitled to, and if necessary 
depending on the research’s objectives, subtracting the estimates of private welfare 
spending.  
The formula for the application of ‘model families’ or micro-data simulation technique is shown 
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Source: Own elaboration based on Bradshaw (1994). 
 
The use of the model family approach generates several advantages for the study of tax/benefit 
systems (Papadopoulos, 1998, Bradshaw, 1994, Van Mechelen et al., 2011): 
 It is simple and results are easy to understand. 
 It has limited data requirements and does not require survey data where social policy 
beneficiaries may be underrepresented, where elements of social policy benefit packages can 
be underreported or not identifiable. 
 Maximises the extent in which like is compared with like, by utilising the same unit of 
analysis: model families or households.  
 Allows for an integral approach, with the possibility of comparing the system as a whole and 
eliminating the problem of not considering the interaction of policies. 
 It can be highly transparent and permits the replication of results. 
 Can be used as the basis for further policy analysis at a macro-level. 
 
‘Model families’ also has some limitations, that nonetheless can be overcome (Bradshaw, 1994). 
The method produces a description of how the social policies should work according to their 
rules, not how they work in reality. In other words, it assumes full compliance with the 
legislations and a take up rate of 100 per cent; hence, it shows the expected impact of the 
policies, not their outcome in terms of their final impact (Van Mechelen et al., 2011, Bradshaw, 
1994). In a country with the geographical, economic and political conditions and institutional 
capacity like Mexico, there could be a considerable distance between the system’s rules and how 
they are applied in terms of access and delivery of benefits. Nonetheless, precisely because of 
such possible distance, this thesis aims to assess the design of the social protection system. The 
objective is to quantify the social protection architecture and its potential for redistributing 




Indeed the key aim of the thesis is to assess the redistributive potential of social policy reforms in 
the form of the outputs that can be produced by the design of the policy architecture. It is not to 
assess actual outcomes which are produced by the interaction between policy regulations, their 
implementation and the wider socio-political and economic environment where households 
operate. In this context, the empirical data of this thesis involves the quantification of tax and 
social policy rules and legislation expressed in a monetary form. It is not the monetary impact of 
taxes and benefits on actual income of households which, as mentioned, is also influenced by 
other socio-political and economic factors as well as individual circumstances and characteristics 
or even clientelististic practices. This latter exercise is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
A second limitation is associated with the inevitable arbitrariness in the selection of the model 
families, since the more assumptions that are made about them, the less representative of a 
country’s reality they might become. The choices that are made not only about the selection of 
model families, but also about locality, benefit amounts, housing costs and others, will strongly 
affect the results. It has been argued that ‘model families’ fails to take into account the 
heterogeneity of the population. These arguments are linked to the issue of representativeness. 
Like it has been stated in a recent report, although the main objective of the technique is to 
illustrate the operation of tax/benefits systems, it is still worthwhile to make a reference to how 
representative the simulation is (Van Mechelen et al., 2011). Another way to overcome this 
limitation is to be as transparent as possible in the presentation of the research design, and in the 
case of extremely sensitive variables, to present results before and after its application, as 
Papadopoulos (1998) recommends. This thesis also addresses the issue by attempting to model 
effects for a wide range of family types. 
The third limitation relates to the need of selecting a specific location within a country to conduct 
the study. In countries with locally determined benefits  a specific location has to be chosen to 
identify the variables for the study (Eardly et al., 1996, Van Mechelen et al., 2011). This is 
especially relevant for studies of federal countries, like Mexico. This thesis will analyse the 
output of policies instrumented at a federal level, namely at the national level, but taking 
earnings and other variables from Mexico City, the largest metropolitan area of the country and 




Van Mechelen et al (2011) also comment that the approach does not capture the entire benefit 
package that families may have at their disposal, for example production for own consumption, 
private transfers or in-kind benefits. Regarding the latter, the authors mention that the 
quantification of services can represent an obstacle in cross-national studies. Nonetheless, this 
thesis does attempts to overcome such limitation by modelling the effects of three types of 
services, as described below. 
Finally, Van Mechelen et al (2011) warn that results may not be straightforward because of the 
specific role that social policy arrangements play at different moments and time. For example, in 
one case social assistance transfers may have a lower amount due to the existence of another type 
of programme that supplements the families’ income. In this thesis this will not be a limitation 
because the simulation covers programmes from all core social policy areas. 
4.4. Research Design 
As commented previously, the model families approach has been previously applied in cross-
national studies to estimate levels of income support offered to families of different 
compositions. In this thesis it is innovatively adapted to compare two moments in time within the 
same country; and to analyse the redistributive effects across families of different labour market 
attachment. The latter is especially important for the case of Mexico because of the 
fragmentation of the social protection system. This section explains the way in which the method 
will be adapted for this thesis, the indicators that will be used to analyse the data, the criteria 
taken into account for the selection of model families and the components of the tax/benefit 
system that will be calculated for the different family types.  
4.4.1. Comparison across Time 
The study analyses the effects of the tax/benefits system’s architectures of 1994 and 2012. The 
Mexican currency is called peso ($). To make the results comparable, all amounts are expressed 
in constant pesos of 2012. Figures of 1994 were brought to 2012 applying the inflation index 
from December 1994 to December 2012 of 5.44, reported by the national statistics office    




Mexican pesos were converted to pounds using the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rates 
established by the OECD (OECD, 2014). The PPP rate of 2012 was $11.33 for one pound.    
Real wages in Mexico have been falling for more than 20 years. Figure 9 shows the evolution of 
the annual average minimum wage for the period 1994-2012, expressed as percentage of the 
minimum wage of December 2010. As can be observed, in 1994 the average would have 
represented more than 140 per cent of the average at the end of 2010; after sharp falls in the 
1990s, it has continued to decrease and just between 2002 and 2012 it lost close to ten percent of 
its real value.   
 
Figure 9. Annual Average Minimum Wage, 1994-2012 (December 2010=100%) 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from CONASAMI (2013). 
 
The figure shows the average minimum wage because it varies across the country to reflect 
differences in the cost of living. In 1994 there were three economic zones with three different 
amounts, but just in 2012 the zones were reduced to two. Table 7 shows the daily minimum 
wages per zone for both years, expressed in pesos of 2012. As is explained below, the research 
will establish income levels of family models in the number of times that original earnings 
represent of one minimum wage. In both years Mexico City falls in Zone A; therefore the 










Table 7. Daily Minimum Wages by Economic Zones (2012 pesos/pounds) 
Zone 
1994 2012 
$ £ $ £ 
A 83.68 7.39 62.33 5.50 
B 77.19 6.81 59.08 5.21 
C 70.12 6.19 ----  
Source: Own elaboration with data from the CONASAMI (2013) 
 
The minimum wage in Mexico lost 25.5 per cent of its value between 1994 and 2012. This fall 
must be taken into account when the results of the research are analysed. Levels of income after 
taxes and benefits will tend be higher in 1994 just because the initial income was 25.5 per cent 
higher, although the levels of state support (i.e. the percentage that the value of the tax/benefit 
package represents of original income) could be higher in 2012.   
 
4.4.2. Criteria for the Selection of Model Families 
The criterion for the selection of model families varies depending on the objectives of the 
research (Bradshaw et al., 1993, Bradshaw et al., 1996, Eardly et al., 1996). In the case of this 
thesis, the selection process aims to illustrate the effects of the different components of the 
tax/benefit system. The eligibility criteria of social programmes and the payment of taxes in 
Mexico vary with the employment profile of the earner(s), income level and family composition. 
These are the three dimensions that are applied for the selection of model families. 
As previously discussed in this thesis, a high degree of segmentation is the main characteristic of 
the Mexican labour market and the social protection system mirrors that segmentation (Barba, 
2006). In other words, the type of employment of the earner determines the type of social 
benefits that the family would receive. Hence, the first dimension to be incorporated in the 
selection process is the employment profile of the family, which is the link that the family has to 
the labour market defined by the type of employment of its earner(s).  
There are four employment profiles than can illustrate the effects of the tax/benefit system. 




 Waged workers in the formal private sector with them and their employers complying 
with tax and social insurance regulations. 
 Public sector workers, which would automatically comply with tax and social insurance 
regulations. 
 Self-employed (or employers) complying with tax regulations. 
 Waged workers, self-employed (or employers) that do not comply with either social 
insurance or tax regulations, or both. 
As stated, families of the first two groups would have access to social insurance and would pay 
income tax, whilst the households linked to the informal sector could be entitled to social 
assistance at the same time that only some or no taxes are paid. The differentiation between 
waged formal private and public sector workers is important because of their different social 
insurance systems. The objective is to identify levels of redistribution across different segments 
of the labour market.  
Families of earners who are formal salaried workers would pay income tax and social insurance 
contributions, and would receive social insurance benefits from the IMSS in both years. Families 
of earners employed in the public sector would also pay income tax and social insurance 
contributions, and would receive benefits from their own social insurance system, the ISSSSTE. 
Families of self-employed earners complying with income tax would not be covered by the 
social insurance system, but in 2012 they could be eligible to social assistance benefits. Families 
of informal workers who would not be complying with income tax and would be covered by 
social insurance even if in principle some should be for being waged workers, but in 2012 they 
could be eligible to social assistance. Education is the only universal programme that is not 
associated to the family’s labour market profile. 
Pensioners would represent an additional employment profile. In this case, it will be assumed 
that the retired worker spent his entire career employed under one of the four profiles mentioned 
above. Hence, a person pensioned by the IMSS system would have worked been employed in the 
formal private sector throughout their lives, a person pensioned by the ISSSTE system would 
have done the same in the public sector, and a person eligible for a non-contributory pension 




The second dimension for the selection of model families is income level. Taxes and benefits 
also depend on the family’s income level. The amounts that a family pays in taxes and social 
insurance contributions are based on the earner(s) earnings. Social insurance benefits can also 
vary according to the workers wage, and more importantly of the study of policy changes in 
Mexico, the eligibility to social assistance programmes depends on the family’s earnings.  
In many studies that have applied the model family approach three gross earnings levels before 
taxes and benefits have been set: average earnings, half average earnings and 1.5 average 
earnings (Bradshaw et al., 1996, Bradshaw and Tokoro, 2014, Van Lancker and Van Mechelen, 
2014). The official data on average earnings in Mexico is the following. The monthly average 
household income reported in National Income and Expenditure Survey (ENIGH) for 1994, 
expressed in pesos of 2012, was $15,080 (£1,331) and in 2012 it was $12,708 (£1,122). These 
amounts include all cash income (e.g. income from waged labour, government transfers and 
migrant remittances) and non-cash income (e.g. gifts and in-kind transfers from other households 
or individuals). If only cash income is considered, the monthly average household income for 
2012 would be $10,005 (£833), and if only income from waged labour is considered, $8,428 
(£744) (ENIGH, 2012). The mean monthly average wage of employees reported in the 2012 
National Occupation and Employment Survey (ENOE) was $6,193 (£546) (ILO, 2013). The only 
issue with using any of these figures for the present study is they all represent post-tax income. 
In fact, all national surveys in Mexico report only post-tax income (Attanasio and Binelli, 2009). 
Several studies that have applied the ‘model families’ approach have set earnings levels at 
average earnings, 1.5 times average earnings and half average earnings. In an attempt to follow 
those studies (Bradshaw et al., 1993, Bradshaw and Tokoro, 2014, Eardly et al., 1996). To set 
levels of gross earnings, one alternative for the present thesis could be to discount the payment of 
taxes from the averages reported in the national surveys, which as mentioned do not report pre-
tax income, and make the calculations for the same three levels as other studies; however, that 
decision would not reveal the full effects of the tax/benefit system at the bottom of the income 
scale, where the application of targeting mechanisms can establish the access to benefits at lower 
levels than half the average income, nor would it reflect the country’s high income inequality, 
where average household income in the 10th decile represents 26 times the average of households 




Another alternative would be to set levels of original earnings in times the minimum wage. The 
minimum wage was established in Mexico since 1917 (CPEUM, 1917); it is widely used in 
Mexican public administration to set the he value of fines, tariffs and similar concepts that are 
deemed to need updating with wage levels (CONASAMI, 2013). The minimum wage is defined 
as the minimum daily amount that a worker can receive for his services (LFTSE, 1963), before 
the payment of taxes or the reception of government transfers. Specifically for social policy, the 
minimum wage is used in the social insurance legislation to establish contributions and benefits 
levels. When the legislation makes reference to the insured worker’s wage expressed in times the 
minimum wage, it considers the gross wage before payment of any taxes (LSS, 1997). Hence, 
setting income levels in times the minimum wage in the present study would avoid the obstacle 
of not having average pre-tax gross earnings in government surveys.  
Setting levels of original earnings in times the minimum wage will also be useful to reflect a 
wider income spectrum, in accordance to the country’s high income inequality, it would be 
useful to reveal the effects of targeting mechanisms at the bottom of the income scale, and it 
would reveal the levels of support offered by the state to workers who earn the minimum legal. 
The minimum wage as a starting point to calculate the effects of taxes and benefits has also been 
used in studies of advanced welfare states (Marx and Nelson, 2013). 
The levels of average earnings expressed in times the minimum wage would be the following. 
The average household income for 1994 would represent 6.1 times the minimum wage of that 
year, and for 2012 6.7 times. The average household cash income of 2012 would represent 5.2 
times the minimum wage and the average from waged labour 4.5 times. The mean wage would 
represent 3.3 times. 
The decision taken will be to establish levels of original earnings in times the minimum wage, as 
follows: 
 One to five times the minimum wage. One is the legal minimum that a waged worker can 
be paid, five would be close to the average in both years and the levels in between will 
reveal the effects of targeting mechanisms. 
 10 times the minimum wage, because it represents the maximum at which some social 




the maximum at which contributions and benefits are set in both years for public sector 
workers. 
 15 and 20 times the minimum wage, to identify the effects of taxes and benefits for high 
income families. 
 25 times the minimum wage, because it represents the maximum at which social 
insurance contributions and some benefits are set for private sector employees. 
The third dimension for the selection of family types is family composition. This dimension 
refers to the number and age and of household members, to identify the levels of support that the 
state offers to different type of families. Bradshaw (Bradshaw, 1994) comments that family 
models should be illustrative, not representative of a population. In the case of this thesis, the 
selection process was carried out with the aim of illustrating the effects of the various 
components of the tax/benefit system. The assumptions considered for the selection of family 
compositions were the following. 
On the side of taxes, the rules for the payment of income tax nor social insurance contributions 
do not differentiate between different types of families, so workers would pay the same amounts 
regardless of having economic dependents or not. The only component for which family 
composition matters if for Popular Health Insurance, because families with young children 
would be exempted from paying them up to a higher income level than childless couples or 
families with older children. 
On the side of benefits, composition is important because family benefits, namely maternity 
leave and childcare, only cover insured women in work, and pensioners could receive a 
complement if have had economic dependents. On the side of social assistance benefits, family 
composition is relevant for estimating the effects of conditional cash transfers, which depend on 
the number and school level of children, and childcare services, to which women in work would 
be eligible to. 
The system does not consider any special provisions for dual earner families. Income tax and 
social insurance contributions are calculated and paid on an individual basis, as well as social 




vary depending on the family’s income and structure, but the rules do not differentiate between 
single and dual earner families. Hence, no dual earner family types are included in the research. 
Considering then the characteristics of social programmes, the following family types were 
selected:  
 A couple with one male earner, one newly born child and one child in primary school, 
which is referred to as the ‘standard family’ through the rest of thesis. 
 A couple with one male earner and four children: one newly born, one in primary school, 
one in secondary school and one in high school. 
 A childless couple with one male earner. 
 A lone parent family headed by a female earner with one newly born child and one in 
primary school. 
 A one person household of a pensioner 70 years old. 
In sum, the process for the selection of the model households will be the following:  
1. The first dimension to be applied will be the four employment profiles, plus the cases of 
pensioners previously employed under the conditions of the four employment profiles. 
2. Each employment profile group will be divided in nine income levels expressed in times 
the minimum wage.  
3. Employment profiles and income levels will be divided by four family compositions. An 
additional composition will be the pensioner’s household. 
Considering all the possible combinations, taxes and benefits will be calculated for a total of 144 
family models plus 45 pensioner household types. Because of space limitations, the results 
presented in the following chapters will be based on the calculations for the standard family at 
three levels of original earnings: one minimum wage, five and 25 times the minimum wage. 
However, reference to the results of other model families will be made when necessary to 
illustrate the effects of the tax/benefit system.  
As previously commented, under the ‘model families’ approach the family types selected are 
meant to be illustrative of the whole population, not representative; however, it is still relevant to 




2011). Section 3.5 described the Mexican labour market and the rates of social insurance 
coverage. This study will cover all labour market status except the unemployed, however the 
unemployment rate in Mexico has been historically low, hardly surpassing five per cent of the 
labour force (WB, 2013). In addition the inclusion of the unemployed will not illustrate any 
relevant changes in the tax/benefit system. So the five labour market status identified to choose 
the family types would represent all households in the country. 
The nine income levels would also represent a wide spectrum of the population. Like mentioned, 
income inequality in Mexico is very high, with a large proportion of workers earning wages 
below the mean. Figure 10 shows the wage distribution for workers in the formal private sector 
expressed in times the minimum wage, from one to 25. Almost 60 per cent of workers earn less 
than the average wage of 3.3 minimum wages (ILO, 2013) and almost 80 per cent have earnings 
equivalent to five times the minimum wage or less. At the other end, 1.8 per cent of workers earn 
25 time the minimum wage or more.      
Figure 10. Wage Distribution, 2012 (% of Workers in X the Minimum Wage) 
 
Source: IMSS (2013b). 
 
Household earnings are only slightly less skewed because of the presence of more than one 
earner. The proportion of households in 2012 with an income from waged labour below the 















five times the minimum wage is 59 per cent (ENIGH, 2012). By including income levels from 
one to five times the minimum wage, this thesis will identify the support offered to the majority 
of families in the country, with the higher income levels as the reference for who much those that 
support compares to the support offered to upper income families. 
On family composition, as already mentioned, 25 per cent of households are headed by a female 
and 75 per cent by a male. One-person households represent nine per cent of the total. By 
number of members, the highest proportion corresponds to households of four member, 23 per 
cent, whilst households of 6 or more members represent 17 per cent. The following section 
describes some general assumptions that apply to all calculations. 
4.4.3. General Assumptions 
This section describes the general assumptions that will apply to the data analysis process. 
Specific assumptions made about the calculation of each component of the tax/benefits system 
are detailed in the corresponding section of the next three chapters. The study compares the 
effects of the system throughout 1994 and 2012. The first general assumption to consider is that 
taxes, benefits and expenditures will be estimated on an annual basis.  The taxes that should be 
paid and the benefit that should be received in each year will be added up for each model family. 
By calculating taxes and benefits annually, instead of monthly, it will be possible to simulate of 
the effects of benefits like sickness or maternity leave, which may cover more than one month. 
It is assumed that family types meet all eligibility criteria for the social programmes that 
correspond to their employment profile and income level. The same is assumed for the 
conditions to remain in programmes like targeted family cash transfers (i.e. the Oportunidades 
programme).  
The value of benefits in-kind will be quantified using figures of average per capita spending. The 
three types of benefits in-kind are included in the study: healthcare, child care and education. In 
the case of healthcare, the figure that will be used is the annual amount spent in each segment of 
the system - namely IMSS services for public sector workers, ISSSTE for public sector workers 
and services for families with no social insurance – divided by the number registered users. The 




children. In the case of education, the figure that will be used is the average spending per student 
reported by the Secretariat for Education.   
It will be assumed that all families make the same use of services regardless of their income 
level, except for education. Two situations for education will be calculated. Private education is 
frequent among high income groups, although in total, only 10 per cent of all Mexican children 
attend private schools. To reflect this trend, it will be assumed that high income families do not 
enrol their children in public schools and pay a tuition fee of a private school. In the case of 
healthcare spending, in spite of the large coverage percentages of the public healthcare 
programmes reported by the government, private spending represents around half of the total 
spending on healthcare in the country. To reflect this trend, it will be assumed that all families 
incur in private spending on healthcare services. These assumptions are important because these 
private spending concepts can be deduced from income tax. 
In the case of social insurance contributions, only the employee’s share is calculated, as this 
would the amount contributed by the family. Employer’s and state contributions are not 
calculated. This assumption applies to contributions paid to the housing institutions that fund 
mortgage loans for formal sector employees. 
In the case of pensioners it will be assumed that the person spent his/her entire working life 
under the same employment profile, as already commented, and earning the same salary in times 
the minimum wage. This assumption is important for the calculation of social insurance 
pensions, which depends on the number of years that persons contributed to the system and their 
wage levels 
The study includes only families with employed earners; the unemployed are not considered. The 
unemployment rate of Mexico is low compared to other countries; at the end of 2012 the rate 
was 4.4 per cent of the total working age population, and historically only in rare occasions has it 
surpassed five per cent (INEGI, 2013), On the other side, the informal sector is very large. 
Employment protection is provided through severance payments mandated by the labour 
legislation and no income support programme for the unemployed had ever been implemented at 
the national level up to 2012. Given the low unemployment rate and the absence of social 




Levels of redistribution are estimated at two different moments. The first one refers to 
‘disposable income’, namely the cash income of family types after the payment of taxes and the 
reception of cash benefits. The second moment is referred to as ‘final income’, namely the 
virtual income that would result from adding the value of benefits in-kind to disposable income. 
The effects of housing programmes will be estimated after final income, because they large 
amount could distort the results.  
Two basic indicators will be used to estimate changes in levels of redistribution and state 
support. The first one is disposable or final income expressed as a percentage of original earnings 
for each family type. The second indicator is disposable or final income of 2012 expressed as a 
percentage of disposable or final income of 1994. Additional indicators that are used to illustrate 
the effects of policy changes are described in the corresponding section. 
4.5. The Mexican Tax/Benefit System 
This section wraps-up the first part of the thesis by presenting the components of the tax/benefits 
system as they will be calculated in the thesis for each employment profile. Considering the 
policy architectures sketched in chapter 3 and the research design discussed in the present 
chapter, table 8 compares the components of the tax/benefit system by employment profile of 
1994 and 2012. Taxes and benefits are presented as they would be subtracted from or added to 
original earnings following the ‘model families’ formula. Social insurance contributions are 
presented before income tax because that is how they are applied in Mexico. As mentioned, 
social insurance contributions will only include the employee’s share. Private spending on 
welfare services should be added to disposable income at the end, especially to estimate the 







Table 8. The Tax/Benefit System by Employment Profiles in 1994 and 2012 
Formal Private Sector 
Employees 
Public Sector Workers Self-employed formal sector Informal workers (employed or 
self-employed) 
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4.6. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter described the research objectives, the method that will be used to achieve them, and 
the assumptions that will be made for its application. The method that will be applied to answer 
the research questions is ‘model families’, used extensively in studies of comparative social 
policy. It consists on the hypothetical simulation of the effects of taxes and benefits on different 
family types. The effects of taxes and benefits are simulated according to system’s rules. The 
method serves the purpose of this thesis, which is to reveal the variations in the levels of state 
support offered to different population groups as a result of changes in the social protection 
architecture of the country. 
One advantage of model families is that if offers certain degree of flexibility. Hence, it is 
possible to adapt it for the comparison of two moments in time within the same country, as it is 
used in this thesis. The chapter concluded by specifying some general assumptions that should be 







5. Effects of Changes in Taxes and Contributions 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of the potential effects of changes in the components of the tax 
system: 
 Social insurance contributions, with two separate systems; the IMSS system for private 
sector employees ruled by the Social Insurance Law (LSS) and the ISSSTE system for 
public sector employees ruled by the ISSSTE Law (LISSSTE).  
 Income tax ruled by the Income Tax Law (LISR) and including personal income tax for 
wage earners and corporate income tax for the self-employed; in the case of the latter two 
additional set of rules would apply, the Single Rate Business Tax (IETU) ruled by its own 
law, the LIETU, and the Minor Taxpayers Regime (REPECOS) considered in the LISR. 
 Popular Health Insurance (SPS) contributions which fund healthcare for families with no 
social insurance, ruled by the General Health Law (LGS) and its operation rules 
published annually. 
The main indicator used for the analysis is disposable income expressed as a percentage of 
original income for each model household. Results are shown by employment status and income 
level. Regarding household composition, findings presented here are based on the calculations 
for a households made up of a couple with a male earner and two children. Tax and contribution 
rules in Mexico apply on an individual basis and do not differentiate among household 
compositions, hence the same effects would apply to all compositions. The only case where 
composition matters is Popular Health Insurance, hence in that case calculations for other 
household models are discussed. 
The effects of the different taxes and contributions are discussed in the order in which they apply 
according to the system’s rules. The following section of the chapter presents the effects of social 
insurance contributions, which would apply first because they are netted out of taxable income. 
The third section discusses the effects of changes in income tax rules, including the introduction 
of IETU and the REPECOS during the last decade. The fourth section centres on the effects of 




those with earners not covered by social insurance either because they are self-employed or they 
work in the informal economy. Each of these sub-sections is divided in three parts: the first part 
describes the changes in the rules and contribution and tax rates, the second one specifies the 
assumptions made for the calculations and the third one discusses the potential effects on the 
disposable income of model households. The sixth section compares the combined effects of all 
the system’s components and identifies the model households that would be most benefited or 
affected by the combination of changes. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered.  
5.2. Social Insurance Contributions 
Social insurance covers households with earners who are formal sector employees. There are two 
systems, the IMSS system for private sector employees and the ISSSTE system for public sector 
employees. Both systems are funded by tripartite contributions from the state, employers (which 
in the case of the ISSSTE system are the state secretariats or ministries) and workers. This study 
includes the calculations of workers’ contributions; since they represent the amount that 
employees contribute from their own wage to fund the benefits they receive from the system. 
Contributions amounts were calculated following the rules specified in the legislation: the 1973 
Social Insurance Law applicable in 1994, the 1997 Social Insurance Law applicable in 2012, the 
1982 ISSSTE Law applicable in 1994 and the 2007 ISSSTE Law applicable in 2012.   
5.2.1. IMSS: Private sector employees 
5.2.1.1. IMSS contributions structure 
The Mexican Social Insurance Institute (IMSS) covers waged workers in the private sector. Its 
services are funded by tripartite contributions. The 1997 reform replaced the Social Insurance 
Law of 1973, one of the main changes was the modification of the contributions structure. Under 
the old law, workers contributed to two insurance branches with a total of 5.25 per cent of their 
wage. The reform introduced the following changes: 
 The Sickness and Maternity branch was separated into three sub-branches, one to fund 




pensioners. The total rate for these concepts was reduced from 3.125 per cent of the wage 
to 0.91 per cent on average.  
 A progressive formula for the Healthcare sub-branch was introduced. The rate was 
established at 0.4 per cent of the difference between the workers wage and three 
minimum wages and exempting all workers earning three times the minimum wage or 
less. 
 The Disability, Old-Age and Death branch was separated in two branches, one called 
Disability and Life and another one Retirement and Old-Age, and the total rates for these 
concepts was reduced from 2.1 to 1.8 per cent of the worker’s wage. 
 The cap of 10 minimum wages that existed for the calculation of the Disability, Death 
and Old-Age contributions was eliminated; after 1997 all contributions were capped at 25 
times the minimum wage. 
Contribution rates before and after the reform are compared in table 9. One important aspect that 
was kept was that workers earning the minimum wage were exempted from paying all 
contributions. 
Table 9. IMSS Workers’ Contribution Structures, 1994/2012 
1994 2012 
Insurance Branches Rate (% of wage) Insurance Branches Rate (%of wage) 
Sickness and Maternity 3.125 Sickness and Maternity 0.91 
  Healthcare1/ 0.28 
  Cash benefits 0.25 
  Healthcare for pensioners 0.375 
Disability, Death and Old 
Age  
2.125 Disability and Life 0.625 
  Retirement and Old Age 1.125 
Total 5.250 Total 2.655 
Source: LSS (1973), LSS (1997). 
1/ Contributions for Healthcare are calculated at 0.4 per cent of the difference between the worker’s wage and 3 
minimum wages; workers earning less than 3 minimum wages are exempted. The perentage shown in the table is the 





5.2.1.2. Assumptions for the calculations of IMSS contributions 
It was assumed that worker’s employment status did not change and that all workers remained in 
the same income level throughout the whole year. 
5.2.1.3. Effects of IMSS contributions 
In 1994 the same rates applied to all workers except those with earnings of one minimum wage, 
because they were exempted, and those earning the equivalent of 10 minimum wages or more, 
because of the cap on the Disability, Death and Old Age branch. The 1997 reform introduced a 
more differentiated structure. Figure 10 compares the 1994 and 2012 disposable income after 
social insurance contributions for four income levels. At the lowest income level, disposable 
income represents 100 per cent of the original in both years because they would be exempted in 
both years. For the rest of the households the reform would have resulted in higher percentages 
of disposable income. 
Figure 11. Disposable Income after IMSS Contributions, Formal Sector 
Employees, 1994 and 2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
For families earning two and five times the minimum wage, the reform would have represented 
and increase in their disposable income from 94.8 per cent of the original to 97.6 and 97.5 per 






















disposable income of 96 per cent, higher than at two and five minimum wages since they would 
be paying less contributions due to the cap of 10 times the minimum wage on one of the 
insurance branches; in 2012 disposable income would increase to 97.3 per cent, slightly below 
the other two household types. 
By reducing contribution rates, the social insurance reform of 1994, would have had a positive 
effect on the disposable income of all households. Interestingly, in 1994 high earnings 
households would have been contributing to the system with lower percentages. This situation 
was corrected by eliminating the cap on one of the branches and by the reform’s intention of 
making the structure progressive, with contribution rates rising with income level. Nonetheless, 
the differences of only decimal points could not be considered significant.   
5.2.2. ISSSTE: Public sector workers 
5.2.2.1. ISSSTE contributions structure 
The State’s Workers Social Security and Services Institute covers all federal civil servants and a 
large percentage of state and municipal workers. In 2007 a new ISSSTE Law was enacted which 
replaced the Law passed in 1982. Like the IMSS reform, the reform included a new contribution 
structure, but contrary to that one, rates were increased and set at higher percentages. The 
changes that the reform introduced in workers’ contributions were the following: 
 Two contribution branches were eliminated: contributions to fund personal loans and the 
contribution for ‘administrative expenses’. Personal loans as a benefit offered by the 
ISSSTE were kept, but the new legislation established that they should be self-funded, by 
the interests paid on previous loans. 
 A special branch within the new Healthcare branch amounting to 0.625 per cent of wage 
was introduced to fund the healthcare services of pensioners. 
 The previous branch that funded all pensions was separated into two new branches: 
Disability and Life and Retirement and Old-Age, with an increase in the rate from 3.5 per 
cent of wage to 6.75 per cent. 
An aspect that was preserved was the cap of 10 minimum wages on the wage used to calculate 




table 10. In total, workers’ contributions share was raised from 8 per cent of wage to 10.63 per 
cent. 
Table 10. ISSSTE Workers’ Contribution Structure, 1994 and 2012 (% of Wage) 
1994 2012 
Insurance Branches Rate (% of wage) Insurance Branches Rate (%of wage) 
Healthcare 2.75 Healthcare  
  
Healthcare for active 
workers 
2.75 
  Healthcare for pensioners 0.625 
Pensions 3.5 Disability and Life 0.625 
  Retirement and Old Age 6.125 
Social services 0.5 Social Services 0.5 
Loans 0.5   
Administrative expenses 0.75   
Total 8.00 Total 10.625 
Source: LISSSTE (1983), LISSSTE (2007). 
5.2.2.2. Assumptions for the calculation of ISSSTE contributions 
It was assumed that worker’s employment status did not change and that all workers remained in 
the same income level throughout the whole year. 
5.2.2.3. Effects of ISSSTE contributions 
Figure 11 compares the potential effects of ISSSTE contributions changes. Disposable income 
would be expected to drop for all model households because of the rise in contributions. In 1994 
disposable income for the first three income levels represented 92 per cent of the original, 
compared to 89.4 in 2012. The highest proportions of disposable income would be registered for 




Figure 12. Disposable Income after ISSSTE Contributions, Public Sector 
Employees, 1994 and 2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
5.2.3. Comparison of Changes in IMSS and ISSSTE Contributions 
Contrary to households with earners employed in the private sector, households with earners who 
are public sector employees were negatively affected by the reforms. In 1994 public sector 
workers were already contributing with larger percentages of their earnings to fund their social 
insurance benefits, but the reform widened the difference. 
Figure 12 compares the amount of ISSSTE contributions as a percentage of IMSS contributions 
in 1994 and 2012. For the lowest income level, public sector workers are not exempted from 
paying contributions like workers employed in the private sector; in 1994 the amount that a 
household of a public sector employee would have been contributing represented 109 per cent of 
the amount contributed by a household of a private sector employee, but by 2012 the proportion 
would be expected to rise to 112 per cent. It is at this lowest level that the gap is the widest 
because private sector workers would be exempted from social insurance contributions. For the 
next two income levels, in 1994 contributions of both systems were set almost at the same level, 
but by 2012 ISSSTE contributions represented 109 per cent of IMSS contributions. The most 



















times the minimum wage, because of the cap on 10 times the minimum wage preserved for 
ISSSTE contributions, which compensates for the increase of rates.  
Figure 13. ISSSTE Contributions as a Percentage of IMSS Contributions, 
Public Sector Employees, 1994 and 2012 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
ISSSTE beneficiaries were paying higher rates in 1994 than IMSS beneficiaries because 
arguably their benefit levels were also higher. The reforms widened that gap. In 2012, the state 
was asking public sector workers to contribute with significant larger percentages of their wages 
to fund their social insurance benefits. The next section of the present chapter discusses the 
potential effects of changes in income tax rules. 
5.3. Income Tax 
Income tax reforms began much earlier than social policy reforms. The Income Tax Law (LISR) 
in force in 1994 was originally enacted in 1980, but significant changes had already been 
introduced by 2012. For example, the marginal rate for the top income bracket had been reduced 
from 60 to 35 per cent (Elizondo, 1994). 
Income tax rules apply on an individual basis to all people subject of paying it regardless of 

























are employed in the formal sector, whether in the private or public sectors, and households with 
earners who are self-employed and follow the rules that oblige them to pay taxes, plus, only in 
2012, pensioners with a pension equivalent to 15 times the minimum wage or more.  
Table 11 lays out the tax schedules for 1994 and 2012. The 1994 schedule includes the 
modifications introduced in 1991, which consisted of a subsidy of a 50 per cent discount on the 
marginal tax rate for the first five brackets, decreasing discounts on the rates of the next levels, 
reductions of the fixed fees of all ranges, and the addition of three brackets at the top of the 
income scale.  




















x MW $2012 x MW $2012 
0.0 0.3 0.0 - 1.50 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 1.92 
0.3 2.3 0.0 122 5.00 0.3 2.2 0.0 114 6.40 
2.3 4.0 0.1 3,157 8.50 2.2 3.9 0.1 2,967 10.88 
4.0 4.6 0.3 7,586 12.50 3.9 4.5 0.3 7,131 16.00 
4.6 5.6 0.3 10,042 16.00 4.5 5.4 0.4 9,439 17.92 
5.6 11.2 0.5 14,479 19.80 5.4 11.0 0.6 13,087 21.36 
11.2 17.7 1.2 37,071 23.80 11.0 17.3 1.8 39,929 23.52 
17.7 22.4 1.9 57,019 28.00 17.3 --- 3.2 73,703 30.00 
22.4 26.9 2.2 67,092 31.50      
26.9 --- 2.4 71,843 35.00      
Sources: LISR (1981), LISR (2002). 
The 2002 reform reduced the number of income brackets and brought down the top rate from 35 
to 28 per cent, although by 2012 it had been raised two percentage points to 30 per cent. The 
number of income brackets was initially reduced to six, but later augmented back to eight. There 




no distinction is made between private and public sector employees. The first part of this section 
discusses the effects on households with waged earners and the second part the effects on 
households with self-employed earners.  
5.3.1.  Income tax for waged earners 
5.3.1.1. Tax structure for waged earners 
The rules described in this section apply to all individuals that have a formal subordinated 
employment relationship with an employer. This would also be the group subject of coverage by 
the social insurance system, either the IMSS for private sector workers or the ISSSTE for public 
sector employees. Low income waged workers are entitled to a subsidy on income tax, 
introduced in 1993. The subsidy is discounted from the amount that should be paid for income 
tax, and if the subsidy’s amount is higher than the amount calculated for income tax, the worker 
receives the exceeding amount as a benefit from the employer, and the employer later deducts 
the amount from his corporate income tax. In practice, the subsidy represents a cash transfer for 
poor workers. Table 12 compares the subsidies applicable during 1994 and 2012. In 1994 all 
workers received the subsidy, although the amounts decreased and became not very significant 
as income increased. With the introduction of the new LISR, subsidies were limited to workers 




























x MW $2012 x MW $2012 
0.0 1.4 0.16 4,909 0.0 0.9 0.22 4,884 
1.4 1.9 0.15 4,613 0.9 1.4 0.22 4,882 
1.9 2.4 0.13 3,923 1.4 1.9 0.22 4,879 
2.4 2.9 0.12 3,603 1.9 1.9 0.21 4,713 
2.9 3.4 0.11 3,312 1.9 2.4 0.20 4,590 
3.4 3.8 0.10 2,993 2.4 2.5 0.19 4,251 
3.8 --- 0.10 2,906 2.5 2.9 0.17 3,898 
    2.9 3.3 0.16 3,536 
    3.3 3.8 0.14 3,042 
    3.8 3.9 0.12 2,611 
    3.9 --- 0 0 
Source: LISR (2002), LISR (1981) 
The legislation permits deductions on income tax of several concepts associated to the 
purchasing of private welfare services and benefits. The amounts spent are discounted from 
taxable income. Taxpayers can deduce the amount spent for themselves and their economic 
dependents. With the reforms the number of these concepts has been increased.  Table 13 lists 
the concepts that were allowed in 1994 and 2012. In comparison to the first year, in 2012 
taxpayers could additionally deduce the purchasing of private health insurance, the payment of 
mortgage loan interests, voluntary contributions to private and pension funds and the payment of 






Table 13. Deductible Concepts from Personal Income Tax, 1994 and 2012 
Concept 1994 2012 
Medical expenses Yes Yes 
Private health insurance No Yes 
Funeral expenses Yes Yes 
Mortgage loan interests No Yes 
Voluntary contributions to public pension funds Yes Yes 
Voluntary contributions to private pension funds No Yes 
Private school fees No Yes 
 Source: LISR (2002), LISR (1981) 
All expenses are deductible at 100 per cent from taxable income (LISR, 2002), with the 
exception of private school fees, which are capped at the equivalent of the average cost of a child 
in the public education system (SHCP, 2011), and mortgage loan interests, which use a formula 
based on investment units, a currency used for financial transactions (LISR, 2002). 
5.3.1.2. Assumptions for the calculations of income tax for waged earners 
The following assumptions were made for the calculation of income tax: 
 The rules described in this section were applied to households with earners assumed to be 
private or public sector employees. 
 Taxable income was taken from the income after social insurance contributions minus 
deductions. 
 Workers’ income and employment status remained the same throughout the year. 
 Household composition consisted of a couple and two children, one newly born and one 
in primary school, but the results would be the same for other compositions.  
 Deductions of private healthcare expenses were calculated using the national annual 
average per capita spending taken from the national income and expenditure surveys 
(ENIGH, 2012). In 1994 per capita private spending amounted to $908 in 2012 pesos 




 Since 90 per cent of children in Mexico attend public schools, deductions of private 
school fees were only calculated for the highest income levels above 15 times the 
minimum wage, which would correspond to the tenth income decile. The annual amount 
applied for both years was $12,900 per child (£1,139 in PPP), reported as the average 
private school fees in Mexico City in a report published by the national teacher’s union 
(SNTE, 2013). Same amount was used for both years because no data was found for 
1994. 
 No data was found on the ENIGH or other sources on voluntary contributions to pension 
plans, so that concept was not included in the calculations. Amounts deducted from 
spending on mortgage loans interests are incorporated to the calculations and discussed in 
chapter 7, where the specific section on housing is presented.  
 
5.3.1.3. Effects of income tax for waged earners 
The first part of the analysis highlights the importance of tax subsidies as a benefit for low 
income families. Figures 13 and 14 compare income tax amounts as percentages of original 
earnings, before and after the application of tax subsidies, for households with earners employed 
in the private sector at five income levels. As can be observed in the first graph, if subsidies are 
excluded all families end up paying higher amounts in 2012 than in 1994.  The difference 
between the two years increased with income level. Hence, the highest increase would be 
registered for households earning 25 times the minimum wage, for which income tax would 
represent 21 per cent of original earnings in 2012, almost the double than in 1994.   
The second figure illustrates how subsidies benefit low income households. The percentages of 
the first three income levels shown are negative because these families would be paying a 
negative income tax, that is, their subsidy would be greater than the amount initially calculated 
which means they would receive the exceeding amount as a cash transfer. Subsidies make the tax 
rate negative until an earnings level of 2.5 times the minimum wage. Subsidies are also higher in 
2012 than in 1994. For households at the lowest income level, the subsidy would be expected to 
increase from 13 per cent in 1994 to 17 per cent of their original earnings in 2012, at twice the 
minimum wage subsidies increase from four to five per cent and at 2.5 times the minimum wage 





Figure 14. Income Tax as a Percentage of Original Earnings before Subsidies, 
Private Sector Employees, 1994 and 2012  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
  
Figure 15. Income Tax as a Percentage of Original Earnings after Subsidies, 
Private Sector Employees, 1994 and 2012 
 










































The combined effect of social insurance contributions and income tax changes would have had a 
positive effect on low income families and negative on middle and high income families, and 
they would have benefited more (or affected less) families of private sector employees than 
public sector employees.  Figures 15 and 16 compare 1994 and 2012 disposable income after the 
payment of social insurance contributions and income tax, for households with earners employed 
in the private and public sectors. In 1994 disposable income of the family of a private sector 
employee earning one minimum wage represented 12.7 per cent more than its original earnings 
and 5.4 per cent more for the family of a public sector employee. In other words, contributions 
and tax rules would actually raise the income for these families above the original income. At the 
other extreme, disposable income in 1994 would drop 14.2 per cent for families of private sector 
employees earning 25 times the minimum wage and 13.7 per cent for families of public sector 
employees. 
Figure 16. Variation between Disposable Income after Contributions and Taxes 
and Original Earnings, Formal Sector Employees, 1994 (percentage) 
 
























Figure 17. Variation between Disposable Income after Contributions and Taxes 
and Original Earnings, Formal Sector Employees, 2012 (percentage) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The figures show that for families with original earnings of up to twice the minimum wage, 
disposable income in 2012 was higher than in 1994; whilst the opposite happened for families of  
five and 25 times the minimum wage. Low income families benefited from higher tax subsidies; 
middle and high income families would have been mostly affected by higher income tax rates. In 
fact, in 2012 income tax subsidies would be sufficient to raise income above the original for 
households of private sector employees earning twice the minimum wage too, meaning that these 
families would be receiving a cash benefit from the state that the others would not.  
Families of private sector employees show higher disposable income than families of public 
sector employees at all income levels because of social insurance contributions. Indeed, whilst 
the IMSS reform established the reduction of rates, the ISSSTE reform raised them considerably. 
Hence, the main winners of contributions and tax changes appear to be low income families, but 
especially those with earners employed in the private sector. At the other extreme, high income 
families would be the main losers. These results suggest that for these employment statuses, the 


























One point that is worth adding is the possible effect of income tax deductions. The results shown 
above include deductions of private healthcare and education expenses. Figure 17 compares the 
impact that the application of deductions would have on income tax. As can be observed, a 
family with original earnings of one minimum wage would only obtain an annual reduction of 
$178 (£16 at PPP), but a family at the top end of the income scale would obtain a reduction of 
$4,644 (£412 at PPP). These numbers were calculated applying the same expenditure levels for 
all families, but in fact high income families spend much higher amounts on these concepts and 
obtain significantly higher reductions, especially considering that the tax reforms increased the 
number of concepts that could be deduced.  
Figure 18. Annual Amounts of Deductions from Income Tax, Private Sector 
Employees, 2012 (pesos) 
 
Source: Own Calculations. 
The increase in the deductible concepts within the income tax law would represent a regressive 
measure in the country’s income tax structure. Whilst the changes in fees and rates made the 
system more progressive, the incorporation of additional deductible concepts would tend to 
benefit households at the top of the income scale. There would be two consequences of these 
changes. First, they incentivise the opting out of public systems by middle and high income 



















would constitute a substantial benefit that the state would be offering to those households that in 
some cases could surpass the cash benefits provided to poor families. 
5.3.2. Income Tax for Pensioners 
Pensioners were exempted from paying income tax until 2012. A reform introduced in that year 
established the payment of income tax on pensions, but only for those of amounts equivalent to 
15 times the minimum wage or more. The same tax schedule displayed in table 3.3 above would 
apply. A pensioner earning 15 times the minimum wage would fall in the seventh bracket, so her 
marginal rate would be of 23.5 per cent. The effects of the application of income tax on pensions 
is discussed in the next chapter, when the calculations of pensions are presented. 
5.3.3. Income Tax for the Self-employed 
5.3.3.1. Tax structure for the self-employed 
The self-employed are treated by the system as individuals with business activities. This group 
would include people who work independently, like small business owners, independent 
professionals or workers under outsourced professional contracts with firms9. These groups of 
workers and their families would not be covered by the social insurance system because the 
legislation explicitly excludes them. In principle, the same tax schedule presented in table 11 
would apply to them, including deductions of private spending on welfare services but without 
the tax subsidies that only apply to waged earners. (LISR, 2002). However, in 2012 two 
additional sets of rules would distinguish the treatment self-employed workers get:  
 After 2007, all the self-employed should pay an additional tax called the single rate tax 
for businesses (IETU), 
 After 2002, an important share of the self-employed could be eligible for the minor 
taxpayers’ regime (REPECOS).  
The IETU consists of a flat rate tax applicable to all businesses and individuals with business 
activities. The rate in effect in 2012 was 17.5 per cent. Income Tax is deductible from the IETU, 
                                                 
9 This workers in principle are independent, in reality are under a subordinate relationship but without the benefits of 




so the taxpayer only ends up paying whichever is higher between the two. Expenses related to 
business activities are deductible; but regarding spending on private welfare services, only 
contributions to private pension plans can be deduced (LIETU, 2007). 
The REPECOS was part of the 2002 new income tax law. Not all the self-employed are eligible. 
The legislation establishes that only people whose activities are the sale of goods or the provision 
of services directly to the public up to a certain income threshold can join. Instead of paying the 
IETU and income tax, people registered as minor taxpayers pay a fee that replaces both taxes, 
depending on their earnings level, with no deductions allowed. (SHCP, 2008). The fees are 
different in each state; Table 14 shows the Federal District’s fees valid in 2012.  
Table 14. Minor Taxpayers Regime Fees in Federal District (Mexico City), 2012 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Fixed Fee 
$ £ (PPP) 
0.0 0.4 200 18  
0.4 0.7 300 26  
0.7 0.9 500 44  
0.9 1.3 1,000 88  
1.3 1.8 1,500 132  
1.8 2.2 2,000 177  
2.2 4.4 3,500 309  
4.4 6.6 7,500 662  
6.6 8.8 10,500 927  
8.8 11.0 13,500 1,192  
11.0 13.2 19,000 1,678 
13.2 --- 35,000 3,090 




The rules of the minor taxpayers’ regime establish that only individuals selling goods or 
providing services directly to the public are eligible for the minor taxpayers’ regime. This means 
that not all independent workers can be accepted. More specifically, the interpretation of the 
rules means that only independent workers who do not give receipts that are tax deductible can 
be classified as minor taxpayers. The regime would then basically apply to small shop or 
workshop owners. Professionals who are under outsourced contracts with firms will not be 
accepted because they do not provide a service directly to the public, whilst independent 
professionals who may be providing services to the public would be excluded too because their 
receipts are tax deductible (SHCP, 2012).  
5.3.3.2. Assumptions for the calculations of taxes for the self-employed 
The following assumptions were made for the calculations of income tax for households with 
self-employed earners: 
 Household earners were self-employed complying with all the income tax rules. 
 None of these households would be paying social insurance contributions because the 
legislation excludes them from compulsory affiliation. 
 Employment status and income level remained the same throughout the year. 
 Household composition consisted of a couple and two children, one in primary school; 
the results would be the same for other compositions. 
 The same assumptions on private welfare spending previously made for households with 
waged earners were made for these households models. 
 No deductions associated to business activities were considered. 
 
5.3.3.3. Effects of income taxes for the self-employed 
Changes on the tax structure would have contrasting effects depending if the earner was eligible 
for the minor taxpayers’ regime or not. Figure 18 compares the percentage of variation in 
disposable income after the payment of contributions and taxes in 1994 and in 2012. Three 
different calculations are displayed for 2012: after subtracting only income tax (ISR), after 
income tax and the single rate tax (IETU), and after applying the rules of the minor taxpayers’ 




be lower than in 1994 for all earnings levels, but much lower at 25 times the minimum wage, 
reflecting a more progressive structure in the income tax schedule. Nonetheless, the effects 
change significantly when the other two taxes are added.  
Figure 19. Variation between Disposable Income after Contributions and Taxes 
and Original Earnings, Self-employed, 3 Income Tax Scenarios, 1994 and 2012 
(percentage)
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The IETU is highly regressive and it would be especially unfavourable to low and middle 
income households. For the affected households the application of the single rate of 17.5 per cent 
results in a higher amount than the amount of income tax, so they would end up paying the 
former instead of the latter. For families with original earnings equivalent to one minimum wage, 
this would represent a reduction of 14 percentage points in their disposable income compared to 
1994,  whilst for families with earnings of five times the minimum wage, of close to 10 
percentage points. At the top income level, income tax would be higher than the IETU so they 
would pay the former.   
For low and middle income workers that were eligible to the minor taxpayers’ regime, 





























have to pay slightly more, but high income families would result to be greatly benefited.  At 
original earnings of one minimum wage, households would actually be paying more in 2012 than 
in 1994, from 3.5 to 4.4 per cent of their original income; at five times the minimum wage 
slightly less, from 7.4 to 6.6 per cent; but at 25 times the minimum wage, the amount paid would 
be cut in half, from 12 to 6.2 per cent.   
The tax changes affected groups of households with self-employed earners in different ways. In 
the case of households with earners who were able to be classified as minor taxpayers, the new 
regime was greatly beneficial, as long as they belonged to middle and high income groups. In the 
case of households with earners that do not meet the requirements to join the minor taxpayers’ 
regime, the IETU would strongly affect the disposable income of the low and middle income 
ones, cancelling the progressivity of the tax changes observable for households with waged 
earners. In any case, it seems that low income families with self-employed earners appear to 
come out as losers of the reforms. 
5.4. Popular Health Insurance (SPS) Contributions 
Popular Health Insurance was introduced in 2002 to provide healthcare services to families with 
no social insurance coverage. As explained before, workers are excluded from the social 
insurance system either because the legislation does not mandate their insurance, as in the case of 
the self-employed, or because they or their employers avoid the payment of contributions. The 
beneficiary families of SPS would be those with earners who are self-employed but pay income 
tax and those with earners in the informal economy that pay no income tax or social insurance 
contributions, even if they may be legally entitled to social insurance for being employed by 
someone else.  
5.4.1. SPS contributions structure 
The design of SPS attempts to emulate the tripartite structure of social insurance contributions. 
One share corresponds to contributions by the affiliated families; another share to state 
governments, which act as the employer; and a third share to the federal government. 
Contributions vary by income decile. A socio-economic survey is carried out for each family that 




the fee that it would have to pay. Table 15 presents the annual contribution amounts for the year 
2012. Same amounts apply to all families disregarding of the number or age of their members, 
but persons who join individually, with not even one family member, pay 50 per cent of the 
family contribution that corresponds to their income level. When the programme was created, 
families belonging to the first two deciles were exempted from paying contributions, but in 2010 
the exemption was extended to families in the third and fourth deciles.  





$ £ $ £ 
I - - VI 2,834 250 
II - - VII 3,648 322 
III - - VIII 5,650 499 
IV - - IX 7,519 664 
V 2,075 183 X 11,379 1,005 
Source: CNPSS (2011).  
Two complementary programmes to SPS were introduced in 2006. The first one called Health 
Insurance for a New Generation offered the same healthcare services that SPS already provided 
plus some additional ones specifically directed at children, but exempting from the payment of 
contributions families up to the seventh income decile with children born after December of 
2006. The second one called Healthy Pregnancy also exempted from contributions families up to 
the seventh decile but which had a pregnant woman as one of their members. The three schemes 
came to be called the Health Social Protection System, which in practice was just Popular Health 
Insurance with additional exemptions for families with young children and pregnant women up 




5.4.2. Assumptions for the calculation of SPS contributions 
The following assumptions were made for the calculation of Popular Health Insurance 
contributions: 
 Because the survey that is applied to each family to identify its income decile is meant to 
establish available cash income, for families of self-employed earners, it was assumed 
that the income that the survey would reflect income after income tax. 
 For families of earners employed in the informal economy, the income used to determine 
the payment of contributions corresponded to the original income since the earner would 
not be paying any taxes.  
 Employment status and income level remained the same throughout the year. 
 
5.4.3. Effects of SPS contributions 
To illustrate the different potential effects of SPS contributions, this section presents the results 
of the calculations for three household compositions: a couple with two children, one of them 
being less than six years old; a couple with no children; and a lone person. Figure 19 compares 
disposable income expressed as a percentage of the original in 2012 for three family 
compositions with earners employed in the informal economy. In 1994 these families would not 
have been paying any taxes or contributions, so disposable income would have represented 100 
per cent for all of them, but in 2012 some of them would be paying contributions to SPS to fund 
their healthcare services.  
In 2012 couples with young children would be exempted from paying SPS contributions up to an 
earnings level of five times the minimum wage; a couple with no children would have to pay 
contributions at five times the minimum wage, and in fact it would be the household contributing 
with the largest share of its original earnings; and a lone person would not be exempted at five 
times the minimum wage, but because he/she would pay only half of the contributions, its 
disposable income would be higher than the childless couple  at that level and higher than the 




Figure 20. Disposable Income after SPS Contributions, Informal Sector 
Workers, 2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Two points can be highlighted from the calculation of SPS contributions. First, that 
proportionally high-income families would actually be contribute less to the scheme than middle-
income families if the latter do not have young children. The second point is that of all the 
household types, lone persons would be the ones contributing the least since they would only be 
paying half the contributions than other ones. This means that the contributions structure is not 
entirely progressive and that does not necessarily offers the support families with children might 
require.      
Another interesting analysis would be to compare the amounts that families with no social 
insurance coverage and families covered by the social insurance system were contributing to 
fund their healthcare services in 2012. Figure 20 shows the percentages that SPS contributions 
represent of original income and compares them with the same proportions that waged workers 
in the formal economy pay to fund social insurance healthcare. As can be observed, households 
with earnings up to five times the minimum wage would be exempted from paying SPS 
contributions, but when the exemptions cease, contributions are higher than the amounts that 




















be less at the top earnings level, but still SPS beneficiaries would be contributing with higher 
percentages. 
Figure 21. Healthcare Contributions as Percentages of Original Earnings, 4 
Employment Profiles, 2012 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
To summarise this section, SPS contributions would decrease disposable incomes for households 
that in 1994 were not contributing to fund healthcare services. In return they would receive 
benefits that they were not previously receiving, of which the effects are discussed in the next 
chapters. The effects vary with income level and household composition. Levels of support in the 
form of exemptions concentrate on families with children up to five times the minimum wage. 
Among the households paying contributions, those at the top to the income scale would actually 
be less affected because of the method of determining contributions by decile. They would also 
have to do it at higher levels than social insurance beneficiaries. The next section compares 
disposable income after contributions and taxes for all employment statuses. 
5.5. Accumulated Effects of the Tax System 
When comparing disposable income after contributions and taxes in 1994 and 2012, low income 
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the same employment profiles result to be the most affected. Figures 21 and 22 compare 
variations in disposable income as a percentage of the original after discounting all taxes and 
contributions applicable to each household type. The household composition is the couple with 
two young children. In the case of households of self-employed earners, the indicator shown in 
the 2012 graph correspond to earners who in that year would have been eligible for the minor 
taxpayers’ regime. 
Figure 22. Variation between Disposable Income after Taxes and Contributions 
and Original Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 1994 (percentage) 
 



























Figure 23. Variation between Disposable Income after Taxes and Contributions 
and Original Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 2012 (percentage) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
In 1994 households of private sector employees obtained an income of 17 per cent above original 
income, and by 2012 the effects of lower social insurance contributions and higher tax subsidies 
would result raise it to 17 per cent more than the original. These would be the household that was 
most benefited by the system in both years. Among low income households, those with self-
employed earners would not be entitled to tax subsidies, hence in 2012 it would be contributing 
with 4.4 per cent of its original earnings. At the other extreme, the household type that was 
paying more into the system did change. In 1994 it was the top income household of a private 
sector employee which was contributing with 14.2 of its original earnings, but by 2012, as a 
result of higher social insurance contributions, it was the top income household of a public sector 
worker the one that was contributing the most with 24.4 per cent. 
To better illustrate the winners and losers of the reforms, figure 23 displays the differences in 
disposable income as percentage of the original between 2012 and 1994. Hence for example, for 
a household with a private sector employee earning one minimum wage disposable income as a 
percentage of the original would be expected to increase in 4.3 percentage points, for a 
household with a public sector employee of the same income level the increase would be of 1.6 






























Figure 24. 2012/1994 Difference in Disposable Income after Taxes and 
Contributions, 4 Employment Profiles (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Three household types would obtain a higher disposable income after the changes in 
contributions and taxes. First, the household type of the private sector employee, which would 
benefit from higher tax subsidies. Interestingly, the household that would follow would the one 
of the self-employed worker earning 25 times the minimum wage, due to the possibility of 
paying income tax under the minor taxpayers’ regime. At five times the minimum wage this 
employment status would also benefit from that regime. In the case of the household of a public 
sector worker with low earnings, the positive effect of higher tax subsidies would be reduced by 
higher social insurance contributions, although the effect of the changes would still be positive. 
The losers of the policy changes are high income households of private and public sector 
employees, in both cases affected by higher income tax rates. The former would be expected to 
register a drop of 9.1 points in its percentage of disposable income, whilst the latter of 10.7 
points. The difference is the effect of higher social insurance contributions for public sector 
workers. At five times the minimum wage, these employment statuses would also be expected to 































This chapter presented the potential effects of reforms in fiscal policy introduced in Mexico 
between 1994 and 2012. The main winners of the reform process would be expected to be low 
income households with earners employed in the private sector and high income households with 
self-employed earners eligible to qualify for the minor taxpayers’ regime, namely small shop or 
workshop owners. The main losers would be high income households with earners employed in 
the private and public sectors, affected by higher income tax rates and in the case of the latter by 
the rise of social insurance contributions too. 
The objectives of many of the tax changes were not to make the system more or less 
redistributive. For example, the introduction of the minor taxpayers’ regime sought to combat 
informality and increase the tax base; goals that do not seem to have been reached (SHCP, 2012), 
as will be discussed in chapter 8. On the reform of public sector employees’ social insurance, the 
rationale behind the rise in contributions was to fund what have been deemed much higher 
benefit levels compared to private sector employees (OECD, 2009). Nonetheless, the 
calculations showed that the changes would be expected to have important redistributive effects. 
Low income households would receive important benefits proportionally to their original income 
as long as their earners were employed in the formal sector. The issue that remains is to what 
extent is the support received compared to the support offered to higher income levels through 
other tax instruments. For example, the amount that low income households would receive from 
tax subsidies in 2012 would be $3,741 (£330 at PPP) in 2012, actually lower than the amount 
that a high income household would get back from deductions on private healthcare and 
education, which is $4,664 (412 at £PPP). 
A final point to highlight is that middle and high income families with self-employed earners 
appear to have gotten a much better deal out of the tax reforms than households with earners who 
were formally employed. Nonetheless, the fiscal changes can only be fully assessed when 
complemented by the calculations of the benefits that the system delivers, which is the topic of 




6. The Effects of Cash Benefits and Private Spending 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter analyses and compares the potential effects of cash benefits on disposable income. 
The cash benefits offered by the Federal Government in 2012 through social insurance or social 
assistance programmes include the following:  
 Incapacity benefits to replace income when workers are temporarily unable to perform 
their job. These benefits cover exclusively formal sector employees and are delivered by 
the social insurance system since its creation. In the case of private sector employees 
benefits are regulated by the Social Insurance Law (LSS) (LSS, 1997) and administered 
by the Mexican Social Insurance Institute (IMSS), and in the case of public sector 
employees, by the Law of the Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers 
(LISSSTE) (LISSSTE, 2007) and the Federal Law for State Workers (LFTSE), (LFTSE, 
1963), and are administered by the Institute of Social Security and Services for State 
Workers (ISSSTE). Both systems offer three types of benefits meant to cover incapacity 
periods generated by different causes, which are sickness, work injuries and maternity.  
 Family benefits to provide income support to low income families, introduced in 1997. 
These benefits delivered by the social assistance programme Oportunidades are targeted 
and conditional on school attendance by children and on attendance to health related 
activities by all family members. Benefits’ amounts depend on the household’s 
composition; a basic amount is offered to all families whether they have children or not 
and extra amounts are added for every child in school age. Amounts are higher for girls 
than for boys and increase for children in higher school grades.  The lack of access to 
social insurance forms part of the main criteria to determine access to the programme.  
 Pensions to provide an income when people are deemed permanently unable to work. 
Pensions are delivered by both the social insurance and social assistance systems. Social 
insurance offers old-age and retirement, disability, work injuries and survivors’ pensions; 
social assistance offers only old-age pensions. This study analyses old-age pensions, 




Government. Social insurance pensions exist since the creation of the system and are 
regulated by the Social Insurance Law (LSS) and administered by the Mexican Social 
Insurance Institute (IMSS) in the case of private sector employees, and by the Law of the 
Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers (LISSSTE) and the institute of 
the same name (ISSSTE) in the case of public sector employees. Social assistance non-
contributory pensions are delivered through the programme 70 y Mas introduced in 2007. 
The programme offers old-age pensions to elderly people without a social insurance 
pension. Initially its coverage was geographically limited to rural areas, but it was later 
expanded to larger communities and in 2012 to the entire country.  
The main indicator that was used to establish the redistributive potential of cash benefits was 
disposable income expressed as a percentage of original income. Disposable income was 
calculated by subtracting from original income, the contributions and taxes that the model 
household would have to pay and adding all cash benefits that it would be entitled to receive 
according to the system’s rules in force in 1994 and 2012. All calculations were done on an 
annual basis. The chapter discusses the results of the calculations of the model families that 
better illustrate the changes in the levels of support offered by the system. 
The rest of the chapter is divided in five sections. The next section presents the calculations of 
temporary incapacity benefits, which as mentioned, include sickness, work injuries and maternity 
benefits. The following section discusses the results of the calculations of family benefits and the 
fourth section the calculation of pensions. Each of these three sections is divided in three parts, 
the first part presents benefit amounts, the methodologies to calculate them and the eligibility 
criteria before and after the reforms, the second part specifies the assumptions made to estimate 
the effects of benefits on the selected model households, the third part analyses and compares the 





6.2. Incapacity Benefits 
6.2.1. Incapacity Benefits Eligibility Criteria and Amounts 
Private and public sector employees are entitled to three types of benefits to replace income 
during spells when they are incapacitated to perform their job. The first type is a sickness benefit 
when the worker suffers from an illness or is recovering from an accident not related to his work 
activities. The second type is a benefit for work injures in case of illnesses or accidents directly 
derived from work related activities. The third type is a maternity benefit paid to all insured 
women in work for a set period before and after giving birth; only women in work are entitled to 
this benefit, so spouses of male insured workers would not receive it. 
Benefits for private sector employees are administered by the IMSS and for public sector 
employees by the ISSSTE. Only the methodology for calculating IMSS incapacity benefits was 
modified by the reforms, although in practice benefits resulted in the same amounts for all 
workers. Under the previous law, sickness benefits amounts were taken from a table of nine 
wage levels. The incapacitated worker’s wage was placed in the corresponding level, and the 
benefit was paid at 60 per cent of the level’s average, except for low and high income workers: 
for workers earning up to 3 times the minimum wage and above 18 times the minimum wage, the 
benefit was simply calculated at 60 per cent of salary. Maternity leave was paid at 100 per cent 
of the level’s average, except for the same low and high income ranges, for which the benefit 
amounted to 100 per cent of the registered wage. Both formulas would generate the same 
replacement rates as the ones obtained by applying the previous methodology. Work injuries 
benefits were not modified.  
In the case of ISSSTE incapacity benefits, neither amounts nor the eligibility criteria were 
modified by the reform. Table 16 compares amounts, duration and eligibility criteria for each 
type of benefit between the IMSS and ISSSTE systems for the year 2012. The IMSS sick leave is 
paid at 60 per cent of wage starting from the fourth day of incapacity, and work injuries and 
maternity leave at full wage from the first day. The payment of ISSSTE sick leave varies with 
the length of employment; for example, for a worker employed for less than one year the first 15 
days of incapacity are paid at 100 per cent of wage and from the sixteenth day until 52 weeks at 




conditions as, with 100 per cent of wage covered from the first day of incapacity up to a 
maximum of 52 weeks. Maternity leave for public sector employees covers a period of six days 
more than for private sector employees, although in both cases it is paid at 100 per cent of wage.  









Sickness 60% of wage 
From 4th day 
of incapacity 




prior to start 
of leave 
100% of wage 15 days < 1 year 
employed 
50% of wage Until 52 weeks 
100% of wage 30 days > 1 year < 5 
years 
employed 50% of wage Until 52 weeks 
100% of wage 45 days > 5 year < 10 
years 
employed 50% of wage Until 52 weeks 
100% of wage 60 days > 10 years  
employed 
 
50% of wage Until 52 weeks 
Work Injuries 100% of wage 
From 1st day 
of incapacity 
until 52 weeks 
None 100% of wage 
From 1st day 
of incapacity 
until 52 weeks 
None 
Maternity 100% of wage 
42 days before 
and 42 days 
after giving 
birth 
30 weeks of 
contributions 
during the 12 
months prior 
to the start of 
the leave 
100% of wage 
1 month 




Source: LSS (1997), LISSSTE (2007), LFTSE (1963). 
If a person continues to be unable to work after 52 weeks due to an illness not related to his job 
activities, an extension period of 26 weeks of sick leave will be granted, paid at 60 per cent of 
wage by the IMSS and 50 per cent by the ISSSTE. If the incapacity persists after the extension 
period, the worker could be eligible for a disability pension. If an incapacity period due to a work 
injury continues after 52 weeks, the worker would be eligible to a work injuries pension. If a 
female employee that gave birth requires more days to recuperate than the ones granted by 




Additional points to consider for the calculations of the effects are that income tax must be paid 
on income from incapacity benefits and that the payment of social insurance contributions is 
suspended during periods of incapacity.  
6.2.2. Assumptions for the Calculation of Incapacity Benefits 
The following assumptions were made for the calculation of incapacity benefits:  
 Incapacity benefits were calculated for families with earners formally employed in the 
private and public sectors.  
 For families with earners without social insurance coverage, it was assumed that no 
income was perceived when they were incapacitated and the income that they would lose 
for being incapacitated was subtracted from disposable income. 
 The study considered for all earners one incapacity period of 7 days due to an illness or 
accident not related to the earner’s job, for all earners. 
 The study also considered for all earners one incapacity period of 7 days derived from the 
earner’s work activities.  
 For all female earners, one period of maternity at the start of the year10. 
 Two children were assumed for each household.  
 Households with female earners were assumed to be headed by them with no other 
earners. 
 Incapacitated earners covered by social insurance met all the criteria to be eligible for the 
three types of benefits. 
6.2.3. Effects of Incapacity Benefits 
The importance of social insurance coverage is highlighted by the results of the calculations of 
incapacity benefits. Figure 24 shows the 2012 disposable income as a percentage of the original 
for male-headed households with original earnings of five times the minimum wage at two 
moments: after contributions and taxes and after contributions, taxes and incapacity benefits. The 
effects would be the same for 1994 and for other income levels, since the reforms did not modify 
the rules and wage replacement percentages do not vary across income levels. The figure shows 
                                                 




the results for three employment status: a household with an earner employed in the formal 
private sector, which would receive benefits from the IMSS; a household with an earner 
employed in the public sector, which would receive benefits from the ISSSTE and a household 
with a self-employed earner and no social insurance coverage. The households with its earner 
employed in the informal economy would show the same effects as the household with the self-
employed earner.   
Figure 25. Disposable Income after Incapacity Benefits, 3 Employment Profiles, 
2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
As can be observed, the household with the earner receiving benefits from the IMSS would lose 
slightly more than one percentage point of disposable income because sick paid leave would not 
cover the first four days of incapacity and after that fourth day it would only be paid at 60 per 
cent of wage. The household with an earner receiving benefits from the ISSSTE would not lose 
any income because all days of incapacity would be covered at 100 per cent of wage. However 
the case, in both of them social insurance coverage would protect families from loss of income, 
but households that lack coverage would be left unprotected.  
Disposable income of a household with a self-employed earner would drop almost four 
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expected for a household with an earner employed in the informal economy; and the larger the 
incapacity period the higher the percentage of disposable income that would be lost.  
Indeed, the figures illustrate the extent to which households with no social insurance coverage 
are left unprotected from loss of income when earners are unable to work. These figures result 
from simulating only 14 days of incapacity, however, in practice incapacity periods tend to last 
for slightly longer periods. For example, the IMSS registers an average of 10 days of incapacity 
for each incapacitated worker due to an illness not related to his/her job, and 27 days for each 
incapacitated worker due to a work injury (Echevarría-Zuno et al., 2008). Hence the 
disadvantage of not being protected against illnesses and accidents could in practice be much 
worse than what the figure shows. 
The disadvantage of not receiving social insurance coverage is more serious for households with 
female earners. For the calculations these households were assumed to be headed by women with 
no other earners, with a period of 90 days of incapacity due to the birth of a child. Maternity 
leave for private sector employees only covers 84 days in total, 42 days before and 42 days after 
birth, and the system’s rules state that any additional days of incapacity derived from giving birth 
to a child would be paid as a sick leave at 60 per cent of wage. Maternity leave for public sector 
employees covers the whole period of 90 days, one month before and two months after birth. 
Self-employed women would not be entitled to social insurance and would not receive any 
protection from loss of income. Figure 25 compares the 2012 disposable income as a percentage 
of the original before and after periods of incapacity. The indicators include all taxes and 
contributions and three periods of incapacity: one due to an illness not related to their job, one 




Figure 26 Disposable Income of Female-Headed Households after Incapacity 
Benefits, 3 Employment Profiles, 2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The results illustrate the difference in the levels of protection across employment status. The 
household with the female earner employed in the public sector would enjoy full income 
protection since all days of incapacity would be paid at 100 per cent of wage. The household 
with the earner employed in the private sector would register a drop in its disposable income of 
almost two percentage points, slightly more than a household headed by a male earner of the 
same employment status because six days of maternity incapacity would be paid like sick leave. 
The lowest drop would be registered for female headed households with no social insurance 
coverage because they would not receive any benefits; hence their disposable income would drop 
in almost 30 percentage points if they had taken 90 days off work to prepare and recover from 
giving birth.     
The results of the calculations illustrate the different levels of protection offered the Mexican 
system to families whose earners are affected by an event that would incapacitate them to 
perform their job. Public sector workers would enjoy higher levels of income protection than 
workers employed in the private sector; whilst families with no social insurance coverage would 
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to have a child would be even more unprotected, because of the lack of maternity benefits. The 
next section discusses the effects of cash benefits offered by the Oportunidades programme.   
6.3. Family Cash Benefits: Conditional Cash Transfers  
6.3.1. Eligibility Criteria and Benefit Levels 
Family cash benefits are offered by the Oportunidades programme. This is a targeted social 
assistance programme that delivers conditional cash transfers to poor families. It was created in 
1997 with the name of Programme for Education, Health and Nutrition, or Progresa for its 
acronym in Spanish, but it was changed to its current name in 2002. This programme represents 
the first means-tested targeted programme of cash benefits in the history of the country’s social 
policy. In 2012 Oportunidades covered 5.8 million families, which meant that one in every five 
Mexicans was a beneficiary (SEDESOL, 2012). 
Eligibility is determined by applying a targeting mechanism that estimates the per capita net cash 
income of potential beneficiary households. Net cash income refers to disposable income after 
the payment of taxes and before government transfers (ENIGH, 2012). Data is collected for each 
household and its income is estimated according to 18 socioeconomic variables. These variables 
represent the determinants more strongly associated to poverty in the national household income 
and expenditure surveys. Variables vary for urban and rural settings; three of the, which apply 
for both contexts, associated with lack of access to social insurance benefits:  
 At least one of the household members has access to healthcare services due to his/her 
employment. 
 The household head is an independent workers and at least one household member has 
access to healthcare services due to his/her employment. 
 The community’s social deprivation index composed of 13 indicators, among them, the 
percentage of families with no access to social insurance healthcare.   
The official poverty measurement methodology adopted in 2008 sets two poverty lines, with 
different lines for rural and urban areas. The bottom line is called the ‘minimum welfare line’ 
(MWL), which represents the minimum income that a person requires to meet his/her nutrition 




nutrition and other basic needs. The thresholds to establish eligibility to Oportunidades are set 
between these two lines.   
Families are incorporated to the programme if their estimated per capita income falls below a 
line called ‘adjusted minimum welfare line’ (AMWL). Different lines are set for urban and rural 
areas. The lines are adjusted versions of the ‘minimum welfare lines’ called MWL mentioned 
above. Families whose income improves after having been incorporated in the programme can 
remain in it as long as their estimated income does not surpasses another threshold called 
‘permanent verification of socioeconomic conditions line’ (PVSCL), also with different levels 
set for rural and urban communities. The PVSCLs are fixed between the MWL and the ‘welfare 
line’. The 2012 amounts of all income lines are shown in Table 4.2. Families with an estimated 
income above the AMWL but below the PSVCL are only entitled to a limited package of 
benefits called ‘differentiated support scheme’ (EDA). If the estimated income is more than the 
PSVCL, the family loses entitlement to the programme. The monthly amounts of poverty lines 
and Oportunidades’ thresholds lines are shown in Table 17. 
Table 17. Monthly Per Capita Amounts of Poverty Lines and Oportunidades Eligibility 





Welfare Line (AMW) 
Permanent Verification of 
Socioeconomic Conditions 
Line (PVSC) 
Welfare Line (WL) 
Rural $684 £60 $716 £63 $1,146 £101 $1,331 £118 
Urban $978 £86 $1,243 £110 $1,538 £136 $2,120 £187 
Source: SEDESOL (2013). 
The programme offers several types of benefits which depend on the gender, age and school 
grade of family members. Benefits are grouped in two types, one group associated to the 
nutrition and health components of the programme and the other group to the education 
component. The operation rules state that benefits’ amounts should be updated every six months, 
like the official poverty lines. Benefit packages differ among rural and urban areas; more 




communities, three different packages were being piloted in 2012 because of the low impact that 
previous interventions had on poverty levels (SEDESOL, 2013). 
The benefits associated to the programme’s nutrition and education components are listed in 
tables 18, 19 and 20, along with their respective amounts for the first and second semesters of 
2012. Same amounts apply for urban and rural areas. A basic benefit called ‘nutrition support’ is 
paid to all households regardless of their characteristics. After the financial crisis of 2008, two 
benefits were added to support the nutrition needs of beneficiaries as a compensation for the rise 
in food prices; one benefit was called ‘living better’ paid also to every family regardless of their 
composition and the other one ‘living better for children’ paid only to families with children 
between 0 and 9 years old with a maximum of three benefits per month per family. A fourth 
benefit is paid to households with elderly people above 70 years old, but by 2012 it was being 
phased out and the rules established that beneficiaries should be transferred to the non-
contributory pension programme ‘70 y Mas’. These four types of benefits are conditional on 
attendance of household members to health related activities.  
Table 18. Monthly Amounts of Oportunidades Nutrition Benefits, 2012 (pesos/pounds) 
Concept January-June July-December 
Nutrition Support $305 £27 $315 £28 
Living Better $130 £12 $130 £12 
Living Better for Children1/ $110 £10 $115 £10 
Elderly People $335 £30 $345 £31 
Source: (SEDESOL, 2013) 
1/ Maximum of three benefits per family. 
The bulk of the benefits correspond to scholarships for school age children. These transfers are 
offered for every child from the first level of primary school to the last level of high school, 
conditional on school attendance. Amounts vary according to the level and gender of children. 
Table 19 lists the amounts of primary school scholarships. These scholarships would be offered 




boys and girls; amounts then increase for the fourth, fifth and sixth grades, still with no 
difference between boys and girls.  




$ £ $ £ 
Primary School     
First $160 £14 $165 £15 
Second $160 £14 $165 £15 
Third $160 £14 $165 £15 
Fourth $185 £16 $195 £17 
Fifth $240 £21 $250 £22 
Sixth $320 £28 $330 £29 
School materials1/ $300 £26 $330 £29 
Source: (SEDESOL, 2013) 
1/ Paid once per year in the second semester of each year. 
 
Table 20 lists the amounts of secondary and high school scholarships. Benefits also increase at 
every level but higher amounts are paid for girls than for boys. There is also a transfer for 
purchasing school materials paid during the second semester of each year. Finally, a lump sum 




Table 20. Monthly Amounts of Oportunidades Secondary and High School Scholarships, 2012 (pesos/pounds) 
School Grade 
January -June July-December 
Rural Urban Rural Urban 
Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys 
Secondary School 
First $495 £44 $465 £41 $615 £54 $585 £52 $510 £45 $480 £42 $635 £56 $605 £53 
Second $545 £48 $495 £44 $670 £59 $620 £55 $565 £50 $510 £45 $690 £61 $640 £57 
Third $600 £53 $520 £46 $735 £65 $655 £58 $620 £55 $535 £47 $755 £67 $675 £60 
School 
materials1/ 
        $415 £37 $415 £37 $415 £37 $415 £37 
High School                 
First $900 £79 $785 £69 $1,100 £97 $980 £87 $930 £82 $810 £72 $1,285 £113 $1,155 £102 
Second $960 £85 $845 £75 $1,175 £104 $1,055 £93 $995 £88 $870 £77 $1,285 £113 $1,155 £102 
Third $1,020 £90 $895 £79 $1,240 £109 $1,115 £98 $1,055 £93 $925 £82 $1,285 £113 $1,155 £102 
School 
materials1/ 
        $415 £37 $415 £37 $415 £37 $415 £37 
Oportunidades 
youths2/ 
$4,192 £370 $4,192 £370 $5,764 £509 $5,764 £509 $4,450 £393 $4,450 £393 $5,956 £526 $5,956 £526 
Source: (SEDESOL, 2013) 
1/ Paid once per year in the second semester of each year. 





As mentioned before, three different packages for urban areas were being piloted in different 
areas of the country in 2012. The first package referred to as ‘Intervention 1’ consisted of all 
the benefits and amounts listed in the tables above for urban areas. The second package or 
‘Intervention 2’ consisted of the same benefits and amounts plus an extra benefit of $295 per 
child in secondary and high school for school achievement, hence granted only to children 
with good school performance. The third package or ‘Intervention 3’ consisted of the same 
benefits and amounts offered in rural communities but without the scholarships for the first 
and second years of primary school. 
Table 21 shows the maximum amounts a family can receive per month. The limits are set to 
discourage the formation of large families. Same maximum amounts are fixed for urban and 
rural areas. There is one limit on the total amount of scholarships and the nutrition support 
‘living better for children’ that a family can receive per month. Another limit is set for the 
total monthly amount adding all benefits. Different limits are set for families with children in 
basic education and for families with children in secondary and high school. The limits set of 
for the total amount exclude transfers for school materials, the benefit for elderly people and 
the lump sum paid to children who graduate from high school.  
Table 21. Maximum Amounts of Oportunidades Benefits, 2012 (pesos/pounds) 
Limits 
January-June July-December 
With Children in 
Primary and 
Secondary School 
With Children in 
High School 
With Children in 
Primary and 
Secondary School 




better for children’ 
$1,225 £108 $2,245 £198 $1,265 £112 $2,320 £205 
Total $1,660 £147 $2,680 £237 $1,710 £151 $2,765 £244 
Source: (SEDESOL, 2013) 
 
There are also different benefit packages for families whose income rises above the ‘adjusted 
minimum welfare line’ (AMWL) but stays below the ‘permanent verification line’. This 
package is called the ‘differentiated support scheme’ (EDA), and consists only of the 
secondary and high school scholarships, including school materials and the lump sum for 





areas. All other benefits are eliminated. Amounts are subjected to the same maximum limits 
as the packages offered to families with incomes below the AMWL. 
6.3.2. Assumptions for the Calculation of Conditional Cash Transfers 
The first assumption made for the calculations was that only families without social insurance 
coverage received Oportunidades benefits. Unlike other social assistance benefits, 
Oportunidades does not explicitly targets families with no social insurance, although, as 
mentioned previously, three of the variables to determine eligibility to the programme refer to 
the lack of access to social insurance. It is possible then for a family to be covered by the 
IMSS, for example, and receive Oportunidades benefits. However, according to the Health 
and Nutrition National Survey, in 2012 only a minor percentage, 11.3 per cent, of 
Oportunidades beneficiary families enjoyed social insurance coverage (ENSANUT, 2012). 
Hence, Oportunidades benefits were only calculated for households with earners who were 
self-employed paying income tax or employed or self-employed in the informal economy not 
paying any taxes. 
Other assumptions that were made for the calculation of family benefits were the following: 
 Income level and household composition remained the same throughout the year. 
 The income used to determine eligibility to the programme was the per capita 
disposable income after the payment of taxes and after discounting lost income 
due to days of incapacity, adjusted by economies of scale and equivalence scales, 
following the same methodology applied for the estimation of the official poverty 
lines and hence the thresholds to determine eligibility to Oportunidades. 
 Household economies of scale and equivalence scales reflect the distribution of 
income within each household and the possibility of sharing income among 
members. The scales by age range used in this study were taken from the ones 
used by the CONEVAL for the estimation of poverty lines: 0.70 for members 0-5 
years, 0.74 for members 6-12 years, 0.71 for members 13-18 years and 0.99 for 
members above 19 years (CONEVAL, 2011).   
 No benefits for elderly people were calculated because it was assumed that they 
would be beneficiaries of the non-contributory pension 70 y mas. 
 All children were assumed to be girls in order to illustrate the maximum amounts 





 Families met all conditions required by the programme’s rules and benefits were 
not suspended during the year. 
 Families were assumed to be living in urban areas, in order to make the 
calculations comparable to those of other employment status also assumed to be 
urban families. 
 Calculations were based on the package ‘Intervention 1’, the most common 
package in urban areas (SEDESOL, 2013). 
6.3.3. Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers 
Oportunidades would have a strong effect on disposable income of recipient families. In 
1994 families with self-employed or earners employed in the informal economy would not 
have been entitled to any cash benefits. Figure 26 shows the 1994 percentage of variation in 
disposable income after lost income due to incapacity spells, and figure 27 shows the same 
indicator for the year 2012, adding the targeted Oportunidades family benefits. Household 
composition in both graphs would be the standard one compared across this study: a male 
earner, with a non-working spouse, one newly born child and one child in primary school. 
Results are shown for the relevant income levels to illustrate effects. 
 
Figure 27. Variation between Disposable Income after Cash Benefits and 
Original Earnings, Self-employed and Informal Workers, 1994 (percentage) 
 

























Figure 28. Variation between Disposable Income after Cash Benefits and 
Original Earnings, Self-employed and Informal Workers, 2012 (percentage) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In 1994, disposable income of all family types would fall below the original. Families of self-
employed earners would register larger drops because they would be paying income tax, 
whilst families of earners employed in the informal economy would only have been affected 
by the loss of income because of incapacity periods. In 2012, Oportunidades benefits of 
family types with original earnings of one minimum wage would increase disposable income 
in more than 25 percentage points for both employment statuses, with the household of the 
earner employed in the informal economy expected to register higher disposable income 
because it would not be paying income tax.  
At original earnings of five times the minimum wage families would not be eligible to the 
programme and their disposable income would fall below the original. To illustrate the extent 
to which Oportunidades benefits reach families across the bottom of the income scale, figure 
28 compares disposable income after cash benefits as a percentage of the original for three 
levels of original earnings: one minimum wage, two minimum wages and 2.5 times the 
minimum wage. The household composition is the same as the one compared in the previous 



























Figure 29. Variation between Disposable Income after Cash Benefits and 
Original Earnings, Low Income Self-employed and Informal Workers, 2012 
(percentage) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The figure reveals that for the standard family type, benefits would be lost at a low earnings 
level, of only 2.5 times the minimum wage. For family types earning two times the minimum 
wage, benefits would raise disposable income in around 10 percentage points more than the 
original. After that level, families could only be eligible to the EDA, but because that package 
only offers scholarships for children in secondary and high school, no cash benefits would be 
paid; hence income of the family type of a self-employed earner would drop 10 percentage 
points below the original. According to the calculations conducted for this study, eligibility to 
the EDA would continue until after an earnings level of three times the minimum wage, 
however, in practice the families would not be expected to be receiving any income support 
from the state. 
The previous graphs presented the results for only one household composition. It would be 
interesting then to test the effects of benefits on other compositions, since benefit amounts 
vary with the characteristics of family members. Figure 29 compares the variations in 
disposable for 2012 of three household compositions –a childless couple; the standard family 
type of four members; and a couple with a male earner and four children, two young ones as 
the standard family plus one child in secondary school and one child in high school– at five 


























wage. In this graph only households of one employment status are shown, that is households 
with earners employed in the informal economy, but the effects would be to households of 
self-employed earners. 
Figure 30. Variation between Disposable Income after Cash Benefits and 
Original Earnings, Informal Workers, 2012 (% of Original Earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Benefits increase substantially with the number and school grade of children. A childless 
couple would be eligible at the lowest earnings level and benefits would only raise its 
disposable income in 19 per cent. As commented above, the couple with two young children 
would still receive benefits at two times the minimum wage but would lose them at 2.5 times 
the minimum wage. A couple with four children, on the other hand, would continue to 
receive benefits until a level of four times the minimum wage. All family compositions 
would lose eligibility at five times the minimum wage. 
For the couple with four children earning one minimum wage, Oportunidades would almost 
double disposable income, more than half the support offered to the couple with two young 
children. In fact, couples with four children earning up to 2.5 times the minimum wage would 
be expected to receive more support than a couple with young children earning one minimum 
wage.  
Two causes are behind the higher benefit levels offered to larger families or to families with 
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because there are more children and because the children are in higher school grades, for 
which the scholarships are higher. For example, as can be observed Table 28 described 
above, a scholarship for a girl in the third year of high school would be double the amount of 
a scholarship paid to a girl in the first year of secondary school.  
Secondly, eligibility would expand to cover families of higher income levels because per 
capita income would decrease as the number of family members grows. An interesting 
analysis then would be to compare per capita income after benefits with per capita poverty 
thresholds to establish the degree to which the programme can be an effective tool to combat 
poverty. This analysis is carried out in chapter 8.    
In summary, before the Oportunidades programme was introduced, households not covered 
by social insurance were not receiving any support from the state in the form of cash benefits. 
The programme represents a great expansion of social policy in Mexico and its benefits are 
an important source of support for the recipient families. Nonetheless, the calculations 
presented in this section reveal two problems with its design. First, strict targeting means that 
many households which may require support are being left out; for example, an urban couple 
with two young children earning 2.5 times the minimum wage which would not be expected 
to receive any benefits as the graphs above show.  Secondly, Oportunidades provides 
substantially higher levels of support to families with older children, paying less attention to 
the welfare of families with young children. This effect could be due with the programme’s 
objectives that do not seek to reduce current poverty levels but rather to enable families to 
overcome their condition of poverty in the long term. Further implications of these two issues 
are discussed in chapter 8. 
6.4. Pensions 
6.4.1. Pensions Eligibility Criteria and Amounts 
Old-age pension are offered by both the social insurance and social assistance systems. Social 
insurance is divided between the system for private sector employees, namely the IMSS, and 
the system for private sector employees, namely the ISSSTE. These systems were reformed 
in 1997 and 2007, respectively. Both reforms consisted in the replacement of pay-as-you-go 





contributions. Changes included the modification of eligibility criteria and of the formulas to 
calculate pensions.  
Table 22 outlines the characteristics of both systems before and after the reforms. The 
retirement age of 65 years for IMSS beneficiaries was not modified by the reform; a worker 
can access an advanced pension when turning 60 years old. The methodology to obtain the 
amount depended on the worker’s last wage, with a basic amount calculated from the 
percentage of the average wage of the last 250 weeks of contributions, plus an additional 
percentage for each year of contributions after the first 500 weeks. Percentages decreased as 
the wage level rose. The percentages and wage brackets are laid out in Article 167 of the 
LSS. The advanced pension represented a percentage of the old-age pension, from 75 per cent 
when a worker retired at 60 years to 95 per cent when retiring at 64. The 1997 reform 
replaced the system of defined benefits for an individual capitalisation system of defined 
contributions. Pensions where converted into life annuities with amounts dependable on the 
balance each worker had in their individual account at the moment of retirement and their life 
expectancy.  
The ISSSTE system was offering three types of pensions in 1994. The retirement pension 
was paid at 100 per cent of the last wage after 30 years of service for men and 28 for women 
with no age requirement; the pension for years of service was offered when a worker turned 
65 years old and was paid at percentages that went from 50 per cent the retirement pension 
after 15 years of service to 95 per cent after 29 years; and the old-age advanced pension was 
paid after 10 years of employment at amount that went from 40 per cent of the retirement 
pension when the worker turned 60 years old to 50 per cent when the worker turned 65. The 
ISSSTE reform increased contribution periods, raised retirement ages and introduced life 









Table 22 Characteristics IMSS and ISSSTE Pension Systems Before and After the 
Reforms 
System Eligibility criteria Amount 
Pay-as-you-go systems before the reforms 
IMSS (1973)   
Old-age pension - 500 weeks of contributions 
- 65 years of age 
Percentage average wages of previous 250 weeks 
of contributions; from 80% for 1MW to 13% 
for more than 6MW + increments for years 
contributed above 500 weeks + family 
allowances or care allowance1/ 
Advanced pension - 500 weeks of contributions 
- 60 years of age 
Percentage of old-age pension. 60 years – 75%, 
61 years – 80%, 62 years – 85%, 63 years – 
90%, 64 years – 95% + family allowances or 
care allowance1/ 
ISSSTE (1983)   
Retirement pension - 30 years of employment for men, 
28 years for women. 
100% of average wage of last year of 
employment. 
Years of service - 15 years of employment 
- 55 years of age 
Percentage of average wage of last year of 
employment. From 50% for 15 years of 
employment to 95% for 29 years. 
Advanced pension - 10 years of employment 
- 60 years of age 
Percentage of average wage of last year of 
employment. 60 years – 40%, 61 years – 42%, 
62 years – 44%, 63 years – 46%, 64 years – 
48%, 65 years – 50%. 
Individual capitalisation systems after the reforms 
IMSS (1997)   
Old-age pension - 1,250 weeks of contributions 
- 65 years of age 
- Life annuity depending on individual account 
balance and average life expectancy 
Advanced pension - 1,250 weeks of contributions 
- 60 years of age 
- Life annuity depending on individual account 
balance and average life expectancy. 
ISSSTE (2007)   
Old-age pension - 25 years of contributions 
- 65 years of age 
- Life annuity depending on individual account 
balance and average life expectancy. 
Advanced pension - 25 years of contributions 
- 60 years of age 
- Life annuity depending on individual account 
balance and average life expectancy. 





1/ An extra month was paid as Christmas bonus in December. Family allowances were paid for each of the 
pensioner’s economic dependants and amounted to 15% of the pension. When the pensioner did not have 
economic dependants, a care allowance of 15 per cent of the pension was granted. 
 
Previous to and after the reforms, both systems guaranteed minimum pensions when a worker 
met the criteria to be eligible but the amounts obtained from applying the calculation 
formulas were too low. Table 23 compares the amounts of the minimum pensions in 1994 
and 2012, expressed in 2012 pesos and converted to pounds at purchasing power parity. In 
1994 both minimum pensions were set at the same level, which was 90 per cent of one 
minimum wage. The reforms introduced a difference, almost doubling the ISSSTE pension in 
relation to the IMSS pension. In fact, although if expressed in times the minimum wage the 
IMSS pension would appear to be higher in 2012 than in 1994, in real terms it is actually 
slightly lower. Another point to comment is that in 1994 the IMSS law established a 
maximum limit on the pension amount of 100 per cent of the pensioner’s last wage; the 
ISSSTE law did not set any similar limit.   
Table 23 Amounts of Minimum Pensions, 1994 and 2012 (2012 pesos/pounds) 
Programme 
1994 2012 
$ X MW £ MX $ X MW £ 
IMSS 2,242 0.90 198 2,179 1.17 192 
ISSSTE 2,279 0.91 201 3,765 2.01 332 
Sources: LSS (1973, 1997), LISSSTE (2007, 1983). 
 
There are two more important differences can be observed between the reformed IMSS and 
ISSSTE systems. The first one was that active public sector employees were given the chance 
to choose if they wanted to be transferred to the new system or not; so only the workers who 
joined the public sector after the enactment of the new legislation were compulsorily placed 
under the new system. If the worker refused to be transferred to the reformed system, 
contributions continued to be paid under the rules of the old system and the pay-as-you-go 
pension system was kept, but with stricter rules, with a minimum pension age set for 
retirement pensions and gradual increases of the pension age for the other two types of 
pension. On the other hand, the IMSS reform automatically transferred all workers to the new 





given the option at the moment of retirement to choose if they wanted to retire under the rules 
of the old or the new systems,  
The second one was that public sector workers who opted to transfer to the new system were 
offered a pension bonus to compensate for the years contributed to the old system. The 
pension bonus was deposited as a lump sum in their individual accounts to constitute an 
initial balance. The bonus amount was calculated according to the worker’s age, wage and 
time of employment, according to a table included in the new ISSSTE law. Private sector 
employees on the other hand, were not given this benefit, hence started to contribute to the 
new system with no initial balance in their individual accounts.  
Besides the reforms of social insurance pensions, the other major change in the policy area 
was the introduction of non-contributory flat-rate social assistance pensions. These pensions 
were introduced in 2006 for elderly people that did not have a social insurance pension. The 
programme was called ‘70 y Mas’ (‘70 and more’). The programme was originally targeted at 
people living in rural communities of less than 2,500 inhabitants. The rules established that 
all persons 70 years old or older in those communities would be entitled to a non-contributory 
as long as they were not receiving a social insurance pension. Coverage of communities was 
gradually expanded. In 2008 it was expanded to all communities of less than 20 thousand 
inhabitants, in 2009 to communities of less than 30 thousand, and finally in 2012 to all cities 
and communities in the country. Hence, in that latter year, all people in the country who were 
70 years old or older and did not have a social insurance pension were entitled to the non-
contributory pension. The programme did not establish any other means or income test. The 
amount offered had not been modified since the creation of the programme; it amounted to a 
monthly pension of $500 (£43) for every person not receiving a social insurance pension 
regardless of their previous earnings. The only benefit that was added was a lump sum of 
$300 (£26) to all pensioners who opened a bank account where their pension could be 
deposited (SEDESOL, 2014). 
6.4.2. Assumptions for the calculation of pensions 
The following assumptions were made to estimate the effects of the pension reforms: 
 All earners obtain their pension on the first day of 1994 and 2012. 
 Social insurance pensions were calculated assuming that the worker was 70 years old 





This assumption was especially relevant for the calculation of life annuities: amounts 
would have been less if a lower age had been used because the pensioner is expected 
to live more years. According to the OECD (2014), the average age at which 
Mexicans retired was 74.5 years in 1994 and 72.3 years in 2012 for men, and slightly 
lower ages for women.  
 Employment statuses, earnings and social insurance contribution levels remained 
steady for all persons throughout their working lives. 
 Formal sector workers had 25 years of contributions to social insurance in both years. 
 Private sector workers in 2012 opted to be pensioned under the rules of the reformed 
system. 
 Public sector workers opted to be transferred to the new system on April 1, 2007, the 
day after the enactment of the reform. 
 Individual accounts balances of private and public sector employees were calculated 
by adding the tripartite contributions of the old-age and retirement branch that would 
have been deposited in each worker’s individual account during the 25 years of 
contributions. The annual return net rates used to calculate balances were the 
following: for the period 1997-2008, 3.2 per cent; for the period 2007-2008, 5.6 per 
cent; for the period 2009-2012, 8.6 per cent. The rates for the first two periods were 
taken from Kato (2008), and the last period from CONSAR (2014).  
 Life annuities for private and public sector workers in 2012 were calculated using the 
on line calculator of the National Commission for the Retirement Savings System 
(CONSAR)11. 
 Households were assumed to be composed of the pensioner and one economic 
dependent. 
6.4.3. Effects of Pensions 
This section illustrates the differences in the pension amounts offered by the different 
segments of the system, using the replacement rate as the main indicator. The replacement 
rate is the percentage that the pension would represent of the original earnings of the 
pensioner before retirement. The comparison of replacement rates does not illustrate the 
effects of other features of the pension system, especially the retirement age that in 1994 was 
                                                 






much lower for public sector employees. A dynamic simulation could be conducted to 
estimate those effects, nonetheless, that type of analysis falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
Figure 30 compares the replacement rates of IMSS and ISSSTE pensions for 1994 at three 
income levels. IMSS 1994 pensions include increments of 15 per cent for the family 
allowance of one economic dependent. In that same year, given the assumed years of 
contributions and age of retirement, public sector workers would be eligible to a pension for 
years of service, paid at 75 per cent of a retirement pension.   
Figure 31 Social Insurance Pensions' Replacement Rates, 1994 (% of wage) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Given the assumptions made, in 1994 the IMSS rules would have been more favourable to 
low and high income workers than the ISSSTE’s rules. At the lowest income level the IMSS 
would have paid a pension equivalent to 100 per cent of previous original earnings, higher 
than the replacement rate of 91 per cent offered by the ISSSTE, the difference due to the 15 
per cent increase offered by the IMSS as family allowance for the pensioner’s economic 
dependent. At five times the minimum wage, the ISSSTE would pay a pension significantly 
higher than the IMSS.  On the other hand, at 25 times the minimum wage, the ISSSTE’s 
pension would be lower because of the cap of 10 minimum wages on the payment benefits, 
whilst IMSS pension would not be affected because in that system benefits were capped at 25 




















The results change if the rules of the reformed systems are applied. Figure 31 compares the 
replacement rates of IMSS and ISSSTE pensions or life annuities at three income levels. As 
mentioned previously, amounts were calculated based on the individual account balance that 
workers would be expected to accumulate from the time when the systems were reformed 
until the moment of retirement. The tripartite contributions that would have been deposited in 
the individual accounts were calculated from the month when the reforms were implemented, 
namely July 1997 for the IMSS system and April 2007 for the ISSSTE system, until the last 
month of 2011, applying the net annual rates mentioned in the previous section. The pension 
bonus offered as compensation for the years contributed to the pay-as-yor-go system was 
added to the balances of ISSSTE beneficiaries.  
Figure 32. Social Insurance Pensions' Replacement Rates, 2012 (% of previous 
earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Two conclusions can be highlighted from the calculations. First, the ISSSTE reform resulted 
in much more generous conditions for public sector employees than the IMSS reform. As can 
be observed in the graph, ISSSTE’s rates would be expected to be much higher than IMSS’s 
rates for all income levels, even if ISSSTE affiliates would have been contributing to their 
individual account for a shorter period. At previous earnings of one minimum wage, affiliates 
of both systems would only be entitled to the minimum guaranteed pension, but the ISSSTE 
pension would represent more than double the pensioner’s previous earnings. At five times 




















pension because the resources accumulated in the individual account would be insufficient to 
obtain a higher pension; but the ISSSTE beneficiary would receive a life annuity equivalent 
to 40 per cent of previous earnings, because of the pension bonus deposited in the individual 
account, benefit that was not offered by the IMSS. In fact, according to the calculations made 
for this thesis, an IMSS beneficiary would have received a minimum guaranteed pension until 
reaching an earnings level of 23 times the minimum wage. At 25 times the minimum wage 
the ISSSTE’s rate would be more than double also because the pension bonus would increase 
the individual account balance. 
Secondly, except for workers with previous earnings of one minimum wage, replacement 
rates would be expected to be much lower in 2012 than in 1994. Workers at the lowest end of 
the income scale would benefit from higher minimum guaranteed pensions, but for all others, 
the individualisation of accounts would result in lower pension amounts. Individual account 
balances were calculated adding 15 years of contributions for IMSS affiliates and seven years 
for ISSSTE affiliates. It could be argued that longer contribution periods would result in life 
annuities of higher amounts. Nonetheless, the strong risk of low pension amounts under the 
individual capitalisation systems has been acknowledged in official documents (WB, 2013), 
for example, it is estimated that by 2021, when workers insured by the IMSS lose the option 
of retiring under the pay-as-you-go system, 71 per cent of the ones who meet the criteria will 
only be entitled to receive a minimum guaranteed pension.  
According to calculations made for this study to further probe the effects of pension reforms, 
a private sector employee with original earnings of five times the minimum wage, that began 
contributing to the individual capitalisation system in 1997, would have to contribute for 44 
years until 2031, to reach a replacement rate of 59 per cent, like the one expected to be 
obtained under the pay-as-you-go system after 25 years of contributions. These calculations 
assumed a steady record of contributions without interruptions which would not necessarily 
be easy because people tend to move in and out of the formal economy on several occasions 
during their working lives, and a net return rate on the individual account resources of 8.6 per 
cent, higher than the rates obtained during the first years of the system. Hence, the 
contribution period for many workers could in fact have to be longer in order to reach 
replacement rates similar to the ones offered by the pay-as-you-go system.   
The non-contributory ’70 y Mas’ pension represents an additional benefit that did not exist in 





any income support from the government. For the effects of this study, the employment 
profiles that would be eligible to the programme would be self-employed workers and 
workers employed in the informal economy. Whilst non-contributory pensions would 
represent an additional benefit introduced with the reforms for households of those 
employment profiles, two important differences with social insurance pensions should be 
highlighted. First, the retirement age was set at 70 years, whilst formal sector employees 
eligible to a pension could access an advanced pension at the age of 60.  
Secondly, the amount of the non-contributory pension falls well below the amount levels of 
social insurance pensions. Figure 32 compares the replacement rates of the three types of 
pensions in 2012. As can be observed, the non-contributory pension would amount to only 27 
per cent of one minimum wage and five per cent of the household’s previous earnings, less 
than one fourth the rate of IMSS pensions for those income levels. Moreover, it should be 
expected that replacement rates of IMSS and ISSSTE pensions increase at least on a minimal 
degree as workers accumulate more resources in their individual accounts, augmenting the 
disparity with non-contributory pensions which are not tied to previous earnings. 
Figure 33. Social Insurance and Non-contributory Pensions’ Replacement 
Rates, 2012 (% of previous earnings) 
 
























To summarise this section, pension reform had differentiated effects across employment 
profiles and income levels. In the case of public sector employees covered by the IMSS or the 
ISSSTE, it appears to be that the reform would be beneficial for low income workers, 
because of increases to the minimum guaranteed pension. This is especially true for ISSSTE 
pensioners; for IMSS pensioners the minimum pension does register an increase in relation to 
the minimum wage but remained at the same amount in real terms. For other income levels 
the reforms would have a strong negative impact and even when the period of contributions 
to individual accounts is extended, amounts would hardly reach replacement rates similar to 
the rates offered by the pay-as-you-go system. It must be noted, however, that public sector 
employees were partially protected from the negative effects of the individual capitalisation 
system by the pension bonus paid by the state in recognition of the time contributed to the 
pay-as-you-go system.  
In the case of people not covered by social insurance, in 2012 non-contributory pensions 
would represent an additional source of support not offered by the state before the reform; 
however, a higher retirement age and much lower pension amounts would result in low levels 
of income protection for the elderly people covered and reinforce the pension system’s 
fragmented and unequal nature. 
6.5. Variations in Disposable Income after Taxes and Cash Benefits 
The combination of fiscal and social policy reforms seemed to have increased the levels of 
redistribution towards low income families, but with significant differences across 
employment profiles. Figure 33 compares the differences between the net cash gains or losses 
of 2012 and the net cash gains or losses of 1994, at three income levels and the four 
employment profiles. Family composition is the standard family of four members: one earner, 
a non-working spouse and two young children. As can be observed, at original earnings of 
one minimum wage, all employment profiles would obtain increases in the relative levels of 
support offered by the state, but families without social insurance coverage would register 
much higher increases. Families with earners formally employed would obtain modest 
increases mainly due to tax subsidies, which in practice constitute a cash benefit delivered 
through the tax system, but families that do not enjoy social insurance coverage would obtain 
gains of more than 30 percentage points in the proportion of disposable income in relation to 





this point is that the system’s rules do not explicitly exclude families of formal sector 
employees from Oportunidades coverage, however, the lack of social insurance is considered 
in three of the variables of the targeting methodology and the fact is that the large majority of 
Oportunidades beneficiaries are not covered by the social insurance system. 
Figure 34. 2012/1994 Difference in Disposable Income as a Percentage of 
Original Earnings (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The strongest negative impact on disposable income as a percentage of the original, would be 
registered for families of formal sector employees, at five and 25 times the minimum wage. 
The main causes of the negative effects were higher income taxes and the absence of state 
cash support. Families of public sector employees would be most affected because on top of 
those two causes, their social insurance contributions were raised. On the other hand, families 
of self- employed workers would benefit from income tax reform if they are eligible to be 
classified as minor taxpayers. Families of workers in the informal economy earning 25 times 
the minimum wage also register a decrease in the indicator, but because in 2012 they would 
be paying Popular Health Insurance contributions to access healthcare. 
Across household compositions, families that had children in higher school levels and were 
not covered by social insurance would be the most benefited by the policy changes, because 


























members with one child in primary school would stop receiving benefits at earnings of 2.5 
times the minimum wage, but when the family had older children in school, benefits could 
continue until an earnings level of four times the minimum wage. In fact, according to the 
results of the calculations, the strongest redistributive effort would be directed towards these 
family types. Disposable income of social insurance beneficiary families would remain at the 
same levels for all compositions between the two years, but families of informal economy 
workers earning one minimum wage would obtain increases in their disposable income as a 
proportion of the original from 35 percentage points if they had one child in primary school, 
to 93 points with additional children in secondary and high school, and would still be 
expected to obtain increases up to an earnings level of four times the minimum wage. These 
variations are shown in Figure 34.  
 
Figure 35. 2012/1994 Difference in Disposable Income as a Percentage of the 
Original, Informal Workers (percentage points)
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Low income households of pensioners previously employed in the public sector would be 
another type benefited by the reforms. As shown in Figure 35, disposable income as a 
percentage of the original would increase in more than 100 per cent at an earnings level of 
one minimum wage. The reason behind this result was the increase of the minimum 
guaranteed pension offered as a perk during the negotiation of the ISSSTE reform. Recipients 
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programme does provide income support they were not previously obtaining, the amounts 
were still well below the pensions paid to social insurance pensioners. Lastly, social 
insurance pensioners with previous earnings of five and 25 times the minimum wage would 
be expected to be major losers of the reform phase because of the systems’ individual 
capitalisation.  
Figure 36. 2012/1994 Difference in Pensions' Replacement Rates (percentage 
points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In short, during the last two decades the redistributive effort has been directed towards low 
income families not covered by social insurance. On the other side, the heaviest burden 
seemed to have been put on middle and high income households of formal sector employees, 
who in 2012 were paying more taxes but not receiving any additional cash benefits.  
6.6.  Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has presented the effects of cash benefits on disposable income. Results have 
shown that the combination of changes in taxes and benefits have made the system more 
redistributive. Low income families do seem to be getting more cash support from the state in 



























different employment profile and composition. Two final points can be highlighted from 
these differences. 
First, higher levels of redistribution have been mainly achieved not by extending or 
increasing benefit levels of already existing social programmes, but by introducing new 
programmes to offer some sort of protection to families previously excluded from social 
coverage. This expansion trend has generated a fragmented institutional architecture, with 
unconnected programmes that offer unequal levels of protection, in some cases against 
different contingencies, for distinct sectors of the population; hence reproducing to a large 
degree the fragmented development of Mexican social policy until the 1980s decade. 
Secondly, large sectors of the population were still being excluded from receiving any type of 
benefits. The targeted nature of the new cash benefits meant that many families who still 
required support were being excluded the system’s benefits. On top of that, one question that 
remains is to what extent were the policy changes and the introduction of new social 
programmes effective to combat poverty and inequality in Mexico. This and other questions 
will be addressed in chapter 8. In the meantime, the next chapter discusses the effects of 






7. Effects of Changes in Benefits In-Kind, Private Spending and 
Housing 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the calculations of benefits in kind, private healthcare and education 
spending and housing. The benefits in kind that were included in the study were healthcare, 
childcare and public education. All benefits’ amounts were calculated using average per 
capita spending figures reported in official documents. The coverage by segment is the 
following:  
 Healthcare services delivered to households of private sector employees by the IMSS 
and regulated by the Social Insurance Law (LSS), to households of public sector 
employees by the ISSSTE and regulated by the ISSSTE Law (LISSSTE), and to 
households with no social insurance coverage by the Secretariat for Health through 
Popular Health Insurance (SPS) and regulated by the General Health Law (LGS) and 
SPS Operation Rules.  
 Childcare services are provided for households with women in work who have 
children up to four years old. Services for women who are in formally employment in 
the private sector are delivered by the IMSS and regulated by the LSS, for women 
employed in the public sector employees by the ISSSTE and regulated by the 
LISSSTE, and for women with no social insurance coverage by the Secretariat for 
Social Development (SEDESOL) and regulated by the specific programme’s 
operation rules. 
 Public education is universal and consists of three levels: six years of primary school, 
three years of secondary school and three years of high school. For the present study it 
was assumed that children of households above 10 times the minimum wage attended 
private education to reflect the reality of the country.  
 
The effects of private spending are presented at two different moments, before benefits in 
kind to obtain cash disposable income and after benefits in kind to obtain final income. 
Private spending amounts were based on per capita spending figures obtained from official 





Regarding housing, the system is made up of the following elements: 
 Formal sector employees covered by social insurance are eligible for mortgage loans 
to purchase, build or refurbish a house. In the case of private sector employees loans 
are delivered by the Workers’ Housing National Fund Institute (INFONAVIT) and 
regulated by the INFONAVIT Law, and in the case of public sector employees by the 
ISSSTE’s housing fund and regulated by the LISSSTE. Mortgage loans were 
estimated based on the cost of a new housing unit in a working class district of 
Mexico City, discounting the housing fund balance that workers would put as the 
down payment.   
 Households not covered by social insurance can receive subsidies that mainly aim to 
support self-built housing solutions. There are several programmes at the Federal 
Level administered by the SEDESOL; the largest of one is the National Popular 
Housing Fund (FONHAPO), regulated by its own operation rules. Subsidies amounts 
were estimated based on the maximum amounts that FONHAPO offers. 
 
The main indicator used for the analysis is disposable income expressed as a percentage of 
original income for each model household. Results are shown by employment status and 
relevant income levels. Household composition is especially relevant in the case of the 
calculations of childcare, because only households with women in work would be eligible. It 
is also important for the calculation of the two benefits in kind because the amount a 
household receive would increase with its size.  
In the next section the value that healthcare, education and childcare would represent for each 
model household is added to disposable income; the following section adds the analysis of 
household welfare spending; the fourth section discusses housing; the fifth section compares 
the potential aggregated effects of all the components of the tax/benefit system and the last 
section of the chapter offers some concluding remarks. 
7.2. Benefits In Kind 
7.2.1. Eligibility criteria and benefit amounts 
Healthcare and childcare are provided through social insurance and social assistance 





IMSS system, and public sector employees, i.e. the ISSSTE system. Social assistance are 
provided by Federal Secretariats (or Ministries) for people that do not have social insurance 
coverage. 
Table 24 displays the eligibility criteria and coverage percentages of healthcare and childcare 
programmes. The IMSS and the ISSSTE programmes are the oldest components of the 
healthcare system. IMSS healthcare covers active and retired formal private sector employees 
and their economic dependents; ISSSTE healthcare covers active and retired public sector 
employees and their economic dependents. Together these two institutes cover more than 50 
per cent of the country’s total population. 
The main change of the reform process was the creation of Popular Health Insurance (SPS) in 
2002. Before that year, the Federal Government, through the Secretariat of Health (SSA) did 
offer some healthcare to population with no social insurance but not as a right through 
services free at the point of service. No registry was kept, services were extremely limited 
and required the payment of a fee. With the creation of SPS health coverage was effectively 
expanded to uninsured population. As commented before, SPS is a voluntary insurance 
programme that offers primary, secondary and tertiary healthcare to families that register in 
it, although not all medical interventions are covered as in the cases of the IMSS and ISSSTE. 
The only requirement that must be fulfilled to join SPS is not to be covered by social 
insurance. Although its design intends to mirror an insurance programme, SPS functions as a 
social assistance programme although its targeting procedure is not carried out by limiting the 
supply of services, but rather through the contribution structure and the exemptions granted to 
low income families. In fact, its designers have claimed that the main objective they pursued 











Table 24. Characteristics of Healthcare and Childcare Programmes, 1994 and 2012 
Programme Eligibility Criteria 
Coverage (%)* 
1994 2012 
Healthcare  49.1 104.9 
IMSS 
Private sector employees, pensioners 
and economic dependents 
39.3 49.1 
ISSSTE 
Public sector employees, pensioners 
and economic dependents 
9.8 10.6 
Popular Health Insurance (SPS) 
Families with no social insurance 
coverage 
--- 45.2 
Childcare  0.9 6.0 
IMSS 
Children 0-4 years old of private 




Children 0-4 years old of public 




Children 0-4 years old of women in 
work and divorced men with no social 
insurance coverage  
Per capita monthly income < Welfare 
line, ($2,388, £211) 
--- 3.3 
Source: Own calculation with data from Presidency (2013), CONAPO (2013) 
*Coverage of healthcare programmes refers to % of total population; coverage of childcare programmes refers 
to percentage of total children 0-4 years old in the country. 
According to official data, with the introduction and expansion of SPS health care coverage 
reached, and surpassed, 100 per cent. Nonetheless, there are several caveats with that 
percentage. First, the IMSS does not report the real number of beneficiaries but rather an 
estimate based on the number of economic dependents per insured worker and pensioner. 
This is done because the institute lacks a national registry of beneficiaries. Secondly, the 
methodology to estimate the number of beneficiaries was modified in 2002, so 1994 and 
2012 coverage levels are not strictly comparable (IMSS, 2010). Thirdly, SPS figures are not 
reliable because grave inconsistencies have been detected with its registry (Lakin, 2010). 
Ultimately, the percentages would refer to legal coverage but problems of access and quality 
of services persist, so even if a family is legally covered, it might not have access to or seek 
medical attention in the public system. Problems with access and quality are especially 
serious with SPS healthcare, because affiliation was rushed due to political reasons without 
guaranteeing the expansion of infrastructure and the adequate provision of services. Hence 
the existence of a large private sector, which represents close to half of all healthcare 





Childcare services are provided to children of women in work up to the age of four years. 
Like healthcare, the provision of childcare is partitioned in three segments. Since 1973, the 
LSS establishes that the IMSS must provide childcare to children of all women in work 
formally employed in the private sector. The LISSSTE establishes since its creation in 1960 
that the ISSSTE must provide childcare to children of all public sector female employees. 
The main reform was the creation of social assistance services administered by the Secretariat 
for Social Development. Two criteria must be met to be eligible to these services. First, the 
worker should not be insured by social insurance. Secondly, per capita household income 
must fall below the welfare line, which in December 2012 amounted to $2,388 (1.3 times the 
minimum wage, £211). As in the case of Oportunidades, household income is estimated 
using a survey that is applied to all women who apply for the programme.  
Table 24 above shows the percentage of children registered in each segment out of the total 
number of children 0 to 4 years old in the country. Coverage of public childcare has increased 
significantly during the last two decades. Coverage of the ISSSTE has remained stable, but 
the IMSS system passed from covering 0.9 per cent of the age group on 1994 to 2.3 per cent 
in 2012. More importantly, SEDESOL childcare grew rapidly and reached 3.3 per cent in 
2012. 
Education is obligatory from pre-school until high school. Public education is universal, free 
and covers the majority of children in the country. Text books are also provided for free but 
families need to purchase other school material. Services are administered jointly by the 
Federal and State governments. Table 25 shows coverage by education level of children in 
the age group that corresponds to each level. Universal coverage in primary education was 
achieved several decades ago. Coverage levels are lower for the other levels but have grown 
significantly during the last decade. Most children attend public schools. The percentages of 
children in public education out of total enrolment are similar in 1994 and 2012: almost 94 
per cent of all children in basic education, i.e. primary and secondary school, were enrolled in 
public schools. The percentages for high school are lower but they register an increase from 
82 per cent in 1994 to 85 per cent in 2012. The majority of children who attend private 






Table 25. Coverage of Education System  
Programme 
2000s 2010s 
Totala/ Public Systemb/ Totalc/ Public Systemd/ 
Pre school 51.0  70.8  




Secondary School 67.9 82.7 
High School 38.7 82.1 50.1 85.2 
Source: INEE (2012), Presidency (2013) 
a/ Data of 1999 except High School, which reports data from 2002. 
b/ Data of 1994. 
c/ Data of 2011. 
d/ Data of 2012.  
 
For the calculations of this study, the values of benefits in kind were established based on 
public per capita spending. Table 26 compares annual per capita spending on healthcare, 
education and childcare for 1994 and 2012. Spending on healthcare was estimated by 
dividing the total budget spent in each year by the number of persons who demanded medical 
attention from each institution. In 1994 the highest amounts were being spent on households 
insured by the IMSS, namely households with private sector employees. By 2012 the order 
had changed and ISSSTE beneficiaries were registering the highest amount; a change that 
reflects the negotiations that took place during the ISSSTE reform, when higher healthcare 
spending was offered to the trade unions in exchange of their approval. Nonetheless, as a 
result of the creation of SPS, the largest increase was registered for uninsured population, 
which in the case of this study would be households with earners who were self-employed or 
employed in the informal economy, for which spending was increased fivefold. One point to 
consider is that because of the fall real wages, amounts in 2012 seem to have a stronger 
impact; for example, in the case of IMSS beneficiaries even if the amount spent decreased in 
real terms, it represented in that year 0.22 of the annual minimum wage compared to 0.19 in 





Table 26. Annual Public Per Capita Spending on Healthcare, Education and Childcare 
Programmes, 1994 and 2012 (2012 pesos and pounds) 
Programme 
1994 2012 
$  x MW £  $  x  £  
Healthcare       
IMSS 5,625 0.19 497 4,921 0.22 434 
ISSSTE 3,300 0.11 291 5,415 0.24 478 
SSA / Popular Health Insurance 1,370 0.05 121 4,550 0.20 402 
Education       
Basic (Primary and Secondary) 8,886 0.29 731 14,453 0.48 1,320 
High School 19,124 0.63 1,688 19,102 0.63 1,686 
Childcare       
IMSS 65,453 2.16 5,779 51,442 2.26 4,542 
ISSSTE 42,301 1.40 3,735 34,971 1.25 3,088 
SEDESOL --- --- --- 10,620 0.47 570 
Source: Presidency (2013), (IMSS, 2013a), ISSSTE (2013) 
 
Per capita spending on public education was obtained by dividing total expenditure by the 
number of enrolled students in each level. Basic education includes six years of primary 
school and three years of secondary school. A child would normally enter primary school at 
six years of age and leave secondary school at 15. High school consists of three years, 
normally from the age of 15 until 18. Public spending in basic education increased 
significantly between 1994 and 2012; measured in times the minimum wage, the value of one 
child in public education rose from 30 per cent of one annual minimum wage to almost half. 
The value of high school education remained stable.  
Per capita spending on childcare was obtained by dividing the amount spent by the number of 
children registered in each network. There is a great disparity between the amounts spent by 
institution. Whilst in the case of children of women formally employed in the private sector 
the value of childcare would amount to more than two annual minimum wages, the targeted 
social assistance services of the SEDESOL would represent less than half a minimum wage. 
The value of IMSS and ISSSTE childcare appears to fall in 2012 compared to 1994 because 
of the increasing outsourcing of services to private providers, which results in lower 
operational costs. SEDESOL also outsources its services to private providers, but under 





private provider are less strict. The differences in the outsourcing processes are reflected in 
the fees per registered child paid to private providers; in the Federal District the IMSS pays a 
monthly fee of $2,300 (£203) per child and the SEDESOL of $700 (£62). 
7.2.2. Assumptions for the calculation of benefits in kind 
The following assumptions were made for the calculations of the effects of the values of 
benefits in kind: 
 Employment status, income level and household composition did not change during 
the year. 
 Healthcare per capita spending was assumed to be equal for all household members. 
 Healthcare per capita spending by employment status was assumed to be the same for 
all income levels. 
 Household composition for healthcare was a couple with two children. 
 Education was calculated for households up to 10 times the minimum wage to reflect 
enrolment rates in public education up to the ninth income decile. 
 Household compositions for education were a couple with one child in basic 
education and a couple with one child in high school.   
 Childcare was calculated for households of women in work with one child born 
during the second month of 1994 and 2012. 
 The value of childcare was estimated for nine months considering that the first three 
months or each year the women were in maternity leave. 
 The eligibility to social assistance childcare was determined from the income after 
contributions and taxes and before government transfers. 
 Per capita household income to establish eligibility to social assistance childcare was 
estimated by applying economies of scale and scale equivalences, taken from official 
data published by the National Commission for the Evaluation of Social Policy 
(CONEVAL, 2011): 0.70 for members 0-5 years, 0.74 for members 6-12 years, 0.71 
for members 13-18 years and 0.99 for members above 19 years. 
 
7.2.3. Effects of benefits in kind 
Figure 36 shows the value of benefits in kind by employment status. The value is expressed 





2012. For example, in 1994 the annual value of childcare for a women in work who was 
employed in the private sector represented 2.16 times the annual minimum wage, and in 2012 
2.26 times. Households with private sector employees would receive IMSS healthcare, 
education and if a member was a woman in work with a child younger than four years old, 
IMSS childcare. Households with public sector employees would receive ISSSTE healthcare, 
education and if one member was a woman in work with a child younger than four years old, 
ISSSTE childcare. Households with self-employed earners or with earners employed in the 
informal economy would receive SSA/SPS healthcare, education and if one member was a 
woman in work with a child younger than four years old and the means-test was passed, 
SEDESOL childcare. 
Figure 37. Annual Value of Benefits-Kind, Private Sector Employees, Public 
Sector Employees and Families without Social Insurance Coverage, 1994 and 
2012 (times the annual minimum wage)  
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The value of benefits in kind should be expected to have increased for all employment status, 
albeit in different degrees. Childcare would be the service with the highest value for all 
employment status, but except for households with no social insurance, education registers 
the highest increase. Healthcare seems to lag behind, with much lower spending levels and 
only slight increments during the last 18 years; although with the creation of SPS the 
inequalities in the distribution of resources between insured and uninsured households seem 
to have diminished.  






































The total value of benefits for households of private sector employees would register the 
lower increase compared to the other employment status, from 2.64 times the minimum wage 
in 1994 to 3.11 per cent in 2012, representing an increase of 0.47 percentage points. 
Nonetheless, this group remains as the most benefited by the three services. The service with 
the strongest impact would be education, which increased in 0.34 times the minimum wage, 
whilst healthcare and childcare were kept at stable levels with lower increments.  
The total value of benefits for households of public sector employees would register a larger 
increase, from 1.80 per cent to 2.40 times the minimum wage of 1994 and 2012, respectively. 
As for private sector employees’ households, education would be the service with the 
strongest impact, but healthcare and childcare would both register important increments. 
Households with no social insurance coverage, namely with earners who are self-employed 
or employed in the informal economy, would be the most favoured by the changes in benefits 
in kind. In 1994 the total value of the benefits provided to these groups would have 
represented 0.36 annual minimum wages, with little resources spent on healthcare and no 
childcare. By 2012, the value of the three services would amount to 1.31 per cent of the 
minimum wage, an increase of 0.96 points. The value of healthcare would rise from 0.5 
minimum wages to 0.20 and childcare would amount to 0.47 of a minimum wage. 
Nonetheless, despite these important increases, the resources devoted to these households 
would still be considerably lower than the resources spent on services for households of the 
other two employment status. In addition, the targeted design of the services mean that the 
households that contribute to fund SPS must do it at higher levels than the households 
covered by social insurance and only poor households would be entitled to childcare. 
The value of benefits in kind would be expected to raise the income of all households, 
although they would have a higher impact on those of lower earnings. Figures 37 and 38 
below compare the 1994 and 2012 variations in household income as a percentage of the 
original, after taxes, cash benefits and the value of benefits in kind, for two household 
compositions at three income levels. The composition shown on the left side of each graph 
consists of a female head in work and two young children, one newly born and one in 
primary school age. The composition on the right consists of a male head, a spouse not 





As can be observed in the first graph, in 1994 the benefits of the system were concentrated on 
low income households with social insurance coverage, especially on female headed 
households due to the high value of childcare. Of these, households of private sector 
employees covered by the IMSS would receive superior levels of support compared to public 
sector employees covered by the ISSSTE.  Little support was offered to households that 
lacked social insurance coverage. Female headed households with no social insurance would 
in fact be the worse off at all income levels households because they would lose 90 days of 
income due to the period of maternity incapacity. These calculations highlight the importance 
of childcare and maternity benefits for women in work.  
Figure 38. Variation between Final Income after Benefits In-Kind and Original 
Earnings, Female and Male Headed Households, 4 Employment Profiles, 1994, 
(% of original earnings) 
 
















































Figure 39. Variation between Final Income after Benefits In-Kind and 
Original Earnings, Female and Male Headed Households, 4 Employment 
Profiles, 2012 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
In 2012, all low and middle income households would have higher incomes than in 1994, but 
it is households with no social insurance coverage the ones that would obtain the major 
improvements. In fact, at original earnings of one minimum wage, income of male headed 
uninsured households would be slightly higher than income of insured households, due to the 
new social assistance cash benefits and healthcare programmes; at the same earnings level, 
among female headed households, insured households would obtain higher incomes than 
uninsured households mainly due to the differences in the value of childcare offered by 
IMSS, ISSSTE and SEDESOL. 
To better illustrate the potential effects of the changes in benefits in kind, Figure 39 presents 
the differences between the 1994 and 2012 incomes of each model household. Incomes 
include taxes, cash benefits and benefits in kind. According to the calculations, the 
households that would be the winners of the reforms would be those at the lowest income 
level with no access to social insurance. Households with female heads at that earnings level 
would have seen their income increase in around 150 percentage points for both households 
and households with male heads in 131 points. The households that would follow would be 
households of public sector employees at the same earnings level, because in spite of the 

















































return receive benefits in kind of higher value than the benefits offered to households of 
public sector waged workers by the IMSS.      
Figure 40. 2012/1994 Difference in Final Income after Benefits In-Kind, 
Female and Male Headed Households, 4 Employment profiles (percentage 
points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
At earnings of five times the minimum wage, income would be expected to increase between 
eight and 20 percentage points for all households. Even if at this income level eligibility to 
social assistance benefits would be lost, households with no social insurance coverage still 
show important increments because of the introduction of SPS healthcare; whilst households 
of public sector workers would also be benefited by higher spending on healthcare, reverting 
the loss they would suffer in income before benefits in kind. At 25 times the minimum wage 
the effects are similar and increases on healthcare would impact positively households with 
uninsured earners and of public sector employees.  
In conclusion, the changes in benefits in kind would be expected to mostly favour households 
with no social insurance coverage, especially households at the lowest end of the income 
scale because of the introduction of income tested social assistance benefits. Among 
households of waged workers with access to social insurance, those with public sector 
employees would have resulted more benefited than households with private sector 


















































benefit of the highest value for households with female heads. The next section analyses 
trends and effects of private healthcare and education spending. 
7.3. Private Welfare Spending 
This section calculates the effects that private spending on healthcare and education services 
could be expected to have in 1994 and 2012. The cost of childcare is not included because the 
number of households that use private childcare remains minimal; according to the 
employment and social security national surveys 0.03 per cent in 1996 and  1.1 per cent in 
2013 of the total number of children below six years old (Presidency, 2013, CONAPO, 
2013). This is important because deductions on these spending concepts have already been 
discounted from income tax. 
7.3.1. Private Spending Amounts 
The calculation of private spending on welfare services poses some challenges. Private 
spending on welfare services varies significantly across income levels, hence assuming a 
spending package for all model households, as has been done in other studies that apply the 
model families approach, would distort results. The alternative taken regarding healthcare 
spending was to use average household spending reported in income and expenditures 
surveys. Regarding education spending, it was assumed that children of families with 
earnings up to 15 times the minimum wage were attending public schools and hence were not 
registering any spending on that concept.  
Private spending on healthcare fell from 58 per cent of total healthcare spending in 1994 to 
48 per cent in 2012 (WB, 2013). At the household level, average spending on healthcare 
decreased from 2.7 per cent of total spending in 1994 to 1.9 per cent in 2012, and from 2.4 
per cent of income to 1.7 per cent. Table 27 shows the annual per capita amounts in private 
healthcare services. 
For the households that sent their children to private school, the cost considered for the study 
was the annual average tuition fees of Mexico City private schools in 2012, reported in a 
study published by the national teacher’s union (SNTE, 2013); no data was found on private 
school tuition fees for 1994, so the same amount was used for the calculations. The amounts 






Table 27. Annual Per Capita Amounts of Private Spending on Healthcare and 
Education (2012 pesos/pounds) 
Programme 
1994 2012 
$ x MW £ $ x MW £ 
Healthcare 908 0.03 80 686 0.03 61 
Education 12,800 0.42 1,130 12,800 0.56 1,130 
Source: ENIGH (2012), SNTE (2013). 
 
7.3.2. Assumptions for the calculation of private spending 
The following assumptions that were made for the calculations of private welfare spending: 
 Healthcare spending was calculated for all families at the per capita amounts. 
 Education spending was calculated for families with original earnings of 15 times the 
minimum wage and above.  
 No data was found on private school tuition fees for 1994, so the same amounts were 
used for both years. 
 
7.3.3. Effects of Private Spending 
Figures 40 and 41 compare disposable income after contributions and taxes, cash benefits and 
private spending as a proportion of original income for 1994 and 2012. The family 
composition is a male breadwinner, his spouse and two young children, one newly born and 
one in primary school. The calculations do not include benefits in-kind, so the graphs 





Figure 41. Variation between Disposable Income after Private Spending and 
Original Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 1994 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 42. Variation between Disposable Income after Private Spending and 
Original Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 2012 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In 1994, private welfare spending as calculated in this study would push cash disposable 
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private and public sector would register an income above the original, mainly due to income 
tax subsidies, healthcare spending would decrease their income in 12 percentage points. In 
the case of low earnings families with no social insurance, their income after spending would 
fall more than 15 points. Hence, in that year after subtracting private welfare spending, the 
state was not offering to any family sufficient support to raise its earnings above the original.  
The situation changes for 2012 with low income families with no social insurance coverage 
being the most benefited by changes in the system. Private healthcare spending would still 
affect in 12 points the disposable income of all families with original earnings of one 
minimum wage, but the benefits offered by the system would offset that reduction for three 
employment status. In the case of families with earners employed in the formal private sector, 
the changes that would raise disposable income above the original are delivered in the form 
of higher amounts of tax subsidies. Nonetheless, the families that register the higher levels of 
disposable income in proportion to the original are those with no social insurance coverage, 
15 per cent in the case of families with self-employed earners and 19 per cent in the case of 
families with earners employed in the informal economy, due to the introduction of social 
assistance cash benefits and 19 per cent in the case of families with earners. Disposable 
income would still be raised above the original after private spending for these employment 
status at twice the minimum wage, but after that earnings level when eligibility to social 
assistance benefits were lost, cash income would drop below original earnings original.  
To better illustrate the effects of the policy changes after private spending, figure 42 
compares the differences in the 1994 and 2012 cash disposable incomes. As can be observed, 
low earnings families of all employment status appear to be the most favoured by the 






Figure 43. 2012/1994 Difference in Disposable Income after Private Spending, 
4 Employment Profiles, (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Among the families with original earnings of one minimum wage, those that lack social 
insurance coverage and that would receive social assistance benefits, register increments of 
more than 30 percentage points in their disposable income. Low earnings families covered by 
social insurance would obtain much lower increments, 4.2 points in the case of a family with 
an earner employed in the private sector and 1.5 points in the case of the family with an 
earner employed in the public sector. 
The situation changes for family models of low earnings but higher than one minimum wage. 
When families with no social insurance coverage lose eligibility to social assistance benefits 
at 2.5 times the minimum wage, they would remain in the same condition as they were in 
1994; but due to income tax changes, families of private sector employees would register 
positive variations until reaching an earnings level of four times the minimum wage. The 
worse off of all these group of family models would be the ones with public sector 
employees, because higher social insurance contributions mean that their 2012 cash income 
would be less than in 1994 from an earnings level of twice the minimum wage. 
All the results discussed above correspond to families with one male earner, the spouse and 
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the levels of cash support for social assistance beneficiaries in 2012. Families with more and 
older children would continue receiving social assistance benefits until higher earnings level 
and as a result, for example, even after subtracting private spending, families of earners 
employed in the informal economy would obtain a disposable income above the original until 
an earnings level of three times the minimum wage. On the other hand, subtracting private 
spending would push disposable income even lower for families headed by women, already 
severely affected by the lack of social insurance coverage during their maternity period.   
As explained before, the value of benefits in kind would level the effects of the changes for 
all employment status. Figures 43 and 44 show final income as a percentage of original 
income, after subtracting private spending and adding the value of benefits in kind. The 
family composition remains the same as the one shown in the previous figures: the couple 
with a male earner and two children, one of them in primary school. After private spending, 
in 1994 benefits in kind would still have pushed income of low earnings families above the 
original, with a much stronger effect on families with access to social insurance because of 
higher levels of per capita spending, but at five times the minimum wage income would have 
fallen to levels close or below the original for all employment status. 
Figure 44. Variation between Final Income after Private Spending and Original 
Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 1994 (% of original earnings) 
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Figure 45. Variation between Final Income after Private Spending and Original 
Earnings, 4 Employment Profiles, 2012 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In 2012, however, the value of benefits in kind would increase income of all employment 
status to more than 150 per cent of the original. As commented previously in this chapter, the 
main difference would be that families covered by social insurance would receive little cash 
support but higher spending on benefits in kind, while for families receiving social assistance 
benefits the composition of the benefit package would be the opposite, larger proportion of 
cash benefits but lower share of public spending on welfare services.  
Figure 45 shows the variation in final income as a proportion of the original, including taxes, 
benefits and private spending. As can be observed, the reforms largely benefited low earnings 
families with no social insurance coverage. At a level of one minimum wage, after private 
spending, their income would still rise in more than 130 percentage points for both families 
with a self-employed earner and with the earner employed in the informal economy.  On the 
other extreme, top income families of earners employed in the formal economy would in fact 
constitute the only ones of the family models shown in the graph with a final income lower in 
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Figure 46. 2012/1994 Difference in Final Income after Private Spending, 4 
Employment Profiles (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
When comparing across family compositions, those of larger size, with older children or with 
women in work not covered by social insurance would be the most benefited by the policy 
changes. Figure 46 compares 2012-1994 variations in final income as a proportion of the 
original for families with earners employed in the informal economy and original income of 
one minimum wage. The figure shows the indicator for three family compositions. Of all the 
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Figure 47. 2012/1994 Difference in Final Income, Informal Workers 
(percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As can be observed the couple with four children, one in each school level, would obtain a 
final income of more than 250 points higher in 2012 than in 1994, due to much higher 
Oportunidades and higher per capita spending on healthcare, namely the Popular Health 
Insurance. For a household headed by women the reforms would increase its final income in 
more than 150 percentage points due basically to the introduction of childcare services.  
The numbers are close to those of households with self-employed earners because even if 
they would be paying income tax, the amounts would be offset by much higher benefit levels. 
Up to this point of the analysis, low income households with no social insurance would be the 
ones that appear to be the most benefited by the reforms.  
7.4. The Effects of Changes in Housing Programmes 
Housing programmes occupy a central space in Mexican social policy. Since the 1970s, the 
state has been strongly active in the area, mainly offering loans and subsidies for the 
construction, purchasing and refurbishing of homes. In 2011, spending on housing 
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major Latin American country (CEPAL, 2013). Contrary to many European countries, the 
state does not provide benefits to help with the payment of rents. 
Home ownership is the most common type of tenure in Mexico. In 2010, almost 80 per cent 
of homes were inhabited by their owners. Two processes had an impact on the high rate of 
homeownership. On one side, intense rural-urban migration during the period 1950-1990 and 
the settlement of migrants in irregular land in big cities’ peripheries, where they commonly 
obtained land titles through clientelistic negotiations with the political regime. On the other 
side, since the 1970s the promotion of home ownership through public policy (Velazquez 
Leyer, 2015). Additionally, as it happened in other semi-peripheral countries (Papadopoulos 
and Roumpakis, 2013), home ownership acquired a high value as a source of welfare in the 
absence of a comprehensive welfare state, and families and individuals prioritised the 
purchasing homes (Velazquez Leyer, 2015). 
As it happened in other policy areas, state intervention in the area has also been historically 
fragmented across labour market segments. In 1972, when the expansion of the social 
protection system was attempted through the social insurance system, one of the most 
important reforms was the creation of the National Worker’s Housing Fund (INFONAVIT), 
to offer soft loans to formal private sector employees, namely the same beneficiaries of the 
IMSS system, funded by a payroll tax of five per cent of wage paid by employers. In that 
same year, a similar programme called the ISSSTE Housing Fund (FOVISSSTE) was created 
to provide loans to public sector employees, also funded with a contribution of five per cent 
of wage, paid by the government since it is the employer. Programmes to provide subsidies to 
families with no social insurance coverage mainly aimed at self-built solutions have also 
existed since then, notably the Popular Housing Fund (FONHAPO), created in the 1980s, 
virtually cancelled in the 1990s, but revamped in 2003  (Velazquez Leyer, 2015). 
7.4.1.    Eligibility Criteria and Benefit Amounts 
The INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE operate as systems of individual accounts, where 
employers’ contributions are deposited. These programmes were not reformed in a significant 
way during the period covered in this thesis. On the other hand, programmes of subsidies for 
families with no social insurance were expanded since the early 2000s. Each of these 
programmes offers different schemes; table 28 compares the architecture of the principal 





FOVISSSTE refer to the amount that the agency will lend; workers can use their individual 
account balance as the down payment or to cover the price. In addition to the interest rates 
that INFONAVIT and FOVISSSE beneficiaries pay, the balance is increases at the end of 
each year at the same rate of the minimum wage. The legislation establishes that the annual 
interest that these agencies must pay on individual account balances must be higher than the 
annual increase of the minimum wage; in 2012 the interest rate amounted to 2 percentage 
points above the increase of 4.2 per cent of the minimum wage. 
Table 28. Characteristics of Housing Programmes, 2012 






Loans in 2012 
INFONAVIT Mortgage loans 1 year of 
contributions 
Points system 






1 MW – 4% 
5 x MW – 9% 












1 MW – 4% 
5 x MW – 6% 















1/ Includes CONAVI programme, operated by the same government agency. 
Sources: INFONAVIT ((LINFONAVIT, 1992), (LISSSTE, 2007), (FONHAPO, 2010), (Presidency, 2013) 
As can be observed, there are important differences in the characteristics of each programme. 
Public sector workers would receive the loans of the highest amounts, and interest rates 
would be lower than INFONAVIT rates for middle and high income workers, although they 
would be expected to contribute for a longer period and the loans are assigned on a lottery 
basis. The maximum amount of a FONHAPO subsidy amounts are much lower than 





7.4.2. Assumptions for the Calculation of Housing Loans 
The calculations were carried out for 2012. The assumptions were the following: 
 Workers met all the criteria to be eligible to the loans or subsidies. 
 Results are presented at three income levels: one minimum wage, five times the 
minimum wage and 25 times the minimum wage. 
 Individual account balances were calculated assuming that workers contributed to the 
system since 1992, the year when they were created, and an annual interest rate of 2 
percentage points above the minimum wage, as in 2012. 
 The loan or subsidy was provided at the beginning of each year. 
 Loans were obtained for the purchase of a new home with a value of $275,000 
(£24,250), the average price of a home in a working class neighbourhood 
(SHF/CIDOC, 2012). 
7.4.3. Effects of Housing Loans and Subsidies 
Table 29 shows the balances that INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE beneficiaries would have in 
their individual accounts at the end of 2011, and the remaining amounts they would have to 
borrow from the institutions to buy a home of $275,000. Low income workers would have to 
borrow the largest amounts, whilst workers with original earnings of 25 times the minimum 
wage would not have to borrow anything.  




$ MX £ GB $ MX £ GB 
1 MW 28,000 2,449 246,800 21,760 
5 x MW 141,000 12,433 133,900 11,800 
25 x MW 706,000 62,257 --- --- 
Source: Own calculations. 
INFONAVIT workers would pay an annual rate of four per cent at one minimum wage and 
nine per cent at five times the minimum wage; for FOVISSSTE workers the rate would be the 
same at one minimum wage but six per cent at five times the minimum wage. Figure 47 





that the loan had been granted for a period of 30 years. Workers with original earnings of five 
times the minimum wage would pay less even if their interest rates are higher because they 
would borrow lower amounts. At one minimum wage workers affiliated to both institutions 
would have to pay the same amount, $17,769 (£1,569), but at five times the minimum wage, 
public sector workers would enjoy more favourable conditions, paying only $12,157 
(£1,072), compared to $15,847 (£1,397) that INFONAVIT affiliates would have to pay. 
Figure 48. Annual Payments of Mortgage Loans, Formal Sector Employees, 
2012 (pesos) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Low income workers would not be able to buy a home at the price assumed for this study. 
The payment of the instalments would represent 78 per cent of the original earnings of both 
INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE affiliates, and 67 per cent of the disposable cash income of 
the former and 73 per cent of the latter. At five times the minimum wage, the percentages of 
original earnings would be 14 per cent for INFONAVIT affiliates and 11 per cent for 
FOVISSSTE ones, and of cash earnings, 16 per cent for the former and 13 per cent for the 
latter. 
Workers with no social insurance coverage could only receive subsidies if their cash income 
excluding benefits fell below the patrimony poverty line. This line corresponds to a previous 
poverty measurement methodology, but the CONEVAL still reports it and the operation rules 


















(£215) per capita, which means that a family of four members with two young children 
should have to have had an income of less than four times the minimum wage to be eligible. 
However, these families would only receive $106,000, well below the price of the home set 
for this study. It would be difficult for these families to afford a home of acceptable 
standards; their only option would be to obtain funding from the private sector, which 
establishes conditions that low income families can usually not meet, e.g. annual interest rates 
above 12 per cent for mortgage loans. 
The reform of income tax legislation introduced deductions on the payment of mortgage 
loans. INFONAVIT and FOVISSSTE affiliates who got a loan could deduce a part of the 
interests paid in a year from taxable income. To calculate the amount that can be deducted, 
both the initial and final balances of the period converted to ‘investment units’ (UDIS), which 
are units of value introduced after the financial crisis of 1995 for financial transactions, then 
the final balance is subtracted from the initial and the result is converted back to pesos. This 
last amount is deducted from taxable income. In December 2011 one peso ($1) amounted to 
4.7 UDIS, and in December 2012 to 4.9 UIDS. 
The application of the deductions would represent an annual increase of $449 (£39) in the 
disposable income of families earning one minimum wage, covered by either the 
INFONAVIT or FOVISSSTE. That amount would represent two per cent of original 
earnings; not a significant increase considering that the interests paid would represent more 
than half their initial income. In the case families earning five times the minimum wage, 
beneficiaries of INFONAVIT would get back $1,621 (£143), 1.4% of their original earnings; 
and beneficiaries of FOVISSSTE $1,075 (£95), 0.9% of original earnings. The former would 
get back a higher amount but that will not compensate for the higher interest rates they pay.  
These calculations were carried out for purchasing of an average home in a working class 
neighbourhood. Middle and upper income families would aim for a more expensive home, 
and if employed in the formal economy, the resources accumulated in their individual 
account would allow them to purchase it. In addition, they could get back form tax 
deductions much higher quantities than the ones calculated here. 
The analysis of housing programmes has revealed the inequality of the system, and much 
lower levels of protection for low income families than other policy areas. The system of 





able to accumulate a sufficient balance to obtain an affordable loan from housing agencies. 
At five times the minimum wage they would afford it, but public sector workers would obtain 
much favourable conditions. Benefits for families with no social insurance have increased, 
but as in other policy areas, they are minimal and insufficient to raise living standards in a 
significant way.  
7.5. Summary of Findings 
The calculations presented in this and the previous two chapters revealed that the reforms 
generated important changes in the levels of support offered by the state to Mexican families. 
Figure 48 graphs the difference between disposable income -after contributions, taxes and 
cash benefits- and original income for 1994; figure 49 presents the same indicator for 2012. 
The figures present the results for the standard household composition of a couple with a 
male earner and two young children, four employment profiles and nine income levels. None 
of the results discussed in this part of the section include housing benefits.   
 
Figure 49. Variation between Disposable Income and Original Earnings, 4 
Employment Profiles, Nine Income Levels, 1994 (% of original earnings) 
 


























Figure 50. Variation between Disposable Income and Original Earnings, 4 
Employment Profiles, Nine Income Levels, 2012 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As can be observed, the reforms modified the levels of cash support offered by the state to 
different types of families. In 1994, the family with an earner employed in the private sector 
at one minimum wage would have been receiving the higher levels of support, raising its 
disposable income in 11.5 percentage points above the original. In that year, disposable 
income would be raised above the original only for that family type and for the family with 
the earner employed in the public sector also at one minimum wage. Families of earners that 
were not formal sector employees were not receiving any support.  
On the other hand, families at earnings levels of 10 times the minimum wage of all 
employment profiles, except the one of the informal economy worker, appeared to be the 
ones contributing with the highest percentages of their original earnings to fund the system; 
in fact, after that level the proportion of disposable income would be expected to rise as 
earnings increased. 
In 2012, the reforms would be expected to raise disposable income above the original for 
almost all employment profiles up to an income level of twice the minimum wage and at 
higher proportions than in 1994. The highest increases by far would have been obtained by 
families with no social insurance coverage, for example, a family type of an earner employed 






















than the original to 31 per cent more than original earnings. On the other hand, contrary to the 
situation of 1994, family types of the highest income level would now be expected to 
contribute with highest proportion of their earnings, although there were significant variations 
across employment profiles. The system for families of private sector employees seems to be 
the most progressive; the system for families of public sector employees appears to be 
progressive too but only up to a level of original earnings of 10 times the minimum, after 
which after which the proportion of disposable income remains similar; whilst the system for 
families of self-employed shows uneven effects with the highest percentage of available 
income being registered at 15 times the minimum wage. Family types of earners in the 
informal economy contribute with similar percentages after the level of two times the 
minimum wage, revealing the lack of progressiveness of the Popular Health Insurance 
contribution structure, the only contribution they would be paying.   
Adding the value of benefits in-kind would have different effects in 1994 and 2012. The 
proportions of final income including these benefits from the original for each year are shown 
in Figures 50 and 51. At original earnings of one minimum wage, in 1994 the value of 
healthcare and education would have increased the gap in final income between families with 
and without social insurance coverage; for example, difference in final income between a 
family type of an earner employed in the formal private sector and covered by the IMSS and 
the family type of an earner employed in the informal economy would be expected to pass 





Figure 51. Variation between Final Income and Original Earnings, 4 
Employment Profiles, Nine Income Levels, 1994 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Figure 52. Variation between Final Income and Original Earnings, 4 
Employment Profiles, Nine Income Levels, 2012 (% of original earnings) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Contrary to 1994, in 2012, at earnings of one minimum wage, families of informal economy 






































income. Nonetheless, benefits in-kind would actually close the gap between the income of 
families covered and not covered by social insurance. Such gap would decrease from 16 
percentage points after cash benefits to nine points after healthcare and education services 
between the family type covered by IMSS and the family type with an earner employed in the 
informal economy. 
To better illustrate the changes in the levels of support that the reforms represented for 
different family types, figures 52 and 53 show the variations in disposable income after cash 
benefits and in net income after benefits in kind. The graphs show the percentage points in 
which the reforms increases or decreased each indicator between 1994 and 2012. The figures 
do not include housing loans or subsidies. Household composition corresponds to the 
standard family of four members. 
Figure 53. 2012/1994 Difference in Disposable Income, 4 Employment Profiles, 
Nine Income Levels, (percentage points)
 
























Figure 54. 2012/1994 Difference in Final Income, 4 Employment Profiles, Nine 
Income Levels, (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own estimations. 
The figures reveal how the increases in the levels of cash support were largely concentrated 
on low income families with no social insurance coverage. The changes were of 40 
percentage points for families of self-employed earners and earners employed in the informal 
economy. The variations decrease with income level, demonstrating how the reforms did 
have a redistributive element. 
Families with no social insurance coverage still turn out to be the most benefited by the 
reforms after adding the value of benefits in-kind, but interestingly, families of public sector 
workers distance themselves from formal private sector workers, as the result of higher 
spending levels. If the amounts of housing loans or pension amounts were added, the 
difference would be higher. This trend reveals that in Mexico social spending is still tied to 
discretionary political negotiations; public sector workers were offered higher benefits in 
return of their acceptance of social insurance reform. The graphs also reveal the  
7.6. Concluding Remarks 
The empirical analysis finalises with this chapter. The calculations showed the high value that 


























work; and the fragmented and unequal natures of housing policy, which coincide with 
changes in other policy areas. 
The chapter concluded with a summary of the effects on all the household types used for this 
study. Results showed that the reforms have emphasised the welfare of low income families 
with no social insurance coverage, with families with older children receiving more benefits. 
This has been the product of the two logics that were combined in the design of the reforms: 
the productivist and residual logics. The outcome has been a tax/benefit system that remains 








8. The New Architecture of the Tax/Benefit System 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter serves the purpose of outlining the main findings from the data analysis and 
discussing them in relation to the literature on recent social policy changes in Latin America 
and beyond. The calculations revealed that the reforms had increased levels of vertical and 
horizontal redistribution, but in a particular pattern that was shaped by two logics applied in 
their design: the residual and social investment approaches. The adoption of these logics 
resulted in the creation of a fragmented system that fails to offer comprehensive levels of 
social protection to large sectors of the population. These are the three themes discussed in 
this chapter. 
The rest of the chapter is divided in the following sections. The next section analyses the 
changes in the levels and types of potential redistribution generated by the reforms. The third 
section discusses the effects of the logics behind the design of the reforms. The fourth section 
describes the consequences of the fragmented policy architecture that resulted from the 
particular type of redistribution achieved by the adoption of the reform logics. The chapter 
follows with a description of the main features of the social policy model that emerged from 
the reforms, and concludes with some final remarks. 
8.2. More Redistribution, Reform Logics and Persistent Fragmentation 
The first part of this section summarises the study’s main findings in terms of the changes in 
the levels of support offered by the state to different family types before and after the 
reforms. The second part discusses three main findings: the system’s higher levels of 
potential redistribution, the residual model adopted for the design of the reforms and the 
construction of a fragmented social protection architecture. 
8.2.1. Higher Levels of Redistribution 
8.2.1.1. Changes in vertical redistribution 
Broadly speaking, the reforms increased the tax/benefit system’s expected levels of vertical 
redistribution from high to low income families. In 1994 the family type with the highest 





would have been the one with original earnings of one minimum wage and the earner 
employed in the formal private sector; this family type would have obtained a disposable 
income 11.5 higher than the original after taxes and cash benefits and a final income of 115 
per cent of the original after benefits in-kind. On the other side, the family types contributing 
with the largest shares of their original cash earnings would the one with the earner employed 
in the public sector earning 10 minimum wages, which would contribute with 19 per cent of 
original income. After adding the value of benefits in-kind, the family type that contribute the 
most would the one with the self-employed earner with an income of 25 times the minimum 
wage, which would have been contributing with 15 per cent of its original income. 
In 2012 it was the family with the earner employed in the informal economy at one minimum 
wage was the one that would be expected to receive the highest levels of state support, raising 
its disposable income after cash benefits in 31 per cent and its final income after benefits in-
kind in 175 per cent above the original. On the other hand, the family type of the earner 
formally employed in the private sector turned out to be the one contributing the most: 25 per 
cent of its disposable income and 21 per cent of the final income adding the value of welfare 
services.  
The reforms modified the family types that gained and lost most income, but in both years 
redistribution went from high income to low income families. The difference is that in 2012 
the distance between major losers and gainers was larger. Figure 54 shows the difference in 
the percentages of disposable and final income of the original, between the family types with 
the highest gains and losses in each year. As can be observed, the difference in disposable 
income increased from 30 percentage points to 130 points and the difference in final income 
after benefits in-kind from 56 to 196 points. These increases illustrate the growing levels of 
state support that low income population were receiving after the reforms. Moreover, in 2012 
it is no longer a family type earning 10 times the minimum wage the one that contributes the 






Figure 55. Distance between Highest Net Gainers and Highest Net 
Contributors, 1994 and 2012 (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
The calculations shown so far in this section correspond to the standard family of a couple 
with two young children. But, as will be discussed in the next section, the family types that 
would be expected the gain the most from the reforms would be the ones with more and older 
children and with women in work. 
The emphasis of the reforms on the welfare of low income families can also be observed in 
the case of households of pensioners. Pensioners of previous low earnings were benefited by 
the reforms, contrary to pensioners of previous middle and high earnings, who would obtain 
much lower replacement rates after the reforms.   
The main policy reforms that triggered the changes in the levels of vertical redistribution 
were the following: 
 A more progressive income tax structure, with a stronger effect of subsidies for low 
income families and increases on the fixed fees and marginal rates for high income 
families.  



















 The introduction and expansion of social assistance programmes that target families 
with no social insurance coverage, because even if they benefit families from all 
income lower end of the income scale.  
There is however one caveat regarding income tax deductions. The deductions calculated for 
this study would generate an annual reduction the income tax of a family earning 25 times the 
minimum wage of $4,665 (£412). This amount would represent a subsidy that this family 
type would get from the state, which represents more than half the amount of $7,980 (£704) 
that a family earning one minimum wage would get in Oportunidades benefits. For this 
thesis, spending on private healthcare and education were estimated at conservative levels, 
using national averages, but in fact upper income families spend much more. For example, 
according to the 2012 national income and expenditure survey, households of the 10th 
income decile spend on healthcare on average $12,728 (£1,124) per year, compared to an 
average of £1,471 (£130) for households of the first decile. The amount used in this study for 
a family of four was $2,745 (£242). Hence, considering also that as part of the income tax 
reform new deductible expenses were added, the amount that a high income family get back 
from income tax deductions should be expected to be much higher than the amount estimated 
in the current study, possibly surpassing the cash benefits paid to a poor family. The result 
would be that the degree of vertical redistribution could be lower than the one estimated here. 
Nonetheless, the findings of this thesis do coincide with similar studies on vertical 
redistribution recently carried out in the country.  
Scott (2013) found out that for 2010 the system delivered positive net monetary benefits until 
the 3rd income decile, and when taking into account benefits in-kind, net benefits were 
positive until the eighth decile. Scott’s paper’s findings are described in the third chapter of 
this thesis and the net effects are detailed in Table 3.1. Whilst this thesis and Scott’s studies 
are not strictly comprable because they seek different objectives, cover distinct time periods, 
use different variables and data sources and adopt different research approaches –Scott looks 
at outputs after policy implementation whilst the current thesis aims to map the change in the 
system’s architecture–, both conclude that there is a redistributive inclination towards low 
income population. Table 30 compares Scott’s and this study’s findings. In the case of the 
present study, the table presents findings for the standard family composition and two 





in the corresponding income decile, matching their net cash income after taxes and benefits 
with the net cash income reported in the 2012 ENIGH by decile.  
Table 30. Net Gains and Losses after Taxes and Benefits by Income Level 
 Scott’ Findings  Thesis Findings 
Decile 
Net Benefits 2010 
X MW 
Net Benefits 2012 
Total Monetary 
Private Sector Informal Economy 
Final Cash Final Cash 
I 137.9 32.1      
II 54.0 8.1 1 165.8 15.8 174.8 31.2 
III 35.3 2.6 2 76.5 1.4 85.5 13.7 
IV 25.1 0.0      
V 17.5 -2.8 3 45.6 -4.4 44.0 -3.8 
VI 12.1 -4.2 4 29.1 -8.4 32.0 -3.8 
VII 6.5 -5.7 5 17.1 -12.9 24.9 -3.8 
VIII 1.6 -7.5      
IX -3.2 -9.4 10 -3.6 -18.6 7.2 -7.1 
X -10.5 -12.7 15 -14.5 -20.3 -1.8 -7.2 
20 -18.1 -22.4 -2.3 -6.3 
25 -21.1 -24.6 -2.6 -5.8 
Sources: Scott (2013) and own estimations. 
Table 7.1 shows how in both studies, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the combination of taxes and cash benefits resulted in net gains for people in the first three 
deciles and that when adding the value of welfare services, up to the eighth decile. There are 
important differences in the percentages of original income that the system offers or takes 
away, which could be due to Scott using data from 2010, whilst this study estimates the 
potential effects of the system as it was designed in 2012; and differences between the 
variables used in each study. 
This thesis, as well as Scott’s work, reveal that the tax/benefit system indeed redistributes 
income from high to low income population. This thesis also revealed that the reforms 
adopted over the last 18 years did increase the levels the redistribution. Scott’s research is 
limited to identifying redistributive effects by income decile covering only four years, 





structures that gain or lost the most or the labour market segment in which they are inserted, 
and his study does not cover a longer period that would allow a comprehensive assessment of 
the reform phase. On the other hand, this thesis by applying model families, uncovers the 
redistributive effects of the system’s policy architecture across different family compositions 
and employment profiles. The next part of the section discusses these effects. 
8.2.1.2. Changes in horizontal redistribution across household compositions 
In a nutshell, the reforms represented an increase in the levels of redistribution towards 
families with children and families with women in work. Regarding families with children, 
prior to the reforms the tax/benefit system simply did not offer any specific support; however 
the reforms introduced two new programmes which offer additional benefits: Popular Health 
Insurance by exempting them from the payment of contributions, and Oportunidades by 
paying benefits for each child.  
Figure 55 compares the variation in net cash gains after taxes and cash benefits between 1994 
and 2012 for three family types with earners employed in the informal economy: one couple 
with four children (one in each school level), one couple with 2 children (one in primary 
school) and a childless couple. Additionally, the figure includes the calculations for a family 
type with an earner employed in the formal private sector that represents all household 
compositions for that employment profiles, since disposable income would not change with 
the number or age of family members. Nine income levels are presented. All children were 
assumed to be girls, because Oportunidades pays scholarships of higher amounts for girls 
than for boys. The calculations for households with self-employed earners would be similar 
to the variations for households with earners in the informal economy, and households with 
earners employed in the public sector would register the same variations for all compositions, 





Figure 56. 2012/1994 Difference in Net Cash Gains, Private Sector Employees 
and Informal Workers, Four Family Compositions, (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own estimation. 
The exemption of Popular Health Insurance contributions represent only a minor support to 
families with children; for example, an increase of only three points in the percentage of 
original income for a family with original earnings of five times the minimum wage (see 
Table 4.10). It is the Oportunidades the programme that boosts levels of support for families 
with children.  
In 1994, net cash gains would not have changed across household compositions, i.e. families 
of the same employment profile and income level would have obtained the same gains after 
taxes and benefits regardless of the number and age of their members. As the figure shows, 
by 2012 there would be important differences across families with earners employed in the 
informal economy. As can be observed, for these households net gains vary significantly 
depending on the number of children. Families with four children would obtain the largest 
increases by far and would obtain positive gains until an original income of four times the 
minimum wage. On the other hand, families with two children would obtain much lower 
increases, in fact, at one minimum wage, the variation would not be much greater than the 
increase for a childless couple, and net gains would disappear after an original earnings level 
of only twice the minimum wage. Families with earners employed in the formal private 
sector would not be expected to benefit from the benefits that support families with children; 
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household compositions, at much lower levels than for families with earners employed in the 
informal economy.  
Families of women in work with young children would be another group of household types 
that would obtain important benefits from the reforms, in this case from the expansion of day 
care centres. In 1994 women employed in the formal sector already had the right to childcare 
delivered by the IMSS or the ISSSTE, but no services were offered to women without social 
insurance. By 2012, the introduction of childcare centres for children of women with no 
social insurance coverage would represent an important increase in the levels of support. 
Figure 56 illustrates the growing importance of childcare. The graph shows the difference in 
the value of childcare as a percentage of original earnings between 2012 and 1994 for each 
household type. 
Figure 57. 2012/1994 Difference in the Value of Childcare as a Parentage of 
Original Earnings, Female Headed Households (percentage points) 
 
Source: Own estimations. 
 
For a family headed by a woman formally employed in the private sector insured by the 
IMSS and earning one minimum wage, the value of childcare would represent eight 
percentage points more in 2012 than the value it represented in 1994. At the same earnings 
level, for a family headed by a female public sector employee the value of childcare would 


























registered for a family of a woman with no social insurance, 35 points of its original earnings 
at the same income level. At an earnings level of five times, as shown in the graph, eligibility 
to childcare would be lost for women in work with no social insurance coverage, leaving 
these women with no support from the state to care for their children and limiting their 
capacity to join the labour market. On the other hand women employed in the formal sector 
would be covered at all income levels. As discussed in the previous chapter, the value of 
childcare is much higher than other benefits in-kind, hence the reforms would have 
represented an effort to redistribute income towards families of women in work, especially 
towards low income women in work either self-employed or employed in the informal 
economy.  
Households of elderly people would also result benefited by the reforms, but at lower degrees 
than families with children and with women in work, and only at low income levels where 
retired formal sector employees would receive minimum guaranteed pensions, or retired 
workers not eligible for a social insurance pension would receive a social assistance pension 
that could represent a significant replacement rate. To further illustrate the degrees of 
horizontal redistribution that the reforms would be expected to generate, Figure 57 compares 
the differences between the 2012 and 1994 amounts of the minimum guaranteed pension and 
the social assistance pension, family benefits (i.e. Oportunidades) for a family of two 
children, family benefits for a family of four children and childcare. For example, in 2012 
elderly people formerly employed in the public sector earning one minimum wage would be 
receiving $1,487 (£131) more than that they would receive in 1994, because of the increase in 
the ISSSTE minimum guaranteed pension; people not eligible to a social insurance pension 
would only be receiving $500 (£44) more, namely the value of the recently introduced social 
assistance pension, and people formerly employed in the private sector would actually be 
receiving less in real terms, even if the value of their pension would be higher compared to 





Figure 58. 2012/1994 Difference in Benefits' Amount, 4 Employment Profiles 
(pesos) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
* The amounts of childcare for formal private and public sector employees decreased because 
the costs per child are lower in 2012, since both IMSS and ISSSTE extended the contracting out 
of services to private sector providers. Nonetheless, the coverage of both systems increased 
significantly, and especially the IMSS covers a much larger number of children, as explained in 
the previous chapter.  
 
The figure shows how in real terms, the largest amounts by far have been directed towards 
families with children and women in work with no social insurance coverage, whilst 
pensioners of the same employment profiles receive a minimal amount. In short, the 
redistributive effort of the reforms was eschewed towards low income families with more and 
older children and towards families of women in work. This type of expansion would 
apparently fit the ‘social investment’ perspective, which has recently occupied a central space 
in the discussion about recent developments in social policy (Morel et al., 2012); such link is 
further discussed below, as part of the characterisation of the Mexican welfare regime model. 
There are also great differences in the redistributive effort among employment profiles; the 
next section summarises the results on the levels of redistribution within that dimension. 
8.2.1.3. Changes in horizontal redistribution across employment profiles 
The thesis has shown how the reforms have favoured employment profiles with no access to 































disposable or final income from the original. Another way to illustrate the differences in the 
redistributive effort across employment profiles is to compare the changes in the amounts of 
disposable or final income between 1994 and 2012. Figures 58 and 59 show the variations for 
the four employment profiles at three income levels. The household composition that is used 
as the basis for comparison is the standard family of the couple of one male earner with two 
children, for the reasons explained above. The minimum wage in 2012 was 25 per cent lower 
in real terms than in 1994, hence the most benefited family types by the reforms would be the 
ones with variations lower than 25. The first figure shows the variations in disposable income 
after taxes and cash benefits, the second figure shows the variations in final income including 
the value of benefits in-kind. 
Figure 59. 2012/1994 Percentage Variation in Disposable Income after Cash 
Benefits, 4 Employment Profiles 
 





























Figure 60 2012/1994 Percentage Variation in Final Income after Benefits In-
Kind, 4 Employment Profiles 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 59 shows that after taxes and cash benefits, the most favoured profile would be 
families with self-employed earners. Interestingly, within this profile the family earning 25 
times the minimum wage would obtain a stronger improvement than at five times the 
minimum wage, because of the effect of the introduction of the minor taxpayers’ regime. On 
the other extreme, family types of public sector employees would be the most negatively 
affected profile, mainly because of the increases of social insurance contributions.  
Adding the value of benefits in-kind improves income of public sector employees’ families 
more than families of private sector employees, basically due to higher spending levels on 
healthcare for the former that resulted from the 2007 ISSSTE reform. Hence, even if affected 
by a rise in their social insurance contributions, public sector employees were able to gain 
some benefits from the reforms as a part of the negotiation process; on the other hand, 
families of formal private sector employees would register the lowest levels of final income. 
Nonetheless, family types of self-employed and informal economy earners remain as the 
most benefited by the reforms, favoured by the introduction of Popular Health Insurance 
healthcare services.   
In sum, the findings show that the reforms directed redistributive efforts towards families 




























these groups of families would tend to be in precarious employment; indeed there was a  
strong emphasis on programmes that aim to act as tools for the incorporation of people into 
the labour market. Several questions arise: what was the rationale applied in the design of the 
reforms, how can the welfare model that emerged from them be characterised and what is the 
potential of that model to reduce the high levels of poverty and inequality that have 
historically affected Mexico.  
8.2.2.  The Logics behind the Reforms 
The patterns of redistribution obtained from the calculations revealed the effects of two 
complementary approaches followed in the design of the reforms: a ‘social investment’ 
perspective and a residual logic. Both approaches fuse to shape a particular type of social 
policy that fails to protect the majority of families from poverty and to reduce inequality. 
8.2.2.1. The ‘social investment’ perspective 
Morel et al (2012) comment that the adoption of the ‘social investment’ perspective in the 
design of social policies seeks to address new social risks, reduce the intergenerational 
transmission of poverty, enhance the human capital of individuals and families so that they 
can assume responsibility for their own welfare through market income, and eventually 
promote economic and employment growth. These objectives are evident in the design of the 
two of the main Mexican reforms: Oportunidades and the expansion of childcare. 
It can be argued that Oportunidades and other Latin American conditional cash transfers 
programmes pioneered the ‘social investment’ perspective. Oportunidades main objective is 
indeed to break with the intergenerational transmission of poverty. The programme’s 
foremost aim is to enhance the human capital of poor children by enabling them to remain in 
school until high school, so that once they graduate, they can have the possibility of joining 
the labour market and obtaining an income that will allow them to overcome their condition 
of poverty. The majority of the benefits offered by the programme take the form of 
scholarships and the amounts increase substantially with school level, to compensate families 
for the opportunity cost of not working and to incentivise them to stay in school (Levy, 2006, 
Levy and Rodriguez, 2004). 
Oportunidades represents an important effort to deliver income support to sectors of the 





country’s history. Nonetheless, the adoption of a ‘social investment’ perspective can have a 
number of negative consequences. Families with young children are left with very little 
support. As the calculations showed, the annual benefits offered to urban childless couples 
and families with one newly born child and a child in primary school are almost the same, 
$7,980 (£704) annually for the former and $5,280 (x466) for the latter, the difference of 
$2,700 (£238) corresponding to the special support ‘living better’ for families with young 
children only introduced a few years ago. At the other end, a family that had also two 
children but one in secondary school and the other one in high school would be expected to 
receive benefits for $21,04512 (x1,860), 160 per cent more than the family with two young 
children, both family types being eligible at the same income levels. Larger families, e.g. 
with two young and two older children would remain eligible at higher income levels, as 
discussed previously in the thesis. The ‘social investment’ perspective as adopted in Mexico, 
appears to be neglecting the welfare of families with young children, limiting the system’s 
redistributive potential towards them, in comparison to families with older and/or more 
children, as authors like Damian (2007) argue, in its current configuration the Mexican social 
policy is generating inequalities between different types of families. 
Another one of the Mexican major reforms that can be seen as reflecting a ‘social investment’ 
perspective is be the expansion of childcare services. In 1994, only women in formal 
employment had the right to childcare, which was delivered through the social insurance 
system, although services were limited and coverage rates minimal. As previously discussed, 
in recent decades not only have social insurance childcare services registered a significant 
expansion, but a new network was created to provide to services to children of women with 
no social insurance coverage.  
The reform has to be understood in the context of increases in the female labour force 
participation rate, which passes from 37 per cent in 1994 to 45 per cent in 2012 (WB). Indeed 
the state appears to have responded to this increase by expanding childcare services, but one 
should be clear about the main drivers behind the rise in the number of women joining the 
labour market. More women join the labour market to complement household income 
because of the fall in real wages. In the period covered in this thesis, the minimum wage lost 
                                                 
12 This ammount would the same for a family type of four children, one newly born, one in primary school, one 





25 per cent of it its real value and average household income (total current income) fell 14 
per cent. At the same time, the number of earners per household increased from 1.7 in 1994 
to 2.4 in 2012, and in urban areas to 2.7 (ENIGH, 2012).  
The expansion of childcare would be responding to this conjuncture. The state provides 
services to enable women to join the labour market because without their earnings, family 
income would drop even more. Besides childcare, the state has not designed any other 
benefits or services for women in work. The percentage of female headed households 
increased from 17 per cent of the total number of households in the country in 1990 to 23 per 
cent in 2005 (INEGI, 2013). The Mexican tax/benefit system does not offer any type of 
‘passive’ income support and childcare services represent the only benefit that has been 
created for women in work who are lone mothers. It could be argued that the adoption of the 
‘social investment’ perspective in Mexico, implicitly assumes that women should be able to 
provide for themselves and their families with a market income and no government support, 
except services that enable them to participate in the labour market. 
Indeed, benefits that protect family income when the earner is not able to participate in the 
labour market have not been prioritised by the reform process. The non-contributory old-age 
pension amounts to only $500 (£44) per month, whilst per child spending on childcare 
services for women with no social insurance amounts to $885 (£78) per month, and the 
monthly quantity that is paid to the private provider amounts to $700 (£62). Total budget 
allocated to that pension programme, $17.7 billion (x1.6 billion), and the number of 
pensioners, 3.1 million, are much higher than the resources spent on the childcare 
programme, $3.1 billion (£274 million) and the number of children covered, 268 thousand, 
but the resources spent per beneficiary are higher in the latter than in the former programme 
(Presidency, 2013). 
The reforms did not consider the introduction of income support for sick or disabled people 
not covered by social insurance, nor for the unemployed. The advocates of the ‘social 
investment’ perspective emphasise that proper income support to combat poverty and 
inequality should be precondition of more ‘enabling’ measures (Morel et al., 2012). It would 
seem that this has not happened in Mexico. In addition, a residual logic that has kept existing 





8.2.2.2. The residual logic 
The design of the reforms has combined the ‘social investment’ perspective with a residual 
logic regarding the role of the welfare state that assumes a greater reliance on market 
arrangements and targeted benefits. As explained in chapter 3, the residual paradigm was 
introduced in Mexican social policy with the IMSS pension reform of 1997, which 
substituted the pay-as-you-go system with a system of individual capitalisation and privatised 
the management of pension funds. In that same year, the expansion of social assistance began 
with the introduction of Progresa, the precedent of Oportunidades. This thesis has shown that 
the reforms did increase the potential levels of vertical redistribution, although with an 
inclination towards some household types and employment profiles, in part as a result of the 
adoption of the ‘social investment’ approach. One question that remains is to what extent the 
benefit levels generated by the reforms can hold the potential of combating poverty. 
The negative effects of social insurance pension reforms were discussed in chapter 5. As was 
explained, low income workers would not be as affected as workers from higher income 
levels, because the amount of minimum guaranteed pensions was kept at the same level, and 
even increased for public sector workers. However, middle and upper income workers would 
hardly obtain replacement rates similar to the rates offered under the pay-as-you-go systems 
even if they were to contribute for almost double the number of years required by the law to 
be eligible. In the case of other family types, the expansion of social protection coverage 
under residual principles would represent serious barriers to its potential at reducing poverty 
rates. 
Figure 60 and 61 compare per capita monthly disposable income after taxes and cash benefits 
for families of informal sector workers, of two different household compositions, at four 
income levels in 1994 and 2012. The first figure’s composition corresponds to the standard 
family of the couple with two young children; the second figure shows the results for a 
couple with two older children, one in secondary school and one in high school.  Per capita 
income was calculated applying the same economies of scale used to establish eligibility of 
family types to social assistance programmes (see chapter 5). The first dotted line marks the 
‘minimum welfare line’, that is the first official poverty line set by the government that 
represents the minimum income that a person requires to meet their basic nutritional needs; in 
December 2012 the amount was $1,159 (£102) per month. The second dotted line marks the 





person requires to meet their basic nutrition and non-nutritional needs; in December 2012 the 
amount was $2,388 (£211).  
Figure 61. Disposable Income and Poverty Lines, Informal Workers, Couple with 2 
Young Children (pesos) 
 
Source: Own calculations. 
Figure 62. Disposable Income and Poverty Lines, Informal Workers, Couple with 2 
Older Children (pesos) 
 






































The standard family would be receiving benefits until an income level of two times the 
minimum wage; the family with the children in secondary and high school would receive 
benefits until the earnings level of 2.5 times the minimum wage. Three conclusions can be 
extracted from the graphs.  
First, Oportunidades benefits would at least partially compensate low income families for the 
fall in real wages, although the degree of compensation varies among types of family 
compositions. As has been previously commented, the minimum wage lost 25 per cent of its 
value between 1994 and 2012. For the standard family type, the new cash benefits would be 
sufficient to offset that drop and raise disposable income in 2012 slightly above 1994, but 
only at the lowest income level, and once the eligibility to the programme is lost after two 
times the minimum wage, the gap between disposable incomes of both years widens. The 
family type of older children presents a better situation because benefit amounts would be 
higher, but even if at 2.5 times the minimum wage it would still be receiving benefits, 2012 
disposable income falls below the 1994 income, and once eligibility is lost, income the gap 
between the two years widens. Oportunidades would be acting as a mechanism to 
compensate for the fall in real wages, although only families at the bottom of the income 
scale would be receiving such benefit.  
Secondly, the new benefits are insufficient to raise low income families above poverty lines. 
In 2012, family types of both household compositions with original earnings of one minimum 
wage would not even reach the first poverty line. This means that even after the support 
offered by the state, neither of these families would obtain an income sufficient enough to 
meet their basic nutritional needs. Actually, disposable income of the family type with young 
children would represent almost 40 per cent less than the ‘minimum welfare’ line set by the 
own government, and disposable income of the family with older children would be 37 per 
cent less. Family types of higher income levels would obtain an income higher than the first 
poverty line, but only barely above it and none of them reaches the second poverty line, 
which is supposed to include the minimum nutritional and non-nutritional satisfactors that a 
person needs. As Damian (2007) argues, in the cases where Oportunidades benefits manage 
to raise family income slightly above the ‘minimum welfare’ line, it would still mean that the 
family should devote all of its earnings to purchase food, without the capacity of spending in 





increased the system’s degrees of redistribution, the changes fail to redistribute income to a 
degree that would lift families from poverty.   
Thirdly, the targeted nature of the reforms excludes families that are not poor enough to 
qualify for the programmes, but still fall below poverty thresholds. According to the 
calculations, family types of two young children would lose eligibility to Oportunidades at an 
income level of just 2.5 times the minimum wage. As has been extensively discussed, 
families with older and/or more children could continue to receive benefits at higher income 
levels, but still many families would remain vulnerable. For example, the family types of one 
child in secondary and one child in high school would receive benefits until a level of 2.5 
times the minimum wage, however, as can be observed in the figure 7.x, the effect would be 
that when benefits cease at original earnings of three times the minimum wage, disposable 
income would actually be lower than at a level of twice the minimum wage. Although strict 
targeting has been praised by the government as one of the virtues of social policy reforms in 
Mexico (SEDESOL, 2007), the fact is that impact evaluations of Oportunidades have 
revealed serious negative consequences (Molyneux, 2006); beyond them, the calculations 
presented in this thesis illustrate the extent to which the programme’s design results in the 
exclusion of families that would still require support to overcome their condition of poverty.  
The negative consequences of the residual logic can also be observed in other areas. Women 
in work not covered by social insurance would only be eligible for childcare services until a 
level of original household earnings of four times the minimum wage. The calculations 
carried out for this thesis assumed that the woman was a lone mother, hence 100 per cent of 
household income would be provided by her. But if the woman had a partner, both incomes 
would be added to establish eligibility, which would mean that she would be at risk of losing 
the right to childcare at even lower earnings levels.  
In pensions, the new non-contributory pensions are not explicitly targeted at low income 
people anymore, although they original were; nonetheless, their low amount does suggest that 
they mainly aim to provide support to poor people. Moreover, their monthly amount 
represents 57 per cent less than half the first poverty line based on basic nutritional needs; 
hence, it could be argued that for the state, elderly people should only entitled to buy food for 





In housing, only families at the lower income levels would be eligible to subsidies, leaving 
families who were still poor and were not covered by the social insurance system without any 
support; but given the low amount of the subsidies, even families that receive then would find 
it difficult to improve their housing conditions in a significant way. 
Advocates of the ‘social investment’ approach argue for a clear distinction between it and the 
residual paradigm. Nonetheless, they do point out that the division between the two 
approaches can be easily blurred and that the ‘social investment’ strategy represents a certain 
degree of continuity with the neoliberalism (Morel et al., 2012). The example of Mexico 
shows how both perspectives can coexist and generate less than optimal effects. Firstly, one 
of the risks of adopting the ‘social investment’ perspective materialises, when today’s poor 
are sacrificed with the expectation that investment in human capital will yield a reduction in 
future poverty rates (Nolan, 2013). Cash benefits channelled through Oportunidades are kept 
at minimal levels, since their main objective is to support children in school and not to lift 
families from poverty, whilst families with young children could be receiving lower amounts 
that leave them even more vulnerable.  
Secondly, the residual logic has meant that no comprehensive income protection system for 
the entire population has been created. Morel et al (2012) highlight that such system 
constitutes a precondition for the successful implementation of a ‘social investment’ strategy. 
The Mexican example shows how that precondition can be easily bypassed, as no schemes 
have been introduced to protect families with no social insurance coverage when income is 
lost due to illnesses, disability, maternity and other associated risks. The amounts of benefits 
that were introduced for people with no social insurance were set at minimal amounts, like 
non-contributory old age pensions. In his proposal for a comprehensive social security 
system, Beveridge (Williams and Williams, 1987) argued that amounts of insurance and 
assistance benefits should be enough to guarantee a basic income for subsistence. In Mexico, 
the two logics applied in the design of the reforms have not only been translated into strict 
targeting, but also into minimal benefit levels that cannot be expected to guarantee a 
subsistence income or to raise families from poverty.  
Contrary to what has been occurring in other Latin American countries, poverty in Mexico 
not only has not fallen in recent years, but has actually increased, and in 2012 poverty rates 
were higher than the region’s average (UNDP, 2014). It is not the aim of this thesis to 





social policies do not hold the potential of contributing to an effective fight against poverty. 
The fragmented nature of the reforms constitutes a final feature that has shaped the social 
policy model that emerged from the reform process. 
8.2.3.  A Fragmented System 
One of the main characteristics of social policy in Latin America during its development 
phase was its ‘truncated’ nature (Barrientos, 2009), because large sectors of the population 
were left without social protection. Throughout the region, recent reforms have broken with 
that segmentation. As Dion (2010) argues, the path taken in Mexico has not been to seek the 
expansion of coverage through the existing social insurance programmes, but rather through 
the layering of new social assistance programmes along them. As the calculations discussed 
in this thesis have shown, the expansion has meant, on one hand, the incorporation into the 
social protection system, of many groups of the population that had never received any 
substantial benefits from the state, but on the other, the creation of a fragmented and unequal 
social policy architecture.   
Social assistance programmes naturally segment the population among those considered in 
need of support and those that not. Such type of segmentation should be expected in any 
country where social policy is based on residual principles. In Mexico, however, there is also 
a horizontal fragmentation across different types of insertion in the labour market. Hence, 
access to social protection continues to be determined by the employment status of the 
family’s earner.  The particular type of expansion of social protection in Mexico has created a 
highly unequal architecture 
Figure 62 compares tax and benefit levels in 2012 according to the employment profiles of 
family earners used for this thesis. Benefit levels are shown in annual amounts per individual 
earner, including benefits that only female earners would be entitled to, namely childcare and 
maternity benefits. The figure shows amounts for three income levels. Benefits in-kind are 






Figure 63. Structure of Taxes and Benefits, 2012 
 
Source: Owe elaboration. 
What can be highlighted from the figure is the disparity in the types and amounts of benefits 
by employment profile. Moreover, benefits are delivered through different programmes 
administered by different government agencies. The figure reveals a disintegrated system that 
offers unequal levels of protection and end up duplicating functions and wasting resources. 
On top of that, it has been pointed out that the system’s fragmentation could be generating 
perverse incentives for the formalisation of the economy.  
Levy (2008) has argued that the introduction of benefits for families without social insurance 
coverage would be incentivising people to join the informal economy. The results presented 
in this thesis show that benefit levels offered to formal sector employees are still significantly 
higher than benefits for informal sector workers. This is especially the case of women in 
work, because of the high value of social insurance maternity benefits and childcare. 
Nonetheless, informal sector workers in 2012 would receive benefits that informal sector 
workers in 1994 were not. Other authors have also noted the risk that in a fragmented system, 
coverage levels of social insurance could diminish when benefits are provided through other 
types of programmes (Martinez Franzoni and Sanchez-Ancochea, 2014). The question in the 
case of Mexico would be that if given the choice, to what extent a person would decide to 
join informal employment because of the minimal benefits that social assistance programmes 



















































informality, but what could be commented are the characteristics of the complex relation 
between the tax/benefit system and the informal economy.  
Informality has been pointed out as one of the main problems in Mexico and in Latin 
America in general. Some of the tax and contribution changes have not sought redistributive 
objectives, but rather have had the foremost objective of increasing the size of the formal 
economy, and hence government revenue. Such is the case of the reduction of social 
insurance contributions and the introduction of the minor taxpayers’ regime, and although 
income tax rates were lower in 1994 than in 2012, before the latter year and throughout most 
of the period they were kept at lower levels. It would seem that these measures have failed; as 
the official statistics show, between 2005 and 2012 the proportion of people employed in the 
informal economy remained at 60 per cent (INEGI, 2014a), whilst tax revenue as a 
percentage of GDP in 2012 fell below the Latin American average (OECD, 2012). Notable is 
the failure of the minor taxpayers’ regime; a recently published government report concludes 
that it actually had a negative effect on the government revenues, as people and firms who 
would have otherwise paid taxes under the regular tax regime, managed to get registered as 
minor taxpayers, benefiting from much lower rates (SHCP, 2012), as the calculations of this 
study showed, especially in the case of high income earners. Special provisions adopted to 
incentivise formality ended up fragmenting the tax system and generating inequalities, like 
the benefit system.  
Since the creation of Oportunidades, social protection has evolved by adding programmes for 
families without social insurance. As noted before, the expansion has broken with the original 
‘truncated’ nature of social policy. It could be argued that these reforms responded to the 
system’s historic inequality system. By the mid-1990s, some of the leading and most 
influential Mexican social policy specialists were pointing out that inequality as the major 
problem with the country’s social policy architecture; social insurance beneficiaries were 
perceived as a privileged group that captured most of the resources (De Gortari and Ziccardi, 
1996). The problem is that the policy changes have not solved the problem of inequality, 
because instead of diluting the system’s segmentation through the universalisation of social 
insurance or the introduction of universalist social programmes with access granted as a right 
of citizenship, reformers seem to have chosen the introduction of targeted social assistance 
programmes. The outcome is a fragmented policy architecture, with a variety of social 





population groups. Even worse, at the end, the employment status of the family’s 
breadwinner continues to determine access to social protection, which was actually one the 
major criticisms of the social insurance model. 
The greater reliance on social assistance programmes reveals that social insurance is 
perceived to be incompatible with an export-oriented economic strategy. Levy (2008, 2012) 
has for long argued for the creation of a ‘universal’ type of social policy, and although with 
important differences with the conventional conceptualisation of universalism, he does 
emphasises the need for a more equal system that dissolves its current fragmentation. The 
problem with his proposal is that it would be funded by consumption taxes, which are highly 
regressive. His reasoning is that both social insurance contributions and income taxes are 
incompatible with a competitive globalised economy. Social insurance is perceived to be 
especially bad because it increases labour costs, which firms must keep low to compete in 
domestic and foreign markets. During the recent presidential elections, the candidate of the 
conservative party was in fact suggesting the disappearance of the social insurance system to 
raise the competitiveness of private firms (Aristegi-Noticias, 2013). The context of an open 
economy is crucial to understand the fragmented type of social policy expansion that has 
been pursued in Mexico. 
The expansion of social assistance would be functioning as a complement to the neoliberal 
economic strategy. Apart from enabling the provision of welfare benefits and services 
without affecting labour costs, there are three ways in which social assistance programmes 
complement the economic model adopted in Mexico during the last decades. First, targeted 
programmes keep low public social spending low. Mexico registers much lower levels of 
social spending than other comparable Latin American countries. As reported by the ECLAC, 
between 1994 and 2010 social spending as a percentage of GDP increased in just 2.9 
percentage points, compared to 6.8 Argentina and 8.9 in Brazil. Low levels of social spending 
contributed to the liberalisation of the economy in two ways; on one side they permitted the 
diversion of resources towards spending on sectors considered more important, like 
infrastructure; on the other, they helped to maintain the macroeconomic stability deemed to 
be a precondition to attract foreign private investment (CEPAL, 2013). Both of these points 
are of course arguable, because the fact is that countries like Brazil and Chile have both been 
more successful in attracting foreign investment, maintaining higher levels of social spending 





Secondly, social assistance would not only be helping to eschew the expansion of social 
protection funded by payroll contributions, but it would also end up subsidising low wages. 
As commented previously, real earnings in Mexico have been falling since the first neoliberal 
structural adjustment measures were introduced in the 1980s. The objective has been to make 
the country more attractive to foreign investors, by offering a cheap labour force. In this 
context, social policy would end up subsidising low wages. They would be helping to keep 
demands for wage increases under control by raising the cash income of poor families. Even 
if benefits amounts are minimal and insufficient to provide an income above poverty lines, 
without them the economic situation of many Mexican families would be even worse given 
the drop in real earnings. 
Thirdly, the expansion of social assistance helped to sustain the legitimacy of the programme 
of economic liberalisation adopted during the last decades. The introduction of social 
assistance programmes allowed the last governments to argue they were implementing 
policies in favour of the poor, but with a minimal effort. Whilst wages were left to drop and 
the de facto liberalisation of the labour market intensified (Brachet-Marquez and De Oliveira, 
2002), governments presented programmes like Oportunidades as great achievements, when 
in fact, the resources devoted to them, and as the calculations in this thesis showed, their 
redistributive potential were minimal. 
With the continuing fragmentation of the system, Mexico could be falling into the paradox of 
redistribution. Korpi and Palme (1998) showed how social policy systems based on social 
assistance programmes have a weaker effect on poverty and inequality because of the low 
levels of political support they gather. The Mexican case is even more serious. Social 
programmes would be dividing the population not only by income, as social assistance 
programmes naturally do, but more importantly, by employment status. Instead of promoting 
social solidarity, social policy would be blocking the prospects of collective action. The 
coverage of the new programmes was kept limited to low income families of earners in 
precarious employment, excluding not just the middle classes, but also poor families who are 
not considered poor enough to receive support from the state. A parallel set of programmes, 
also fragmented, coexists with the new programme. Given this fragmentation, no major steps 
towards the creation of a system with higher redistributive potential should be expected, as 
the own system blocks the formation of cross-class coalitions that could form to demand 





In sum, the new social assistance programmes have ended up adding a new layer to the 
system, reproducing the unequal levels of social protection offered by the state to Mexican 
families. The fragmented expansion of the system blocks the building of redistributive 
coalitions that could lead to a more egalitarian model of welfare. At the end, the state fails to 
provide adequate levels of protection to all citizens and to effectively reduce the high levels 
of poverty and inequality that persist in the country. 
8.3. A Neoliberal Model 
A ‘liberal-informal’ welfare regime with a strong productivist logic, is how Barrientos (2009) 
has called the welfare model that has emerged in Latin America after the wave of social 
policy reforms started in the 1990s. There is debate as to the extent in which there is a unique 
regional model or in fact different model-types have appeared (Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002, 
Martínez Franzoni, 2008). The debate takes more relevance after the left turns of most South 
American countries during the last decade (Cameron and Hershberg, 2010). Nonetheless, for 
the case of Mexico, it would be difficult not to argue that a liberal type of social policy was 
adopted and consolidated by the last three governments. 
Before the reforms Mexico exhibited the features of a Latin American corporatist model, with 
a social policy based on stratified social insurance programmes and a large informal sector, 
like Barrientos (2009, 2004) has characterised it. Mesa-Lago (2000) placed Mexico in the 
intermediate group according to its level of development of social policy, that distinguished 
themselves from the pioneer countries with the most advanced systems because they 
introduced their systems later, they had lower coverage levels and also because of their more 
unified social insurance systems. Filgueira (1998) defined the Mexican regime as ‘dual’ 
because of the inequalities that the social protection system based on social insurance 
programmes generated, by covering only one part of the population. Dion (2010) highlights 
the system’s inequalities generated by the stratification of social insurance programmes and 
its low coverage percentages.  
All these conceptualisations share two main characteristics: i) the centrality of stratified 
social insurance programmes and ii) the low coverage levels of social protection. As the 
calculations of this thesis showed, the reforms have broken with these two central features. 
Mexican social policy would now resemble the liberal model of productivist logic that 





gaining importance but without dismissing the social insurance component. These 
programmes would have diluted the ‘truncated’ nature of social protection. The social 
insurance and social assistance paradigms would be coexisting in Mexico, with the former 
still the basis but with the latter increasing its relevance, as Franco (2006) commented for the 
Latin American region in general. Bayon (2009) highlighted these same features of the 
Mexican welfare model in the twenty-first century. Nonetheless, the research conducted for 
this thesis revealed two elements that could be added to current characterisations of the 
Mexican welfare model.  
First, social assistance programmes offer only minimal benefits that keep social spending at 
low levels. Low social spending in turn allows for taxation to be also maintained at low 
levels. Although personal income tax rates have increased, special conditions like the minor 
taxpayers’ regime open opportunities for people to pay fewer taxes, that is, in the case that 
they would be paying any taxes, because in practice, less than half of the population pays 
them. Tax avoidance would be a measure that would be compensating families for the fall in 
real earnings, whilst also aiding firms to keep labour costs down and increase their 
competitiveness. In this way, benefits of minimal amounts and value constitute a fundamental 
element of the welfare model.  
The second element is the system’s fragmentation. In the context of a pluralist democratic 
regime, the fragmentation of benefits and services would permit their provision to large 
sectors of the population at a low cost. During the authoritarian phase of the Mexican 
political regime, governments could, to a large extent, afford to neglect the needs of large 
sectors of the population that were not considered strategic within the corporatist structure. 
Now that the legitimacy of the government resides in the electoral process, it becomes 
imperative to expand social protection to previously ignored groups. Social insurance would 
not be the optimal medium for the expansion because that would have an impact on labour 
costs. This process is outlined by Dion (2010), who also argues that as the political regime 
was liberalised, traditional corporatist institutions lost relevance, enabling the retrenchment of 
social insurance programmes. In this way, the layering of additional programmes becomes 
also an essential component of the welfare model. 
It is not the objective of this thesis to identify the drivers of the reforms, but it is worth 
commenting on three factors that could prove to be crucial for the future of social protection 





on the expansion of non-contributory pensions. The programme ’70 and more’ was 
introduced in the context of the competed elections of 2006, as a response to the 
implementation of universal non-contributory pensions by the leftist Federal District 
government. Popular Health Insurance was also implemented by the Federal Government 
after the Federal District government had introduced a healthcare scheme of universal 
aspirations, although the link to electoral competition would be less clear and, as in the case 
of other programmes, its factors would require further research. 
Esquivel et al (2011) mention that the social policy reforms did not respond to social 
mobilisation, but were rather designed and implemented in a top-down process by 
‘progressive’ policymakers. Levy (2006) stresses that the introduction of Progresa (later 
renamed Oportunidades) did not respond to social pressures and that there were no demands 
for the expansion of social benefits during that time. Nonetheless, this view overlooks the fact 
that a few years earlier the Zapatista uprising had brought to the forefront of public debate the 
country’s high levels of poverty and inequality. Perhaps not directly, but social mobilisation 
could have had an impact on the expansion of social protection. Nonetheless, the absence of 
strong social mobilisation behind the reforms is evident and could explain their low 
redistributive potential. Comparative research with other Latin American countries that have 
developed more generous social protection systems in the contexts of intense social 
mobilisation could be fruitful to fully investigate how social movements have impacted 
policy developments in the region.  
The consolidation of a neoliberal hegemony could also explain the origins of policy reforms 
and why certain models were chosen. Whilst the system’s expansion can be explained by 
electoral competition, the dismantling of some corporatist structures or the effects of social 
mobilisation, the question that would remain would be why, in the first place, did reformers 
chose thy types of reforms they did. For example, why did reformers chose a targeted 
approach to expand non-contributory pensions; why did they insist on introducing a pension 
system of individual capitalisation for public sector workers when all evidence shoes that 
those type of systems had great deficiencies; or why the layering of an additional healthcare 
insurance programme instead of a system of universal access. The consolidation of 
neoliberalism in Mexico is associated to the rise of the liberal technocratic elite that took 





be how was that elite able to defeat all contestations to their neoliberal agenda within and 
outside government structures. 
In sum, the particular features of the Mexican reforms revealed by the calculations of this 
study, namely minimal benefit levels and a high fragmentation, distinguish it from the 
orthodox ‘liberal’ model present in Anglo-Saxon countries. The Mexican model could 
perhaps be better labelled as ‘neoliberal’ rather than ‘liberal’. The question would be if traces 
of this neoliberal model can also be observed in countries that are facing pressures for the 
expansion of social protection by electoral competition, under contexts of strong economic 
liberalisation.  
In the particular case of Mexico, the explanation behind the apparent compatibility of 
neoliberalism and pluralist democracy might be found in the sequencing of events. The 
liberal policy making elite that has dominated national politics for more than 20 years arrived 
to power before the transition to democracy, still under the authoritarian regime. This fact 
allowed them to draw the social policy path that the country would follow with relatively low 
levels of contestation.  Eventually, a liberal model of social policy became hegemonic, in 
tune with the aggressive liberalisation of the economy. Electoral competition has not been 
sufficient to amend the path (Rodríguez Araujo, 2010, Teichman, 2002). Much needed 
research is needed on the mechanisms that enabled the consolidation of neoliberalism in 
Mexico, in contrast to South American countries, which seem to have taken steps towards a 
social-democratic model (Huber and Stephens, 2012). 
8.4. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has discussed three main findings of the research. First, the reforms did increase 
the levels of vertical redistribution, which is what would be expected because social 
assistance programmes naturally redistribute income towards the poor; but on horizontal 
redistribution across family compositions, more support was directed towards families with 
older children and women in work, and on redistribution across employment profiles, the 
effort was eschewed towards families with earners either self-employed or employed in the 
informal economy.  
Secondly, that two reform logics had been combined to design the reforms. On one side, a 





region in general, and that in the case of Mexico was made evident by the emphasis on 
programmes that aimed to support the education of children and the employment of women, 
with the objective of enabling poor families to overcome their situation through labour 
market participation; on the other side, a residual logic that limited the expansion of social 
protection to the introduction of social assistance programmes. The result of this combination 
was a limited redistributive potential, which neglected the wellbeing of families with small 
children and offered minimal benefits that were not sufficient to raise low income families 
above poverty lines.  
Thirdly, whilst the reforms broke with the benefit system’s ‘truncated’ nature, they did so by 
layering additional programmes, creating a fragmented policy architecture that offered 
unequal levels of protection depending on the earners’ employment profile. The system 
offered different benefit types and levels to different population groups, administered by 
different government agencies. Such fragmentation blocked prospects for collective action to 
demand a more comprehensive social protection, resulting in more fragmentation and 
continuing low benefit levels. 
Lastly, the chapter outlined the welfare model that emerged from the reform process. The 
argument was made that more than a ‘liberal’ model, the Mexican social protection system 
would better be labelled a ‘neoliberal’ model because of its close complementarities with the 
neoliberal economic strategy adopted during the last decades. Given the pressures generated 
by electoral competition, it would be expected that the system continues its expansion, but 
with limited redistributive potential because of constrains of the ‘neoliberal’ model. Low 
levels of social mobilisation and well entrenched neoliberal ideas in the state’s structures 
make it difficult to expect any major changes in the model. Social policy will continue to fail 








The thesis revealed the redistributive potential of changes in the Mexican tax/benefit system 
between 1994 and 2012. The research consisted on the modelling of the potential effects of 
social policy on households. Empirical findings revealed the emergence of a neoliberal social 
welfare model with low redistributive potential, based on a fragmented architecture and 
minimal benefits for poor families in the informal economy. The present chapter offers the 
answer to the research questions and concludes the thesis by identifying major policy 
implications and future avenues for research. 
The chapter is divided in seven sections. The first one briefly summarises each chapter of the 
thesis. The next section provides the answer to the main research question and the three sub-
questions that guided the study. The following two sections describe the study’s limitations 
and highlight its main contributions. The next one describes some major policy implications, 
followed by a section that identifies possible avenues to continue the research on Mexican 
social policy. The chapter concludes by offering a number of final reflections. 
9.2. Thesis Summary 
The first three chapters of the thesis offered the introduction to the research, the theoretical 
framework and the literature review. The main concepts relevant for the study of 
redistribution and social policy were presented, as well as the narrative on the history of 
social policy in Latin America and more specifically on Mexico. The literature review also 
included main theoretical insights into recent policy changes in both the region and the 
country, and basic socio-demographic and labour market data relevant for the design of the 
research. The fourth chapter described the methodological approach based on the ‘model 
families’ technique, presented the research questions that guided the study, and explained the 
selection process of model families and the components of the tax/benefit system. 
The next three chapters presented the empirical findings. Chapter 5 showed that changes in 
the structure of social insurance contributions and income tax reform had a negative effect on 
the income of families with earners employed in the formal economy, except those at the 





employed would benefit from the minor taxpayers regime. Chapter 6 revealed that the extent 
to which lack of social insurance coverage would leave families unprotected, especially in the 
presence of pregnant women in work, and how the design of family transfers prioritise 
families with children in secondary and high school. In addition, the reform of social 
insurance pensions would severely harm pensioners except for those with previous low 
earnings, and social assistance pensions would have a minimal effect because of their low 
amount. Chapter 7 highlighted the importance of the introduction of healthcare for families 
without social insurance coverage and the relevance of childcare within the benefit system, 
whilst the analysis of housing programmes revealed the inequalities of the system and the 
limited potential of subsidies to improve housing standards of low income population.  
Chapter 8 provided a discussion of the research’s main findings and linked them to the 
literature on social policy. Three main points were discussed, the increase in levels of vertical 
redistribution and the changes in levels of horizontal redistribution triggered by the reforms; 
the ‘productivist’ and ‘residual’ logics that drove the reform process and shaped the present 
architecture of the system; and the expansion of social protection in a fragmented and 
unequal manner. The argument was made that Mexican social policy should better be defined 
as ‘neoliberal’, since it represents a fundamental piece of the export-oriented growth model 
by subsidising low wages and private investment. 
9.3. Answering the Research Questions 
The research was guided by one main question and three related sub-questions. The main 
research question was ‘How did the fiscal and social policy reforms undertaken in Mexico 
between 1994 and 2012 modify the redistributive potential of the tax/benefit system? The 
three specific questions were the following:  
1. How were the changes in the system’s rules expected to benefit or affect households 
from different sectors of the population? In other words, who were the winners and 
losers of the reforms? Which were the family types most affected or benefited by the 
reforms? 
2. How were changes or continuities in the redistributive potential of the tax/benefit 
system obtained? In other words, what specific changes in the system’s rules benefit 
or affect households from different sectors of the population? Which programmes 





3. How can the emerging architecture of the tax/benefit system be characterised? In 
other words, what are the main features of the social protection institutional assembly 
after the reforms?  
The simulation exercise involved five different household compositions, nine different levels 
of income and five different employment profiles – a total of 225 combinations. Taxes and 
benefits were calculated for each combination in according the rules in force in 1994 and 
2012. Results were compared between both years and across different family types in each 
year. 
In relation to the main research question, How did the fiscal and social policy reforms 
undertaken in Mexico between 1994 and 2012 modify the redistributive potential of the 
tax/benefit system?, the study found that the reforms had the three major effects on the 
system’s redistributive potential:  
 Increase of the vertical redistributive potential from high to low income families. The 
system in 1994 was vertically redistributive, but the reforms increased that potential.   
 Across family compositions, introduction of redistributive logic towards low income 
families with children and families with women in work. In 1994, the system did not 
take into account family composition to establish the payment of taxes, determine 
access to benefits and/or estimate benefit levels. 
 Across employment profiles, introduction of redistributive logic towards low income 
families of earners who were self-employed or employed in the informal economy. In 
1994, the system’s redistributive potential was directed towards low income families 
with earners employed in the formal economy; the reforms introduced redistribution 
towards low income families with no access to social insurance, and by 2012, 
redistributive levels would be expected to be higher for the latter than for the former. 
 Also across employment profiles, higher levels of redistribution towards low income 
pensioners of the system for public sector workers (i.e. ISSSTE). 
The answer to the first specific research question, How were the changes in the system’s rules 
expected to benefit or affect households from different sectors of the population?, allows 
further expansion of the answer to the main question. The winners and losers of the reform 





 By far, the higher increases in net gains after taxes and benefits would have been 
obtained by low income family types with self-employed earners or employed in the 
informal economy; hence these would be the major winners of the reform process. 
 Among the latter, families with older children, namely in higher school grades, and 
with working families would have benefited the most.  
 If only changes in taxes and cash benefits are considered, no other family types would 
have benefited from the reforms in a significant way. If changes in the value of 
benefits in-kind are added, low income families of public sector employees also 
register important improvements.  
 High-income families with earners employed in the formal economy would be the 
main losers of the reforms. If only cash benefits are considered, middle-income 
families of these employment profiles also register losses, but after benefits in-kind, 
only the former end up losing out. 
 The other group of major losers would be middle and high income retired people 
previously employed in the formal private sector. 
The answer to the second specific question, How were changes in the redistributive potential 
of the tax/benefit system obtained?, permits the identification of the policy changes that had 
the strongest impact on the system’s redistributive potential. On taxes and cash benefits, the 
policy changes that benefited or affected major winners and losers were the following:  
 The introduction of the Oportunidades programme had the strongest impact on the 
levels of redistribution towards low income families with no social insurance 
coverage. The impact increased for families with older children in higher school 
grades. 
 Increases to tax subsidies had a minor positive effect on low income families of 
formal sector employees. 
 Reduction of income tax rates that result from the introduction of the minor tax-
payers regime has also a minor positive effect on middle and high income families of 
self-employed earners.  
 Changes of social insurance contributions affected families of public sector 
employees. 
 Families of high-income formal sector employees were affected by income tax 





private welfare spending. Even at the low levels that they were calculated here, the 
amount that a family earning 25 times the minimum wage would get back from 
deductions would surpass the amount that a family earning one minimum wage would 
receive from tax subsidies. Tax deductions might not represent a significant 
proportion of original earnings for high income families, but they do ameliorate the 
increase in income tax rates. 
 Pension reform and the adoption of the individualisation of pension funds would 
affect middle and high income pensioners of the system for private sector employees 
(i.e. IMSS). 
On the side of benefits in-kind, the changes that would be expected to have the major effects 
were: 
 The introduction Popular Health Insurance healthcare would have a strong impact on 
low and middle income families with no social insurance coverage. 
 The introduction of childcare services for women in work with no social insurance 
coverage would have a high strong effect on low income families of women of that 
employment profile. 
 Increases on healthcare spending for public sector employees show a strong impact on 
low and middle income families of that employment profile. 
The answer to the third specific question, How can the emerging architecture of the 
tax/benefit system be characterised?, wraps up the research’s findings and conclusions. Four 
salient features can be identified in the new policy architecture after the calculations of its 
redistributive potential. 
 The architecture shows a mix of the traditional social insurance programmes and a 
group of emerging social assistance programmes. 
 The system has a low redistributive potential. Even if vertical redistribution towards 
low income families was increased, benefit levels remain low and insufficient to raise 
families above poverty lines. Even if income tax rates were increased, tax revenue 
remains at remain low levels because of conditions like the minor taxpayers’ regime 
on one side, and the large informal economy on the other side. At the same time, 
benefit amounts remain low and the cash support offered by programmes like 





the official minimum poverty lines set by the own government. In other words, 
benefits are not enough to even provide an income that would allow families to 
purchase a food basket to meet minimum nutrition requirements. 
 Policy changes reflect the combination of two logics. On one side, a ‘productivist’ or 
‘social investment’ strategy that puts the emphasis on programmes that aim to enable 
people to overcome poverty through labour market participation. On the other side, a 
residual logic that considers programmes targeted at low income population the only 
legitimate types of interventions. Because these logics are prioritised, many families 
that are still poor but not poor enough of do not meet the criteria to qualify for social 
assistance are left with no state support. For example, levels of support for families 
with small children are lower than for families with older children and stop at 
extremely low earnings levels; in addition, programmes that offer protection to the 
elderly, disabled or the unemployed are extremely limited or simply inexistent.  
 The reforms broke with the system’s ‘truncated’ nature, but created a fragmented 
architecture that offers unequal levels of protection to different sectors of the 
population. Social protection was already fragmented because of the stratified social 
insurance programmes. The reforms reproduced that fragmentation across different 
segments of the labour market, not only because of the natural segmentation that 
social assistance programmes produce between recipients and non-recipients, but also 
by the expansion of social protection through the layering of programmes along the 
traditional social insurance programmes.  Moreover, the emerging architecture offers 
unequal benefit levels to different population groups. The inequality was present in all 
policy areas. The fragmentation has two outcomes: i) it reproduces the inequality of 
Mexican society, and ii) it blocks the formation of collective action to demand more 
equal and effective benefit system.  
 Social protection serves as a complement to the neoliberal economic strategy pursued 
by the last three governments. Low labour costs are considered a necessary condition 
for the functioning of the export-oriented growth model. The emerging architecture 
would be contributing in three ways to the implementation of the model: i) it helps to 
maintain low wages by offering a supplement to families’ earnings, ii) it allows the 
expansion of social protection without increasing payroll contributions, and iii) it 





system, by allowing governments to argue they are combating poverty but doing so at 
a minimal cost. 
9.4. Contributions to the Literature 
The thesis has attempted to make a modest but important contribution to the literature on 
Mexican social policy by demonstrating the effects of changes in the tax/benefit system at the 
household level. The contributions can be ordered in three groups. First, at an empirical level, 
it provided a comprehensive assessment of the reform process at the micro level. Previous 
studies have analysed social policy changes but not their redistributive effects including tax 
policy (Dion, 2010, Bayón, 2009). Scott has estimated levels of redistribution of taxes and 
social spending across income deciles but not levels of horizontal redistribution and only 
from 2006 to 2010 (Scott, 2013, Esquivel et al., 2011). This thesis offered a complete 
analysis of the transformation of social protection in Mexico since the mid-1990s, comparing 
degrees of redistribution, i.e. net gains/losses after taxes and benefits at the household level 
before and after the reforms, producing an assessment of the potential impact of the reform 
process on family income. In addition, the study covers all social policy areas, including 
housing, which is not analysed in previous studies. 
It was shown that the reform process would have increased income of groups of the 
population that had been previously neglected by the social protection system, namely 
families with no social insurance, but that the new benefits were concentrated on low income 
population and because of the logics followed in their design, were ineffective to combat 
poverty and inequality. 
Secondly, the thesis makes a contribution at the methodological level, by applying the micro-
simulation logic to the study of social protection in Mexico. As commented before, whilst 
micro-simulation models of tax/benefit systems have been used to analyse the impact of 
public policies in other regions for some time, in Latin America their development is only 
beginning (Lopez Calva and Urzua, 2011). This thesis would represent an initial attempt to 
estimate the potential impact of tax and policy changes by modelling their effects at the 
household level. The application of the ‘model families’ approach allowed the identification 
of the consequences that policy changes had for the welfare of families of different 
population groups. No similar research project of Mexican social policy was found when the 





Contrary to previous work, like Scott’s (Scott, 2013, Esquivel et al., 2011), using the ‘model 
families’ approach permitted the identification of the changes in the vertical and horizontal 
redistributive potential of the policy architecture. In addition, the method enabled a 
comparison of the effects of the principal social programmes across two moments in time for 
which no data from national surveys would be available. 
Finally, the thesis contributes to current theories of Latin American social policy at the 
theoretical level, by complementing current characterisations of the Mexican social 
protection architecture, introduced and consolidated during the twenty-first century. Previous 
studies have identified the liberal features of the reforms in Latin America and Mexico (Dion, 
2010, Bayón, 2009), whilst Barrientos (2009) highlighted their productivist approach too. 
This thesis adds to these current conceptualisations of the welfare model. It quantified the 
effects on family income of the application of the residual and productivist logics to the 
design of policy changes. By estimating the potential combined effects of taxes and benefits 
and their complementarities with the functioning of the export-oriented growth model, the 
thesis revealed the strong link that has emerged between social protection policies and the 
neoliberal economic strategy applied by the last governments. 
The calculations revealed how the new benefits serve as a supplement to the low earnings of 
poor population and enabled the expansion of social protection without increasing payroll 
taxes. Neoliberalism requires low labour costs to gain competitiveness, hence the low taxes 
and minimal benefits established in Mexico. The country would represent a paradigmatic 
case of a neoliberal social policy in the context of a pluralist democracy.  
 
9.5. Limitations of the Research 
Besides the limitations imposed by the methodological approach, already discussed in chapter 
4, there were some aspects of the reform process that were not possible to capture in this 
thesis. First, the scope of the research was on federal policies as they would be delivered in 
the Federal District, but social protection has also been expanded at the subnational level, 
property taxes are paid at that level as well, and there may be variations in the access to 
benefits and services throughout the country, but including these variables would have 





Secondly, except for education, the calculations did not consider different usage rates of 
welfare services and levels of private spending. It was assumed that all families received the 
same services and spent the same proportion of their income on healthcare, but in practice 
there would be variations in usage rate and spending among family types. For example, high 
income families would tend to make less use of public healthcare, whether delivered by 
social insurance or Popular Health Insurance. Micro-simulation models utilising empirical 
data could better capture these variables. 
The research did not evaluate the quality of services and implementation of programmes, or 
specific criteria for the delivery of benefits that were not considered, like the conditions that 
families must meet to remain in the Oportunidades programme, which have been proved to 
have some negative effects that non-beneficiary families would not have (Damian, 2006). In-
depth qualitative research could assess these variables. A final point that was not considered 
was the differences in the minimum pension age of pension programmes; life-cycle 
simulation could be useful to assess such differences. Nonetheless, in spite of all these, the 
thesis does provide a comprehensive assessment of the social protection architecture’s 
redistributive potential and reveals major winners and losers of the reform process, and it 
constitutes an original exercise in the country by the way it captures in such detail the 
redistributive potential of the reforms.  
9.6. Policy Implications 
Given its limitations, the thesis identified several relevant policy implications for the 
improvement of the tax/benefit system redistributive potential. The research has shown how 
the architecture of the system fails to adequately address within its redistributive rationale the 
key challenge of offering comprehensive and equitable level of protection, because of its 
productivist/residual logic and its high degree of fragmentation.  
Morel et al. (2012) emphasise that the presence of an adequate income support system to 
combat poverty and inequality is what distinguishes the ‘social investment’ strategy from 
neoliberalism. In Mexico, the productivist approach has been incorporated without building 
that type of support system. The same authors and others (Nolan, 2013) acknowledge the 
adopting the ‘social investment’ strategy represents the risk of sacrificing current poverty 
levels with the expectation that they will be reduced in the future. This is precisely what has 





out of poverty by seeking opportunities in the labour market, the low wages imposed by the 
neoliberal model would not allow them to do so. 
A first step towards a social policy that offers real protection to Mexican families would be to 
prioritise the construction of a universal income support system. Universalisation can be 
achieved by expanding the social insurance system. The legislation can be reformed to 
mandate the obligatory insurance of groups of workers not currently considered. This would 
offer the entire working population comprehensive income protection against risks like old-
age, illness, disability or maternity. The latter is especially important because currently the 
lack of social insurance coverage can represent a reduction of close to 30 per cent of annual 
income for women in work who give birth. The universalisation of social insurance, a goal 
originally sought with the 1973 reform, would be severely undermined with the system’s 
current fragmentation and inequality. 
Furthermore, the work towards a system of social welfare in Mexico that will be more 
socially just, more economically equitable and more  administratively efficient needs to meet 
the challenges of the following set of reforms:  
 On old-age pensions, the inequalities between social insurance and social assistance 
programmes need to be eliminated and the present system of private individual 
accounts must be reversed to reduce administration fees and increase returns. A three 
tier system could be created in its place. A basic universal pension to all citizens 
above the pension age, a second tier of pay-as-you-go pensions, and a third tier of 
individual capitalisation, could be its basic architectures, preferably with only one 
administrator under state control.   
 Family policy needs to lose its strong productivist and residual components. Benefit 
amounts should guarantee a minimum income that will at least allows all families 
reach the lowest poverty line. Benefits should be paid for each child regardless of 
their age or school grade, to make sure that all families receive adequate support.  
Targeting should be replaced by an approach that offers benefits to all or at least the 
majority of families, as the proposal of ‘basic universalism’ recommends (De Ferranti 
et al., 2003). It would be convenient to integrate family policy and social insurance 
benefits under an integrated system, which would not only reduce administrative 





 Healthcare programmes, as well as childcare, must also be unified under the same 
systems, to reduce fragmentation and inequalities. As it has been recommended 
(Laurell, 2007), the country needs to implement a universal healthcare system, 
accessed as a right of citizenship, free at the point of service. Regarding childcare, an 
option could be to unify social insurance and social assistance services under one 
system that could be accessed by any women in work, subsidised by the state. 
 On housing, as more people join social insurance, they will have the opportunity to 
contribute to their housing fund. State intervention should be enhanced to reduce high 
costs generated by the marketization of public housing programmes. To improve 
housing conditions of people who do not have a housing fund, income support to pay 
rents could be incorporated, in addition to keeping subsidies for self-built solutions,.     
The question that remains is how to fund increases to social spending that the creation of a 
universal income protection system would represent. Levy (2012, 2008) has put forward a 
proposal to break with the current fragmentation by introducing a universal social protection 
system funded by increases to consumption taxes. This would not be an optimal option; not 
only because those types of taxes are highly regressive, but because real wages have fallen 
dramatically in Mexico, so any increase in consumption taxes will hamper even more the low 
earnings of poor families.  
Income protection could still be funded by social insurance contributions. Available resources 
for the social insurance system would increase as more people are insured.  But family 
policy, healthcare, childcare and other benefits could be funded by increasing the income tax 
base. Special conditions like the minor taxpayers regime for the self-employed need to be 
eliminated, as they mostly benefit high-income population. There is scope to increase 
marginal rates at the top of the income scale. Among OECD countries, Mexico has the lowest 
collection rates of income tax, 5.2 per cent of GDP compared to an average of 11.3 per cent 
in 2010 (OECD, 2012), whilst it is also the most unequal, average income of the top decile 
represents 27 times the average income of the first decile (OECD, 2011).  
Above all, what is required is the dismissal of the neoliberal economic model and the 
promotion of domestic markets. An increase to the minimum wage could be a starting point. 
It is not suggested that wages rise to the same levels of Mexico’s North American trade 





proven to be an effective tool to fight poverty in other Latin American countries like Brazil 
(Filgueira and Reygadas, 2010). Gradual increases could be introduced to reduce inflationary 
pressures. This option would help to raise living standards without immediate increases of 
benefit amounts and social spending. The growth of internal markets would be promoted as 
families increase their consumption levels. 
All these measures could represent steps towards a more just and equal social protection, but 
without major political changes, any expectations for social reforms should be kept low. Yet, 
the presence of a pluralist political system generates some hope. Electoral competition has 
helped to expand social protection to groups of the population previously excluded. Perhaps 
its further consolidation could open spaces for social mobilisation, in spite of the 
fragmentation of the social protection system. 
9.7.   Avenues for Future Research 
Several possible avenues for future research have been identified throughout the thesis. The 
natural next step would be to update the research with policy changes introduced after 2012. 
The transformation of Mexican social protection continues at an accelerated pace. Five major 
changes have been introduced during the last year. Just at the national level, recent changes 
include the creation of the programme ‘Crusade against Hunger’, income tax reform, the 
creation of an unemployment insurance programme, the expansion of non-contributory 
pensions and the reform of the Oportunidades programme. In theory, these reforms may 
appear as an extension of social protection, but in practice they could be masking the 
consolidation of the neoliberal model. Further research is needed to estimate their impact of 
at the household level.  
Another step that could be taken would be to continue the research on the Mexican 
tax/benefit system with the construction of micro-simulation models. As mentioned, these 
models have been in operation for a considerable time in other region (e.g. EUROMOD) In 
Latin America, their development is still incipient. They would allow estimating the effects 
of tax and social policies after their implementation, hence producing an evaluation of how 
the system really works, which could be compared on research based on ‘model families’ to 
explore distances between policy design and implementation. One advantage of micro-
simulation models would be that they could cover a wider range of family types. Two 





benefits and services as in theses thesis because of the lack of available data. Further 
inclusion of variables associated to the payment of taxes and the provision of benefits and 
services in national surveys could solve the latter problem in the future. 
Life-cycle simulation models, like the one developed by Evans and Williams (2009) for the 
United Kingdom, could prove to be useful tools for the assessment of redistribution in 
Mexico. They could be especially valuable to estimate the effects of the social insurance 
benefits that persons receive during their lives and would allow the modelling of differences 
in eligibility criteria like the pension age of different pension programmes. One problem 
would be the lack of data to simulate historical effects, but they could be applied in the future 
studies if the variables are available in national surveys. 
Social protection has also been transformed at the subnational level. During the hegemonic 
party regime, social policy interventions at this level were practically inexistent. As multi-
party electoral democracy has settled in the country and parties in local governments have 
alternated, activity in the social policy field at the state and municipal levels has rapidly 
expanded. The pioneer was the Federal District government, with the introduction of the 
programme of universal non-contributory old-age pensions in the early 2000s, several 
programmes have been introduced since then and other states have followed. In addition, 
some taxes like property taxes are determined and collected by local governments. The 
redistributive effects of tax/benefit systems mounted by state governments could be assessed 
by applying ‘model families’. 
Another step could be to embark on cross-national comparative research not only with other 
Latin American countries, but also with countries of other regions where social protection has 
also been expanded in recent years, like Southern Africa and East and Southeast Asia. Given 
the wide variety of social protection tools that policy-makers have at their disposition and the 
differences in the reform models observable in the design of reforms in different countries, it 
is necessary to identify which alternatives have the strongest potential of reducing levels of 
poverty and inequality. Applying ‘model families’ to cross-national research in these 
countries, as it has been applied in countries with advanced welfare states (Bradshaw and 
Tokoro, 2014, Eardly et al., 1996, Bradshaw et al., 1993), would reveal the reform models 





In-depth qualitative research would be necessary to assess the actual access, conditions and 
quality of benefits and services, and hence to investigate their real impact on the welfare of 
families. In this respect, the ethnographic research of Escobar and Gonzalez de la Rocha 
(2004) on the effects of the Oportunidades programme has been highly valuable in revealing 
deficiencies with its design and implementation. Similar research must be conducted on all 
social programmes, but the areas that require immediate attention are the new social 
assistance programmes, like ’70 and more’ and Popular Health Insurance, where the 
government reports high coverage percentages and spending amounts, and which indeed 
seem to have a positive impact on vertical redistribution, as this study has shown, but yet 
reports of serious deficiencies with their operation are constantly emerging.   
It is also necessary to further investigate the political economy of the emergence and 
consolidation of the neoliberal social protection model. Dion (2010) provides an 
unprecedented and complete explanation of the drivers of the origins and initial development 
of social insurance in Mexico, but her analysis of the recent reform process has been 
criticised for lacking the same level of profoundness (Rath, 2014, Middlebrook, 2011). 
Chapter 7 of the thesis suggested some variables that would seem to have a strong impact in 
the policy changes and continuities adopted during the last decades. Applying different 
institutional and ideational approaches could yield a better understanding of why the Mexican 
tax/benefit systems has evolved with such a low redistributive potential, and what are the 
political, social and economic conditions that could be modified to promote the institutional 
and policy changes necessary to construct a more just and equal system. 
Finally, more research might be needed on the dynamics between the economic model, social 
policy and the informal economy. Indeed informality is commonly cited as one of the 
obstacles for the development of Latin American countries.  As this thesis has shown, new 
social benefits subsidise informality and would in fact end up reproducing it. But further 
research is needed on additional factors that have created the country’s large informal 
economy. Dion (2010) suggests that in the context of an open economy, the government has 
accepted and promoted the informalisation of the labour market to pursue economic growth. 
The author argues that by being unable to combat corruption, tax evasion and precarious 
employment, the government increases the competitiveness of the economy based on low 
labour costs. This process was discussed in chapter 7 of the thesis. Still, the question would 





to intentional actions or economic constrains, and institutional or cultural legacies. A better 
understanding of the determinants of informality could generate policy alternatives to combat 
it even under a liberalised economy.  
9.8. Concluding Remarks 
The research conducted for this thesis has revealed the productivist, residual and fragmented 
expansion of the Mexican social protection system. Levels of vertical redistribution have 
been increased, which is what would be expected from the introduction of social assistance 
programmes. But the analysis of horizontal redistribution showed that the emphasis has been 
put on the welfare of family types that are deemed to require support for the incorporation of 
their members to labour markets, since this is seen as the main mechanism for families to 
improve their living standards through their own effort. Benefit levels of new programmes 
are minimal since their main objective is not to combat poverty and inequality, but rather to 
enable the incorporation of people into the labour market, hence are not sufficient to raise 
living standards of poor families above minimum poverty thresholds. Because of their 
residual nature, the new programmes exclude large number of low income families that do 
not qualify for them but who would still need support from the government to improve their 
living standards.  
Across employment status, redistribution has been directed towards families of low income 
workers that lack social insurance, who tend to be in precarious employment. The tax/benefit 
system ends up reproducing informality. Levels of support for families with earners in formal 
employment have not been increased, and as was the case of pensions, have actually been 
reduced for the majority of them. Labour market attachment still defines access to benefits 
and segments the population.  
The final result is a fragmented system that offers unequal levels of protection to different 
sectors of the population, who receive different benefit levels, from different programmes 
administered by different government agencies. Even if the ‘truncated’ nature of the social 
protection has been broken, the expansion has ended up reproducing the segmentation of the 
population. Instead of combating inequality, the social policy reinforces it.  
The system serves as a complement to the neoliberal economic model. Fiscal and social 





competitiveness of the country in the context of a highly liberalised economy. New social 
benefits supplement low wages and offer an alternative to the expansion of social protection 
without funding from payroll taxes.  
Interestingly, these reforms also took place during the period of the consolidation of a 
pluralist democratic regime in Mexico. Indeed, it might be argued that neoliberalism was the 
corollary of pluralist democratic politics. However, correlation should not be confused with 
causation. So what in fact should be argued is that contrary to the post war political 
experience in Europe where a process of democratising capitalism resulted in the creation of 
extensive welfare states, in Mexico the process of democratic consolidation in Mexico took 
place amidst a neoliberal elite consensus. The social policy agenda was captured by 
neoliberal priorities and rationales that framed the direction of reforms, ensuring that 
alternative policy options were ‘filtered out’. At the end only those that were compatible with 
the neo-liberal consensus were considered, like the social investment perspective. 
The prospects for the transition towards a more just and equal social protection are not 
optimistic. No expansion of coverage of social insurance programmes that offer integral 
protection should be expected. Low benefit levels that are not tied to workers contributions 
would create disincentives for the expansion of social insurance coverage. Feedback effects 
would generate obstacles to the unification of the system and it should be expected that the 
segmentation becomes more rigid. 
None of the reforms introduced after 2012 break with the productivist/residual logic. They 
represent more residual benefits, like the ‘Crusade against Hunger’, more social assistance 
programmes like non-contributory pensions to compensate for the retrenchment of social 
insurance pensions; more productivist programmes that are ineffective to combat poverty, 
like the expansion of Oportunidades; and the only reform that would appear to extend 
protection like the unemployment insurance programme, does not do that because it is funded 
by the retrenchment of housing programmes. 
Mexico is one among the few Latin American countries where poverty and inequality have 
not been reduced during the twenty-first century (UNDP, 2014). As this thesis has shown, the 
social protection architecture that has been erected in recent years represents one of the 
reasons for these failures. The fragmentation of Mexican society is reinforced by the 





system of better and more equal benefits and services. Unless political change is promoted, it 
is unlikely that any significant progress will be made in the near future towards the 
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